

Research Initiative on Democratic Reforms in Ukraine (RIDRU)



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The Research Initiative on Democratic Reforms in Ukraine

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About RIDRU

The Research Initiative on Democratic Reforms in Ukraine (RIDRU) (<http://ridru.artsrn.ualberta.ca/>) was a University of Alberta (U of A)-led research project that brought together leading scholars to explore ongoing democratic reform in the government of Ukraine in three key areas: nationalities, culture and language policies (NCLP), higher education (HE) reform, and law and governance (L&G)—both as they emerged in Ukraine and impacted the diaspora in Canada and beyond during the 2015–18 period. The team of fourteen researchers from nine universities in North America, Europe, and Asia worked to analyse, document, and theorize the epochal transition of Ukraine’s government from a post-Soviet command system to a European democratic model of governance.

This interdisciplinary/comparative project was supported by four funding bodies, namely: the Kule Institute of Advanced Study (KIAS) and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS), both at the University of Alberta; the Ukrainian Resource and Development Centre (URDC) at MacEwan University; and the non-profit community organization Alberta Foundation for Ukrainian Education Society (AFUES).

The research project studied the Ukrainian government’s democratic reform programme and its ongoing implementation with a view to assessing its feasibility, tracking its progress, formulating recommendations on its further development, and making policy recommendations for not only Ukraine but also for EU-Ukraine and Canada-Ukraine relations. In 2015, the Ukrainian government under President Poroshenko had set as its primary foreign economic policy goal the acquisition of membership in the EU. The deadweight, however, of authoritarian politics, crony capitalism, and Soviet-style bureaucracy were/are formidable obstacles to the success of any reform programme along Western lines, not to mention the inertia of over twenty years of half-hearted or no reforms. As the February 2014 Revolution and the unrelenting violent conflict indicated, Ukraine’s situation was close to desperate. It is within this context that RIDRU aimed to explore these reforms.

Project participants

For practical purposes and to capitalize on the scholarly strengths at the University of Alberta, the project selected three key areas of the government’s reform policy on which to concentrate initially. They are good governance and the rule of law (L&G), post-secondary education reform (HE), and nationalities and language policies (NCLP). While the overall project was lead by Dr. Olenka Bilash, she worked closely with each of the three research cluster leaders to build research capacity at the University of Alberta.

Good governance and the rule of law was explored by a team of researchers around the world under the leadership of Dr. Bohdan Harasymiw. Participants included:

Joanna Harrington	Specialist in International Law, Constitutional law, and Comparative constitutional law
Faculty of Law, University of Alberta	
Linda C. Reif	Specialist in International Trade Investment Law; International Business Transactions; International Human Rights Law; Comparative Law
Faculty of Law, University of Alberta	
Wayne Renke	Expertise in evidence; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Counter-Terrorism
Faculty of Law, University of Alberta	
Thomas Hueglin	Expertise in constitutional issues and federalism
Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University	
Olena Hankivsky	Expertise in processes of democratization
Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University	
Anastasiya Salnykova	Expertise in processes of democratization
PhD Candidate, Political Science, Simon Fraser University	
Juliet Johnson	Expertise in the EU, post-communist Europe, and politics and money
Professor, Political Science, McGill University	
Lucan Way	Expertise in democratization and authoritarian democracy
Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto	
Brian D. Taylor	Expertise in reform of law enforcement bodies
Professor, Maxwell School of Government, Syracuse University	
Allan Siaroff	
Professor of Political Science, University of Lethbridge	

“Establishing a western system of establishing core competencies in curricula” and “public student accessibility to future universities” are two reforms explored by a second team of international experts lead by Dr. Olenka Bilash, Dr. Jerry Kachur and Dr. Roman Petryshyn. The Higher education cluster consisted of:

Roman Petryshyn	Specialist in International development in Ukraine
Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta	
Jerry Kachur	Specialist in Comparative education
Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta	
Olenka Bilash	Specialist in higher education
Professor, University of Alberta	
Anatoly Oleksiyenko	Specialist in higher education in Ukraine and post-Soviet contexts
Professor, University of Hong Kong	
Serhij Kvít	Expertise in organization and management of post-secondary education.
President, NaUKMA and Minister of Education, Ukraine	
Olena Hankivsky	Expertise in processes of democratization.
Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University	
Ivan Kozachenko	Expertise in diaspora studies
Post-doc, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta	
Tamara Martsenyuk	Expertise in gender studies
Professor, NaUKMA	
Svitlana Oksamytyna	Expertise in study abroad
Professor, NaUKMA	

Dr. Alla Nedashkivska lead a third research team and explored the government of Ukraine's strategic plan to undertake a programme of support for national language as well as a reform of state policy in the area of culture. Cluster participants included:

Alla Nedashkivska	Specialist in Ukrainian linguistics, language politics, media and discourse analysis studies
Professor, University of Alberta	
Olenka Bilash	Specialist in language education and educational reforms
Professor, University of Alberta	

Volodymyr Kulyk	Specialist in Ukrainian national identity, language policy and language attitudes, ethnopolitics and media discourse
Head research fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine	
Svitlana Zhabotynska	Specialist in cognitive and neurophysiological linguistics, Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism
Professor, the Department of English Philology, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National University in Cherkasy, Ukraine	
Holger Kusse	Specialist in cultural linguistics, politolinguistics, philosophy of language
Professor, Department of Slavic Studies, Dresden Technical University	
Galina Yavorska	Expertise in sociolinguistics, lexical semantics, discourse analysis, global and security studies. She researches relationships between language and politics focusing on language ideologies and language loyalty
Professor, the National Institute of Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine	
Marianna Novosolova	Expertise in cultural linguistics and pragmatics
PhD student and research associate, Department of Slavic Studies, Dresden Technical University	
Svitlana Krys	Expertise in comparative literature, current cultural reforms in Ukraine, particularly, the literary sphere
Assistant Professor, MacEwan University	

We also relied upon the technological skills and creativity of Mr. Oleksandr Pankieiev to work on the RIDRU website and the Faculty of Arts team under the leadership of Mr. Clare Peters to manage our online conferences and recorded symposia. We wish to acknowledge the Faculty of Education's instructional technology team—headed by Mr. Shane Klein—for overseeing the online recordings of presentations. Further, we extend gratitude to Mr. Oleksandr Pankieiev and Ms. Adriana Onita for monitoring the live interaction during our online conferences, and to Mr. Oleksandr Pankieiev for his intercultural and technological expertise overseeing the Kharkiv hub of our final online conferences. Finally, special thanks are extended to Susan Rajakaruna for her superb management skills during the first years of the project.

Project goals

The overall goal of the project was to analyse and document the epochal transition of the government of Ukraine from a post-Soviet command system model to a European democratic model of governance. As an interdisciplinary and comparative research project it positioned the University of Alberta as a leading centre internationally on this topic. It also built up several of the University's

research areas of strength and fit within three objectives of the University of Alberta's *Comprehensive Institutional Plan*: Talented People; Learning, Discovery, and Citizenship; and Connecting Communities.

The project was envisaged as (a) establishing three research teams of experts drawn from various disciplines in North America and Europe (b) building broader capacity toward research explorations in Ukraine through graduate student support, research project funding and reporting, and a series of on-line seminars; (c) implementing state-of-the-art computer communication, research reporting, and archiving systems; and (d) disseminating research findings through electronic conferences and peer-reviewed proceedings, and accessible archives.

Project activities and outcomes

To achieve its goals, RIDRU members and partners engaged in constructing new knowledge, building student capacity, developing a website, experimenting with different communication technologies, modeling long-term digital conferencing for educational and research purposes, sharing information with communities, and strengthening and expanding relationships with partner institutions.

Constructing new knowledge - RIDRU contributed funds to conduct two new research studies about language use in Ukraine; invited 26 new presentations from international experts in all three clusters, most of which were recorded on the website; organized online conferences and specialized symposia with 110 sessions; and produced this peer reviewed collection of articles. We created an international innovative project with active contributors from Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, England, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, The Netherlands, Poland, Scotland, Spain, Ukraine, and the USA and interest from people in many additional countries.

Building student research capacity - RIDRU provided specialized skill training strategies and knowledge creation and mobilization for students and faculty in multiple ways: offering research opportunities to 11 undergraduate researchers and 6 graduate students and introducing new forms of knowledge mobilization tools such as a Three-minute thesis contest and a White Paper team contest for Ukrainian graduate students. The accompanying guidebooks are further examples of training and mentoring of students and faculty.

Developing a collaborative website - This inter-disciplinary research project documenting, analyzing, and interpreting three reforms in Ukraine was recorded on a website under the domain name of the Research Initiative for the Democratic Reform of Ukraine (RIDRU):

<http://ridru.artsrn.ualberta.ca/> The site will be archived at the University of Alberta through ERA and as such will be available to researchers for decades to come.

Experimenting with different communication technologies - Although our team had had experience communicating through email, establishing a website, and organizing an online conference, we ventured into new territory with the internationally accessible online speaker series and the interactional blended learning online conferences, including one with two "live" hubs. We also accessed:

Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/Research-Initiative-on-Democratic-Reforms-in-Ukraine-RIDRU-1147052395390266>

Twitter and Youtube channel. We also noted that use of Twitter was not possible in Ukraine during the on-line conference; however, feedback was provided through the Facebook page and a Youtube channel. Special thanks to Oleksandr Pankieiev and Adriana Onita who attended to these interactions during the conferences.

Modelling long-term digital conferencing for educational and research purposes - RIDRU fully embraced the need for academics to combat their carbon footprint by moving into online research exchanges. Reaching an audience of specialists that is dispersed around the world also makes online conferencing suitable for RIDRU. Google analytics shows that we attracted 7,217 different users and 20, 284 sessions.

Sharing information with communities, developing a broad email distribution list and notifying the public of upcoming events of our project - In the spirit of community-university engagement and community engaged scholarship, the project enhanced awareness of policy development as related to governance of reforms. It enhanced partnerships, training and skill development for those outside of academia. Through community outreach we offered multi-modal information and events to over 5,000 local readers for community education (e.g., Ukrainian Canadian Congress-Alberta Provincial Council), and 400 international contacts. Linkages at the host U of A were strengthened within and between faculties (e.g., Faculty of Education, Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Law, Arts Collaborative Enterprise, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies); between other Canadian, American, Asian, and European universities (e.g., with MacEwan University, University of Washington, Indiana University, University of Hong Kong, and Dresden Technical University); with partners in Ukraine (e.g., with UCU, NaUKMA, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National University in Cherkasy, the National Institute of Strategic Studies in Kyiv, and Karazin University in Kharkiv).

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Introduction

Since the Euromaidan conflict of 2013-2014 Ukraine has struggled to realize a far-reaching slate of reforms. While the nation's government has indeed introduced measures to revamp local governance, its citizens remain skeptical that post-Soviet-style corruption has legitimately been mitigated. Reforms in governance, education, and healthcare push the country in the direction of Europe, while lethargic political will in national institutions undercuts progress. Further, conflict in the Donbas region with Russian-backed groups continues to intensify already strained Ukraine-Russia relations. After the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections, Ukrainians are left to navigate a stalled anti-corruption court system, slow economic privatization, shortage of effective legislation, unresolved military conflict with Russia in Donbas, and illegal Russian annexation of Crimea. In this context the following collection of articles, presented at the online conferences of the *Research Initiatives of the Democratic Reform of Ukraine (RIDRU) 2015-2018*, deals with issues of democratic reform, language, and identity.

We begin with *Implementing Ukrainian Law in Higher Education*, wherein former Minister of Education and Science for Ukraine Serhiy Kvit provides an examination of Ukraine's effort to implement the recent law "On Higher Education." Based in pro-democratic sentiment regarding the governance of universities, the law calls for operational university autonomy. Here we have a compelling account of the formation of the law, measures taken towards its practical implementation, as well as a discussion of the threats and challenges Ukraine faces in higher education going forward.

Building on this understanding of the legal measures, *Higher Education Reform Development* assesses the degree to which Ukrainian universities have implemented the reforms required by the Bologna Process. Yuliya Zayachuk's findings are interpreted through the goals of the process and through a survey of the literature on internationalization in higher education. The result is an informative update on the state of higher education in Ukraine. Additionally, part of the paper is based on recent interviews conducted with professors from two other participant European universities—Berlin's Humboldt University and the University of Turku in Finland. The perspective gleaned from these institutions helps shed light on how the movement towards internationalization is perceived across Europe.

Progress on Ukraine's Reform on Student Government follows up with an account of grass-root issues faced by student government leaders in Ukraine. Based on a survey with faculty and students and interviews with student leaders, Olenka Bilash provides needed context to legal reforms, and simultaneously makes suggestions as to how student government operations might themselves be fortified.

Fleshing out the notion of reform, *Reforming Ukrainian Health Care and Education* compares the policymaking activities of two Ukrainian parliamentary committees—the Committee for Health Care and the Committee for Science and Education—as a means of assessing the process of democratic transitions in post-Euromaidan Ukraine. Readers are offered an intriguing glimpse into fledgling democratic machineries at play in Ukraine. Of particular note is the way in which Oleh Orlov discusses the concept of "reform" as it is utilized by members in each committee.

In *The Impact of Geopolitical and Military Parameters on Inclusive Education Reform in Ukraine and Crimea*, Roman Petryshyn reveals how quickly progress on inclusive education in Crimea was reversed, after the Russian Federation illegally annexed Crimea. Using Chong and Graham's three-level "nested" framework, policies and practices in inclusive education from 2003 to 2014, when Crimea was an autonomous republic within Ukraine, are compared to those of 2014 to 2017, after the annexation Crimea.

The sixth paper, *Dominance of Ukrainian in the Bilingual Setting: Neurocognitive Factors*, shifts focus to the notions of language and identity and considers the complex interactions of Ukrainian and Russian language dominance from a number of angles. It is held that a portion of bilingual Ukrainians speak Russian as their dominant language, and that this creates anxiety on an individual as well as on a societal level. With the fluid socio-political atmosphere of Ukraine, and in consideration of the present tension with Russia, Svitlana Zhabotynska explores the effects of a Russian-dominant bilingualism.

In *The Concept of Language Praising*, the role of language in cultural identity is explored, with specific attention paid to the concept of language praising in the textual record. Holger Küsse explains how diverse languages are valued for varied reasons, but holds that the tendency to value highly one's nationality through language praise is indeed universal. A wide range of evidence is offered to illuminate the breadth of the issue. Of particular note is the author's compelling discussion of language equality and language superiority.

Lastly, *Swinging between Christian Forgiveness and Military Pathos in the Ukrainian Mass Poetical Discourse Since 2013* takes a discerning look at the extant anxieties in the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians. "Mass poetic discourse," or rather, classical and popular online poetry alike, is shown to reflect these uncertain and embattled linkages. Marianna Novoslova explores representations of the brotherly pathos and military aggression imbedded in Russia-Ukraine relations through their depictions in post-Maidan works, contributing a novel perspective on the state of the Ukrainian identity and its perception of the conflict with Russia.

Together, these articles offer information on the current state of democratic reformations in Ukraine, insight into the role of language in shaping identities in bilingual regions, and perspective on the ambivalence underpinning the Russia-Ukraine conflict. A careful reading offers reason for both encouragement and despair, yet the way forward becomes only clearer.

Chapter 1 — Implementing Ukrainian Law in Higher Education: Successes and Challenges

Serhiy Kvit

(Kyiv-Mohyla Academy)

Abstract

This article includes a list of the most important issues related to the task of implementing the new Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” with all its related orders and decisions of the Ukrainian government—and particularly of the Ministry of Education and Science. The author narrates the preparation of the law, outlines the logic behind each steps, points to examples of conservative reaction from elements of the academic community, and discusses various threats and challenges to the law’s implementation. The article is based on Kvit’s speech at the Symposium of Higher Education Cluster of the Research Initiative on Democratic Reform in Ukraine (RIDRU) at the University of Alberta, December 8-9, 2016.

Key words: law on higher education, implementation, autonomy, quality assurance, research.

Introduction

For two years, starting from the second part of 2014 until mid-2016, a thorough analysis of the implementation of the Law of Ukraine, “On Higher Education,” was undertaken by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, particularly regarding the elaboration and adoption of a number of bylaws (more than thirty resolutions and Orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and more than sixty Orders of the Ministry) and also regarding meetings, seminars, and training sessions with representatives of higher education institutions and student government. It is important to understand that this was possible thanks to the critical role of the team of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, which worked with the Ministry during that period.

I would like to start by introducing the story of the Law of Ukraine, “On Higher Education,” providing an overview of these laws, then proceeding to the main problems that have emerged during their implementation. I will provide an overview of conservative reaction to the law and its implementation in the latter half of 2016, and, finally, I will focus on the issue of academic quality assurance in post-secondary institutions in Ukraine.

This paper was revised and submitted in 2018.

Progressive Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” (2014)

The story of the adoption of the Law of Ukraine, “On Higher Education,” is a good example of how the academic community and student activists can realize their aspirations even in extremely adverse circumstances. Actual work on this law began with opposition to attempts by Viktor Yanukovych’s regime to impose the Russian style of governance in various fields in Ukraine, including in higher education. This model reflects the following principles: total centralization, mutual distrust, and political loyalty. In November 2010, then Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine, Dmytro Tabachnyk, presented the bill, “On Higher Education,” which was based on the principle of centralization, more rigidly, even, than in Soviet times. His purpose was to build a tiered power structure: the President of Ukraine would stand at the top, the Minister of Education in the middle, and the Rector at the bottom. No space was left for university autonomy or freedom of speech.

The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy publicly opposed such legislative initiatives. Tabachnyk expected his Bill to be endorsed in the Parliament by the beginning of 2011. An all-Ukrainian mass protest campaign called “Against the Degradation of Education” took place between 2010 and 2013, organized mainly by public youth organizations and student self-government.

In 2012-2013, a specially created working group was involved in elaborating the text and then in promoting the draft law, “On Higher Education.” In the end, the victory of the Revolution of Dignity enabled its adoption. The new law was approved by Parliament on July 1 and came into effect on September 6, 2014. It is based on the concept of comprehensive autonomy for universities across three domains: academic, financial, and organizational. The law introduced a third cycle of education (i.e., the PhD), and also emphasized the necessity of interdisciplinarity, integration of higher education and scientific research, protection of intellectual property, internationalization, and more.

Disadvantages of the law were tied to the main principle of the working group—moving forward only through consensus. Since it was important to maintain the unity of all stakeholders (universities, the Academies of Sciences, students, employers, trade unions, independent experts, and others) in opposition to the political regime, it was decided to bypass discussing all sensitive issues—anything unacceptable to at least one stakeholder—in order to reach consensus, thereby leaving many items unresolved and without guidance from legislation. For example, the right to scholarships was legislated at the level of minimum cost of living (knowing that this was inadequate) for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the state did not have sufficient funds to provide a minimum scholarship payment that matched the cost of living. Also, the establishment of a PhD program with Western standards and practices was stifled on account of the residual Soviet concept of a Doctor of Science (a weak analogue to the Doctor habilitatus in Germany and Poland).

Later, during implementation, we observed that it was impossible to convince all members of the academic community of the need for various reforms, reforms that would affect important

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stakeholder interests, which are guaranteed in the current professional culture and which were often simply forms of corruption.

Extremely interesting in-person debates and discussions that later continued online took place at the Kyiv Polytechnical University. Anyone could join the working group, which considered about 4,000 proposals and amendments to the text of the bill, which were offered by more than 100 different organizations. Adoption of the Law “On Higher Education” by the Verkhovna Rada (i.e., the parliament) of Ukraine in the summer of 2014 put a new task onto the agenda—the implementation of the law, which would fundamentally change Ukrainian academic life.

Implementation of the main provisions of the law

It is important to stress that, ideologically, the concept of comprehensive university autonomy does not necessarily imply a specifically neoliberal policy on the reformation of higher education in Ukraine. The Ministry of Education and Science agreed with some ideas of the International Monetary Fund, namely those relating to the need to optimize the inadequate networks of educational institutions at all levels and to align offers of the national education and research system with the needs of industry and the labor market. We also aimed to thwart total state control over the universities' activities. Ukraine inherited all these problems from the Soviet era.

The priorities of our team were the following: Universal access to quality education, decentralization of governance, autonomy of educational institutions, deregulation, reduction of bureaucracy, public-private partnerships, and state-community management.¹ At the same time, the state should assume a substantial role in ensuring social justice and responsibility for educational reforms within a climate of openness and accountability. The liberalization of relations in higher education and research must be consistent with the development of the national economy and must enhance the growth of an academic culture and the international competitiveness of Ukrainian universities.

The temptation to jump from post-Soviet feudalism in higher education to unlimited liberalism threatens to deepen corruption and strengthen the same feudal relations from which we aim to escape. The state should be responsible for formulating and enacting steady policies in higher education and research aimed at raising the quality and international integration of Ukrainian universities, including providing comprehensive university autonomy. On the other hand, universities should be responsible for their own quality. They know best how to do it and therefore must be protected from any political or bureaucratic pressures.

¹ Kvit, S. (2015). The battlefield of civilizations: Education in Ukraine. Kyiv: PH “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.” (p. 147)

Therefore, beginning in the 2015–2016 academic year, a new list of fields of study and sub-disciplines was adopted in Ukraine.² The goal of the Ministry of Education and Science was to bring the Ukrainian list in line with modern international standards. This is one of the key documents necessary for the reformation of the learning process.

The Soviet government considered a university instructor as a person who merely provides the students with knowledge in a classroom. Students' needs for personal professional growth, participation in research and conferences, publications, or even preparation for work were not taken into account. That is why, in the Soviet Union and in contemporary Ukraine, in comparison with Western universities, there were far more (two or even three times more) named disciplines to teach. This, in turn, forced a corresponding increase in the number of fields of study and sub-disciplines.

And so, to ameliorate this discrepancy, what have we done? We reduced this number and gave universities the right to approve their own curricula. Now, a license is granted first for common sub-disciplines. After that, universities' fields of study programs (i.e., specializations) are accredited. We reduced instructors' workloads from 900 to 600 hours per year, and students' workloads to 30 hours from 36 per credit. With enormous efforts, this practice is being introduced gradually as students choose elective courses.

In the approval of a new procedure for awarding academic titles,³ we see the internationalization of this process. For example, for the first time, the level of required proficiency in English has been set at B2 or greater on the Common European Frame of reference Scale. Also, international training and publication in peer-reviewed journals will be required. Such steps are intended to overcome the long-standing policy of self-isolation, which was cultivated in Soviet times and lingers today. Since there have been many so-called scientific journals in Ukraine that were—and still are—virtually unknown to anyone outside the country, and which almost no one reads (except the authors), the new policy of the Ministry encourages Ukrainian academic institutions to promote their journals in professional databases such as (ideally) Scopus and Web of Science. The policy also urges researchers to publish their works in international peer-reviewed journals.

² Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated April 29, 2015, #266 "On approval of the list of fields of studies and narrow fields of studies, which train candidates of higher education"; order of MES of Ukraine, dated November 6, 2015, #1151 "On features of introduction the list of fields of studies and narrow fields of studies, which train candidates of higher education, approved by the resolution of CMU, dated April 29, 2015, #266," registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on November 25, 2015 #1460/27905; order of MES of Ukraine April, dated 12, 2016, #419 "On amending the order of MES of Ukraine, dated November 6, 2015, #1151," registered in the Ministry of Justice on May 6, 2016 #691/28821 (amending the table of correspondences of the list of fields of studies and narrow fields of studies).

³ CMU Resolution, dated August 19, 2015, #656 "Some issues of implementation of Article 54 of the Law of Ukraine" On Higher Education "about awarding academic titles of professor, associate professor, senior researcher"; order of MES of Ukraine, dated January 14, 2016, #13 "On approval of the Procedure of awarding of academic titles to scientific and pedagogical staff," registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on February 3, 2016 #183/28313. The Ministry, supported by the Office of the Fulbright Program in Ukraine, conducted training on "[h]ow to publish in international peer-reviewed journals" in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa. Also, about 2,000 persons had online training.

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The system of training doctoral students was also changed.⁴ Internationalization and professionalization of researchers remains the main goal of doctoral programs. However, now, unlike what programs of study offered the Soviet postgraduate, new PhD programs have more intensive learning processes with a special emphasis on English. For example, two tutors can work with one PhD student; the students must conduct their own research, participate in international conferences, communicate with foreign colleagues, and publish the results of their research in peer-reviewed journals. These changes were brought about with input on the practices and experiences of the Doctoral School of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, founded in 2008.

It may be seen, then, that the development and implementation of new standards of higher education has begun.⁵ In support of this, competitive selection of members of the scientific-methodological council and scientific-methodological commissions of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine was stipulated. Further, guidelines for developing new standards for higher education were prepared. These standards include requirements for content and evaluative metrics at each level of higher education and within each sub-discipline. This includes the awarding of credits according to the European Credit Transfer System and stating the list of competencies, substantive content of training (formulated in terms of learning outcomes), and the requirements of the system of internal educational quality assurance. Importantly, associations of employers now play an important role in shaping standards of higher education.

⁴ Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated March 23, 2016, #261 “On approval of the Procedure of training of higher education applicants PhD degree and doctorate in higher education (research institutions)”; MES order, dated July 14, 2015, #758 “On publication of theses and reviews official opponents,” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on July 22, 2015 #885/2733.

⁵ Order of MES of Ukraine, dated October 27, 2015, #1115 “On amendments to the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine of September 11, 2015 #922,” which established the Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and approved relevant regulations; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated November 27, 2015, #1246 registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on November 11, 2015 #1542/27987 “On approval of the Procedure of competitive selection of members of the Scientific and Methodological Council and scientific-methodical commissions of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated November 26, 2015, #1226 “On establishment of the tender committee for the selection of candidates to the Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated January 14, 2016, #15 “On announcement of competitive selection of members of the Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated January 26, 2016, #53 “On announcement of competitive selection of the members of scientific-methodical commissions (sub) of Higher Education Sector of Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated April 6, 2016 #375 “On approval of the membership of Scientific-methodical commissions (sub) of Higher Education sector of Scientific and Methodological Council of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.” Guidelines on the development of higher education standards were approved. A number of explanatory letters were also sent and training sessions were held on the development of higher education standards. It has already developed a part of the higher education standard and is ready for public discussion and external expertise.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine abolished all regulations that restrict or prevent implementation of the principle of academic autonomy of universities,⁶ as well as those that set some mandatory courses regardless of narrow fields. The “obligatory” status of some educational-professional programs was changed to “recommended.” Previously, these programs set the list of mandatory disciplines for specific areas of training. The practice of enforcing such compulsory curricula dates back to Soviet times, when ideological “Marxism-Leninism” required it. Based on new standards of higher education, universities today have the autonomy to determine their own curricula.

In order to ensure proper implementation of the new law regarding introduction of elective courses, the All-Ukrainian meeting was held in May 2016, during which various models of variable components were presented. Materials for the meeting were sent to all higher education institutions, and the corresponding video was posted on the Internet. In fact, similar arrangements accompanied all key aspects of implementation of the law.

Academic mobility is very an important component of modern higher education, affecting its internationalization.⁷ In addition to adopting necessary implementing documents, the Ministry will

⁶ Order of MES of Ukraine, dated January 26, 2015, #47 “On peculiarities of formation curricula in 2015/2016 academic year”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated March 4, 2015, #235 “On recognition of the void orders of MES of Ukraine, dated October 20, 2004, #811 “On introduction in higher education establishments the course ‘Intellectual Property,’” dated May 21, 2004, #414 “On introduction in higher education establishments the discipline ‘Higher education and the Bologna process’”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated November 9, 2015, #1152 “On recognition of the void order of MES of Ukraine, dated May 24, 2013, #584 “registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on November 23, 2015, #1457 / 27902” (these were canceled provisions about establishment and organization of the state examination Commission in the higher education establishments of Ukraine); Order of MES of Ukraine, dated December 28, 2015, #1363 “On recognition of the void order of MES of Ukraine, dated December 8, 1995, #340,” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on January 14, 2016 #55/28185 (this was a repealed provision about the organization of external studies at higher educational establishments of Ukraine); Order of MES of Ukraine, dated December 28, 2015, #1364 “On recognition of the void some orders” (these were canceled orders of MES of Ukraine, dated July 31, 1998, #285 “On the procedure of development components of regulatory and educational providing of training in higher education”). Before the adoption of the law, there were some documents that regulated the organization of educational processes in universities that were contrary to the principles of autonomy and triggered conflicts in their practical use, namely: Order of MES of Ukraine, dated December 30, 2005, #774 “On introduction of credit-modular system of organization of educational process,” Order of MES of Ukraine, dated February 6, 1993, #161 “Regulation on the organization of educational process in higher education establishments,” Order of MES of Ukraine, dated January 23, 2004, #48 “Temporary Regulation on the organization of educational process in the credit-modular system of training specialists,” Order of MES of Ukraine, dated October 16, 2009, #943 “Guidelines on implementation of the European Credit Transfer System and its key elements.” Given the above, the MES of Ukraine abolished the Order, dated December 30, 2005, #774, which obliged all universities to introduce a credit-modular system of educational process on specific areas (courses) and other documents related to this issue.

⁷ CMU Resolution, dated August 12, 2015, #579 “On approval of the Procedure of the right to academic mobility”; Order #1184, dated November 18, 2015, “On amendments to the technical requirements for the hardware and software of Unified State Education Electronic Database” to provide a Unified State Education Electronic Database accounting training to higher education applicants on a program of academic mobility. The ministry conducted three expanded arrangements on the internationalization of higher education for vice-rectors and heads of international departments. They discussed issues of academic mobility, foreign student training, the recognition of educational documents, as well as opportunities to participate in EU programs like Erasmus + and Horizon 2020. Also, in cooperation with the national center of academic

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make special arrangements for vice-rectors and heads of international departments of universities. It will also clarify various issues regarding academic mobility, foreign students, and the recognition of educational documents. The law facilitates opportunities to participate in European Union programs like Erasmus + and Horizon 2020. Academic mobility of Ukrainian students is provided for by the relevant regulations. It is important that understanding of academic mobility and internationalization of higher education—one of the main objectives of the Bologna Process—grow in Ukraine. Of course, there can be no academic mobility without knowledge of English.

Rejection of Soviet rules meant abolishing the previously mandatory three-year period spent working in government organizations and enterprises after students completed government-sponsored higher education.⁸ The rule was absurd for three reasons. First, the majority of state budget revenues come from private enterprises, not public. Second, this rule echoes the practice of serfdom which was abolished in the nineteenth century. Third, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three-year rule stopped being enforced, in practice. Nonetheless, universities and various bureaucratic agencies' continued to report it as though it were. The Ministry has since confirmed the right of graduates to make their own choice of workplace.

A number of important steps by the Ministry and the Government have deepened organizational and particularly staffing autonomy in Ukrainian universities.⁹ It is important to emphasize this, which contrasts with previous Ministry intervention in higher education staffing decisions. Current policy priorities include open and transparent elections of rectors, organization of admission committee work, and student transfers. Higher education institutions are also increasingly able to issue their own diplomas, and will, in the future, be able to completely reject state patronage of operational activities. Another step taken by the Ministry was to expand opportunities for foreigners and stateless persons to obtain higher education in Ukraine. Procedures for issuing invitations and long-term visas were approved, and the grounds for implementing universities' legal, organizational, and financial autonomy were developed.

mobility, ENIC UKRAINE in Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv held meetings with heads of universities on the recognition of foreign diplomas of education.

⁸ CMU Resolution, dated April 15, 2015, #216 “On amendments to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine”; dated August 22, 1996, #992, which canceled provision on mandatory working and compensation. A letter was sent, #1/9-309, dated June 26, 2015, with a thorough explanation.

⁹ CMU Resolution, dated December 5, 2014, #726 “Specific issues of implementation of Article 42 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Higher Education,’” adopted guidelines on the specifics of the electoral system and procedures for the election of the head of higher education, as well as specifying the standard contract with the head of higher education); Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated December 23, 2015, #1109 “On approval of the list of qualifying categories and pedagogical titles of teachers and the procedure of their awarding”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated October 5, 2015, #1005 “On approval of recommendations on the competitive selection of replacement of vacant posts of scientific and pedagogical staff and conclusion of their employment agreements (contracts)”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated October 7, 2015, #1015 “On recognition of the void order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine”; dated December 24, 2002, #744; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated June 17, 2016, #688 “On approval of the ballot and election commission protocol of the election of the head of higher education establishment.”

Special attention was paid to documents related to higher education,¹⁰ because along with the rejection of “state diplomas” came the need to regulate mandatory information published on every university diploma. Likewise, procedures were developed to recognize foreign diplomas, certification of higher theological education, as well as degrees and academic titles issued by theological schools.

A number of documents were adopted to strengthen the Unified State Education Electronic Database.¹¹ This database consolidates all data about the movement of students from high school to university graduation, thus helping to regulate the issuance of educational documents. The Unified State Education Electronic Database enables online verification of the authenticity of student identification, diplomas, or certificates at any time. Regaining state control over the issuance of educational documents and student ID, maintaining the Unified State Education Electronic Database, and decentralizing educational document production are all measures that help to curb corruption, more broadly.

Doing so involves the elimination of an artificial monopoly, created for the purpose of private enrichment.¹² Educational documents produced under conditions of monopoly are more expensive than they need to be. We anticipate that in the future, with the consolidation of university autonomy, accumulation of experience, and increased professional responsibility, all information about diplomas issued will be available online through university websites.

¹⁰ CMU Resolution, dated March 31, 2015, #193 “On documents on higher education (degrees) of state standard”; order of MES of Ukraine, dated May 12, 2015, #525 “On approval of forms of higher education (degrees) documents of state standard and annexes, academic transcripts sample,” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 18, 2015 #551/26996; Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated August 19, 2015, #652 “On state recognition of higher theological education documents, degrees and academic titles issued by higher theological education establishments”; Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, dated April 8, 2016, #381 “Some issues of state recognition of documents on higher theological education, degrees and academic titles” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 5, 2016 #678/28808, about Regulations of the Commission on state recognition of higher theological education documents and the Regulations of the Commission on state recognition of documents of degrees and academic titles; MES order, dated June 22, 2016, #701 “On amendments to the order of MES of Ukraine, dated May 12, 2015, #525” (forms of documents on higher education); Order of MES, dated May 5, 2015, #504 “Some issues of recognition in Ukraine of foreign documents on education” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 27, 2015 #614/27059.

¹¹ CMU Resolution, dated April 15, 2015, #229 “On amendments to the Regulations on the Unified State Education Electronic Database”; MES order, dated March 6, 2015, #249 “On approval of Rules for individuals’ and entities’ access to the Register of documents on higher education and Rules for placing the order to create information reproduced in documents on higher education, and accounting of documents on higher education in the Unified State Education Electronic Database”; MES order, dated July 22, 2015, #787 “Regarding the timely introduction of information to USEED (the Unified State Education Electronic Database)”; MES order, dated November 18, 2015, #1184 “On amendments to the technical requirements for the hardware and software of the Unified State Education Electronic Database”; MES order, dated June 17, 2016, #693 “On approval of the Regulation on the Register of higher education establishments of the Unified State Education Electronic Database.”

¹² Information of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine about establishment and operation of the Unified State Database on education and the state enterprise “Inforesurs” for the Committee on Science and Education of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, March 16, 2016: <https://goo.gl/oUiQal>

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The next step aimed at implementing university autonomy was to ensure openness and transparency of higher education establishments' activities by publishing important information on university websites.¹³ In particular, new requirements include posting the statutes of the university, budget, and manning table, and making explicit and public the organization of its learning process, the creation of an Academic Council along with accounts of its decisions, and the creation of an admission committee.

The Ministry has prioritized developing an external independent testing system that applicants use to access universities,¹⁴ and it has clarified the conditions for admission to universities.¹⁵ Previously, external independent testing served only school graduates who wanted to enter undergraduate programs. However, in recent years, a successful experiment was conducted, testing for admission to Master's level law programs across the country. Today in Ukraine, the system of external independent evaluation is the only way students are accepted into universities because it minimizes the threat of corruption at admission. In the future, along with decreasing the number of Ukrainian universities (there are currently 1,000 or more, along with branch institutions) and improving their quality and competitiveness, they will have the right to set their own requirements for admission in addition to testing certificates.

The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine will take care of universities evacuated from the occupied territories.¹⁶ There are 16 such universities and 10 research institutes of the National

¹³ Order of MES of Ukraine, dated February 19, 2015, #166 "Some issues of disclosure of information about activities of higher education establishments"; a number of explanatory letters were sent.

¹⁴ CMU Resolution, dated December 9, 2015, #1013 "On regulation of wage structure, features of indexation and amendments to some legislative acts"; CMU Resolution, dated July 8, 2015, #533, which approved the new regulation on UCEQA and the procedure of external independent evaluation and monitoring the quality of education; MES order, dated October 1, 2014, #1121 "On the program of external independent evaluation for persons who want to obtain higher education after completing secondary education"; MES order, dated January 15, 2016, #20 registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on March 2, 2016 #180/28310 approved the new edition of the Regulation on public observation of external independent evaluation of educational achievements of graduates of secondary schools; MES order, dated December 29, 2014, #1529 "On approval of samples of the Certificate of external testing and its information card, and their technical description" registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on January 19, 2015 #66 / 26511; Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated April 15, 2015, #222 approved the Procedure for involving teachers, researchers and other professionals for the external evaluation; MES order, dated February 3, 2015, #85 "On the order of using premises of education institutions for the EIT" registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on February 18, 2015 #175 / 26620.

¹⁵ CMU Resolution, dated May 11, 2016, #333 "On recognition of the void some resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine"; MES order, dated October 15, 2015, #1085 "On approval Rules of admission to the higher education institutions of Ukraine in 2016," registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine November on 4, 2015 #1351/27796; in November 2015 and in June 2016. Ministry held a number of regional meetings with representatives of universities about organization of admission in 2016.

¹⁶ CMU Resolution, dated October 13, 2015, #935 "Some issues of state higher education establishments, displaced from the area of anti-terrorist operation"; MES order, dated January 26, 2016, #50 "On establishment of the Board of rectors of higher education institutions which are temporarily displaced from the zone of anti-terrorist operation"; MES order, dated May 24, 2016, #560 "On approval of admission to obtain higher and vocational education of persons residing in the

Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Mostly, they stayed within the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions controlled by the Ukrainian government. After all, instructors and students want to be closer to the homes they were forced to leave. However, some institutions moved further west. For example, Vasyl Stus Donets'k National University now operates in Vynnytsia. Displaced universities are mostly very active and participate in many international programs. They have created their own council of rectors. Individuals from occupied territories prefer to apply to these universities.

Implementation of financial autonomy is perhaps the most difficult task facing the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.¹⁷ Because undeclared war continues in Ukraine, the economic situation is only beginning to change for the better. Therefore, there is a need to maintain special control over all state resources. In particular, finances are allocated through the State Treasury—a relic of the Stalinist system. It still manages all university funds. We mention state universities more often since private universities are not yet proportionally significant within the university network. In particular, they do not yet conduct much research and mostly accept applicants based on their ability to pay tuition rather than on academic excellence. Currently, state universities can open bank accounts, and private universities have the right to receive state support for their best competitive programs. The list of paid university services has significantly expanded and requirements for the “typical manning table” were canceled.

With the objective of rejecting the Stalinist system of university funding, which relied on the concept of government order, the Ministry has developed the bill, entitled “On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Financing of Higher Education (Regarding Economic Relations in Higher Education).” We want to move away from the centralized allocation practice of scholarships for a certain number of students in all state universities (the best and the worst, without a clear methodology) and move toward funding only the best universities. Under these new conditions, such

temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine,” registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 31, 2016 #795/28925; MES order, dated June 14, 2016 #667 “On approval of the list of authorized higher education establishments” (a list of universities that can accept students residing in the temporarily occupied territory).

¹⁷ CMU Resolution, dated September 2, 2015, #719 “Issue of own revenues of state and public higher education establishments, scientific and cultural institutions”; Order of MES of Ukraine, dated October 13, 2015, #1082 “On recognition of the void the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, dated January 11, 2014 #26” (abolition of typical staff standards); CMU Resolution, dated August 19, 2015 #634 “On approval of the contract about providing educational services between the higher education establishment and individual (entity)”; CMU Resolution, dated May 20, 2015, #305 “On amendments to the Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated August 27, 2010, #796” (“On approval of the list of paid services that may be provided by education establishments, other institutions and education institutions that belong to the state and municipal property”); CMU Resolution, dated August 26, 2015, #657 “On approval of placing by higher and vocational education institutions on deposit accounts in banks of state sector temporarily free budget funds received for paid services.” The Ministry also developed a bill entitled “On amending some laws of Ukraine concerning the financing of higher education (regarding economic relations in higher education).” The Bill was discussed with representatives of the public, letters were sent to heads of higher education establishments, a number of meetings were held, along with round table discussions with experts, debates, scientific conferences. It was approved by the Board of MES and a special section was created on the site of MES of Ukraine, “The new model of university funding.”

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universities would receive basic funding necessary for their sustenance plus a social fund, development fund, and the state target support fund.

The development of student self-government is one of the priorities of higher education development in Ukraine.¹⁸ Therefore, the Ministry not only issued necessary regulations but also made arrangements to train leaders of student self-government and encouraged them to actively protect students' interests and collaborate with university administrators—for whom they provided explanatory sessions. These measures are necessary because implementation of the principles of university autonomy is possible only with active and critical university communities, including students.

Significant changes were also introduced in the system of licensing and accreditation.¹⁹ The changes focused on the general clarity of the procedure and simplification and elimination of unnecessary bureaucracy. However, they also aimed to preserve rigorous requirements with regard to quality. According to the Law, "On Higher Education," these tasks are the responsibility of the independent National Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education. In the following segment, the challenges and threats posed by the changes will be discussed.

Conservative reaction to reforms and other threats

According to the Law, "On Higher Education," elections to the National Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education were to be held in June of 2015. However, because the elections were corrupt, I, as Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine, did not recognize the results and offered to make amendments to the Law, specifying election procedure and requirements for the candidates—and only after that to hold new elections.²⁰ Because the draft law, "On Higher Education," was created

¹⁸ A number of explanatory letters on various areas of student self-government organizations (some issues of activity, organization of elections, funding, approval of decisions by bodies of student self-government, living in student residence, etc.); Order of MES, dated September 16, 2015, #938 "On recognition of the void the order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine," dated November 15, 2007, "On approval of the Regulation of student self-government"; two all-Ukrainian meetings were held with representatives of the SSO from all Ukraine, as well as a series of trainings for SSO from Kharkiv, Odesa, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Odessa, Lviv, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytsky and Chernivtsi regions; a section was created at the site of MES of Ukraine with all the useful and explanatory materials for students, which were collected from all universities about activities of the student self-government. These were analyzed and clarifying letters on working order were sent out.

¹⁹ Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated December 30, 2015, #1187 "On approval of licensing conditions for educational activities of education institutions"; Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated December 23, 2015, #1117 "On approval of the form of certificate of accreditation of educational program, rules of registration, renewal, issuance, storage and records of certificates"; MES order, dated April 8, 2016, #389 "On licensing of educational activities on third education and research level"; MES order, dated February 25, 2016, #163 "On introduction to USEED (the Unified State Education Electronic Database) of information about MES of Ukraine solution for licensing of educational activities."

²⁰ Kvit, S. (2016). National agency for quality assurance in higher education: expectations and reality. Retrieved from <https://goo.gl/CocY4Z>

within an adversarial climate of opposition by the academic community to the Ministry of Education and political regime, the main goal of the Law's developers was to protect academic freedom and universities' interests from the tyranny of the Ministry. Now, other issues have attracted the spotlight, such as protection of the academic community from a corrupt agency.

Concentrating power related to licensing, accreditation, quality control of higher education, dissertation defence, and academic integrity in one institution is a significant threat to reforms in Ukrainian higher education. After all, the purpose of creating the Agency was to establish a new, powerful body of competent experts to replace corrupt bureaucratic elements. However, the media uncovered stories of plagiarism in the scientific publications of several members of the Agency, including individuals who had intended to become academic chairs. Unfortunately, despite the 2014 Ministry-imposed penalty of stripping academic degrees from scholars caught plagiarizing, doing so still does not mean the end of a professional career in Ukrainian politics, government, or academic society.

We have further evidence, as well, of conservative attempts to resist reforms. For example, on August 12, 2016, the Kyiv Union of University Rectors appealed to the Minister of Education and Science with a request to revise a number of provisions of the Law "On Higher Education," particularly those related to the organization of learning and teaching processes. The Union of Rectors also stated that it did not support a number of elements of the law, the need for which became clear during its implementation. In particular, the law sought clarification of election procedures and requirements for members of the National Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education.²¹ The arrival of the Union of Rector's letter was a signal that the Ministry should not rush reform of Ukrainian higher education.

Such resistance is exemplified by Kyiv District Administrative Court's decision on September 7th to suddenly cancel requirements for publication in international peer-reviewed journals and to require knowledge of English at level B2 in order to complete academic degrees.²² This shows that the current Ukrainian courts can still make striking and far-reaching decisions. Therefore, it is important to keep up the general trend of openness and collaboration with the global academic community, talking in a common language, and keeping in mind international standards of cooperation and competition. The problem is that the Ministry of Education and Science is in fact attempting to reduce the requirements of English language competence and other demands for Ukrainian internationalization in higher education and research.

²¹ Letter of the Union of Rectors of Kyiv Universities to the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine Liliya Hrynevych (#82 / CP, dated August 12, 2016).

²² Resolution of the District Administrative Court in Kyiv #826/11279/16, dated September 7, 2016.

Conclusions

Only a uniform and highly principled position on the part of the wider Ukrainian academic community can ensure the ultimate success of higher education reform. More specifically, Ukrainian universities must actually want to move towards full autonomy and responsibility, as higher education reform means reform of universities themselves. An autonomous university does not imply a feudal fiefdom with a subsistence economy and dominance of post-Soviet management practices; it means the establishment of a modern higher educational institution.

Based on these examples of implementation of the progressive law, “On Higher Education,” which was elaborated and supported by the Ukrainian academic community, and following conservative reaction to it, the best course would be to offer many specific initiatives aimed at implementing these rules and changes in Ukrainian academic life. Therefore, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (KMA) established its own Center for Academic Quality Assurance by a decision of the University Senate on June 24, 2016. There are no other similar centers in Ukraine.

The Center will conduct the following activities:

1. Student surveys on the quality of teaching and quality of study programs and courses.
2. Faculty (i.e., instructors and faculty members) surveys on the academic organization process and on the quality of university management.
3. Employer surveys on the quantity and quality of knowledge and skills they require of their new employees—and those of KMA graduates in particular.
4. KMA alumni surveys about the quality and impact of educational experiences at KMA. This survey will also collect the KMA graduates’ suggestions on possible improvements of the KMA educational process.
5. Improvement of KMA study programs.
6. Professional development of instructors.
7. Assumption of responsibility for academic integrity issues at KMA.
8. Collection of statistical information about university performance regarding, for instance, participation in and the results of national and international rankings, student and faculty quality, and violations of academic integrity.

The Center for Quality Assurance will collaborate with the similarly new KMA Quality Assurance Committee, comprised of representatives of all KMA academic units, as well as student representatives. The KMA Quality Assurance Committee reports to the University Senate and has the task of drafting KMA policies and procedures regarding internal quality control and assurance. The KMA community recognizes the Center and the Committee’s activities as an important step in the development of the University’s corporate culture.

We are finding this project to be of national significance as many Ukrainian universities lack both effective internal quality assurance procedures and quality assurance units. Compounding the problem, while no proper university external quality assessment system yet exists in Ukraine, the

development of both internal and external academic quality assurance measures should be based on the autonomous universities' needs and initiated by universities themselves. The current problem is that for the past several years, Ukraine has benefited from favorable educational legislation, but Ukrainian universities have gained little relevant experience and often fail to recognize quality evaluation and assurance as effective tools for their own development.

The Center has two main tasks: provide effective instruments for internal quality control and assurance at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, and create a model of internal academic quality assurance applicable to other Ukrainian universities. The model should be both functional and reflective of the current situation in the Ukrainian higher education system, which has faced many changes recently, under the provisions of the new Law of Ukraine, "On Higher Education."

Chapter 2 — Higher Education Development: Integration of the Ukrainian Higher Education System into the European and World Educational Space

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Abstract

This paper discusses the latest European higher education reforms in the context of how they are being implemented in Ukraine. The main successes achieved by Ukraine within the framework of the Bologna reforms, as well as the reforms in educational management and governance, are analyzed. The new 2014 Law of Ukraine, “On Higher Education” and resulting opportunities for systemic modernization of higher education in Ukraine are explored. It emphasizes that Ukraine faces many challenges in achieving its reform objectives; however, it has no alternative but to integrate into European higher education spaces.

Keywords: Higher education, Reforms, Bologna, Educational management, Ukrainian higher education system

Like any social institution, the university is in a state of ongoing dynamic change and reform. During any historical period, these changes have a wide spectrum of national, mental, ethnic, and cultural features. Simultaneously, general global trends determining the trajectory of educational development have always existed, currently exist, and will exist in the future.

To survive and thrive under new conditions, universities have had to both compete and cooperate, overcoming obstacles and responding to social challenges and demands through joint efforts. Among other consequences, these changing conditions prompted universities to seek out reciprocal international ties.

This study focuses on the analysis of trends in the European higher education reforms, which act as instruments of integration, internationalization, and globalization. It also focuses on local Ukrainian adaptations of these trends, new dynamics of higher education in Ukraine, and the integration of the Ukrainian system of higher education into European and world educational spaces.

According to researchers in higher education, the world's higher education landscape changed significantly between the middle of 20th Century to the present (Altbach, 2013; Altbach & Knight, 2007; Knight, 2004; Schuetze, 2012; Clark, 1998; Teichler, 2003 & 2004; Mendivil, 2002). Schuetze (2012) points out that the older ideal of the university as liberal, enlightening, accessible, and embodying the public interest is barely recognizable in the contemporary "reformed" institution. According to Schuetze (2012), higher education reforms are not isolated issues, and modern changes in higher education are determined by two groups of factors: 1. External forces and factors of change; 2. University-specific changes.

According to Mendivil (2002), the important aspects of modern changes in higher education systems include the following: internationalization of the public and private sectors of higher education; strategic alliances between universities, corporations, and the public sector; growth in enrollment at all levels and in all models of the system; the development of distance learning; the emergence of virtual universities; curricular flexibility; change in the structures and management bodies of university governance; accreditation and certification of programs and institutions; and the emergence of new tools to ensure academic quality. Mendivil (2002) points out that, within the context of the changes underway in systems of higher education, there has formed a market for higher education services in which traditional providers (i.e., public and private institutions of higher education) compete or coexist with so-called "new providers."

These new commercial providers are mainly occupied with teaching, training, or providing services and do not focus on research per se. Because many of the new providers focus on delivering education across borders, they must be included as actors on the internationalization scene. So, the university has become only one of the actors in today's new "knowledge business." The emergence of the new actors and "providers" is of great interest in understanding the direction of higher education in the immediate future.

Altbach (2013) emphasizes that we are currently in an era of global competition in higher education and he poses this two-part question: how do we deal with it, and what is the role of the European Union and Bologna in this trend? Determining the answers is challenging, but this is also a time of significant global opportunities (Altbach, 2013).

The European Union's influence in higher education is closely associated with academic internationalization, which is a part of the move toward economic and political integration. According to Knight (2004), who studied the problem in detail, "internationalization" means a series of international activities, such as academic mobility for students and teachers, international linkages, partnerships and projects, international academic programs, and research initiatives. It also means the delivery of education to other countries and the inclusion of an international, intercultural, and/or global dimension into the curriculum and teaching and learning process (Knight, 2004).

The EU promoted and lavishly funded programs such as ERASMUS that provided large numbers of university students of EU and developing countries with academic experiences outside their home countries. An important part of this process is the Bologna process.

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At present, European higher education reform strategies take several directions: structural reform (Bologna); reform of educational management and governance; and reforms in higher education funding.

These strategies were the focus of my research in the framework of the Erasmus Program at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany (2011-2012), and at the University of Turku, Finland (2017). To begin, let us examine the first direction of higher education reform—structural reform (Bologna).

Teichler (2004) reports that there were various types of European higher education reforms over the past 20 years, and the Bologna Process was only part of them. Based on semi-structured interviews with four experienced professors in Germany and Finland, their comments reveal diverse understandings of the Bologna process:

“The Bologna Process itself is not an ideology; rather, it is a kind of policy implementing certain values and ideologies.” (J)

“The Bologna Process is not an educational reform but a reform for the labor market.” (R)

“The Bologna Process is nothing more than an economic philosophy of how to differentiate a population for the market.” (B)

“The Bologna Process is a system for better cooperation within European countries. By and large, ‘Bologna’ comes at the right time, since we need more international orientation, mobility, and cooperation in higher education as well as to improve the competitiveness of our graduates.” (L)

Core objectives of the process are mobility, employability, and appeal. Instruments of the convergence process include the following:

- Bachelor's/master's study system.
- Credit accumulation and transfer system.
- Easily readable and comparable degrees (usage of qualifications frameworks).
- Quality assurance and quality development (Hung & Tauch, 2001).
- Issuing Diploma Supplements.
- International mobility in higher education.
- A curricular reform oriented toward learning outcomes that improve the quality of teaching.
- Teaching strategies that focus on addressing and challenging students as independent, autonomous learners.
- Internationalization of study programmes (e.g., joint degrees).
- Changes in doctoral education; freedom of knowledge transfer; multilingualism; lifelong learning.
- Knowledge triangles (close communications between education, research and technological innovation).
- The principle of teaching freedom and learning freedom.

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that various European countries are adopting the aims of Bologna reforms at different rates depending on their national and cultural traditions as well as their historic educational backgrounds. For example, continental European countries that have very strong cultural heritages, and their educational systems do not readily adapt to external influences. A classic example of this is Germany. On the other hand, countries that have a short history of national independence more quickly adopt the direction of external influences. A classic example of this is Finland and its higher education system.

Ukraine has an extremely short history of national independence and faces many challenges. The Ukrainian university system, like those in Germany and Finland, is currently in the process of sometimes radical reforms in the interests of joining the European Higher Education Area. In Ukraine, we have many challenges in achieving the objectives of the Bologna reforms. We are aware that we must expend great effort to realize its positive goals, but we accept that Ukraine has no alternative but to be integrated into the European higher education space.

Historically, Ukrainian lands were divided between foreign powers. As a result, different systems of education existed in different regions, established by corresponding governments. After World War II, Ukrainian lands were united within a single administrative unit as part of the USSR. Education was strictly controlled by central Soviet authorities, and independent development was impossible. Only after achieving national independence in 1991 could an independent Ukrainian system of education begin development.

Changes in higher education in 1990's Ukraine—within the context of global higher education trends and social challenges—include the following: establishment of governing bodies in education for the new state; curricular revision; introduction of a multi-level system of higher education; development of a network of higher education institutions; expansion of fees in higher education institutions; and “massification” of higher education (Shandruk & Shatrova, 2015).

The establishment of the national higher education system is based on a new legislative mandate. It provides for an entirely new level of training quality, an increase in academic and professional mobility of graduates, greater openness, democratic principles of teaching, and the accession of Ukraine's higher education system into the world's higher education spaces.

The Constitution of Ukraine (1996), the Law on Education (1996), the Law on Higher Education (2002), and the new Law on Higher Education (2014) constitute the legal framework for Ukrainian higher education. The Ukrainian legislation regulating higher education also includes decrees of and regulations established by the President and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Higher education is perceived by Ukrainians as a way to achieve professional distinction, economic independence, and freedom. Current Ukrainian high school graduates frequently choose a university with a competitive field of study, affordable international outreach programs, quality international credentials, and strong international partnerships.

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After signing the Bologna Declaration in 2005, Ukraine became part of the renewal process. This took place on June 19–20, 2005 at the Fourth Summit of the Bologna Process in Bergen, Norway. Joining the Bologna Declaration unquestionably represented a positive step toward integrating Ukrainian education into the European Higher Education Area. The education system is assumed to contribute significantly to the integration of Ukraine into the European Union.

The integration movement of Ukraine into the European Union is the strategic direction of Ukraine's development. The process of European integration is accompanied by the formation of joint educational and scientific spaces and by the development of joint criteria and standards shared throughout Europe. Participation of Ukrainian higher education in the integration processes of the European Higher Education Area and in the Bologna transformations are aimed at acquiring qualitative changes in its educational structure and university curricula.

Integration into the European educational space for Ukraine means: (i) participation of Ukrainian universities in European educational programs; (ii) the raising of Ukrainian higher education to the standards of the European Higher Education Area, the European qualifications framework, and the European Research Area; (iii) adaptation of the main principles of European education to Ukrainian national values; and (iv) creation of an innovative environment in the new social and economic order based on educational and scientific support.

Discussing the goals of the Bologna Process within the framework of the Erasmus Program, one interview participant stated: “There are two main purposes of the Bologna reforms: 1. the restructuring of higher education to include a different composition of competences; and 2. the internationalization of higher education and mobility.” (T)

Restructuring of higher education first involves implementing the Bachelor's/Master's degree system. The adaptation of academic courses to the Bachelor's and Master's degree programs of study in European universities is the most significant result of the Bologna reforms today. The changes resulted in better structured curricula as well as the emergence of new learning opportunities and quick initiation of professional activities. However, currently in Ukraine, there is a lack of societal recognition of the “Bachelor's” academic qualification level as revealed by the absence of a labor market for its graduates.

Regarding internationalization of higher education and mobility, it is important to keep in mind that these are two inseparable components of a single process. Ukrainian universities consider internationalization as a major tool to drive much needed internal change and improve access to knowledge, research, and funding across borders. Ukraine is attempting to find its own niche internationally.

When Ukrainians mention “internationalization” of higher education, they usually mean “Europeanization.” Faculties define internationalization in regional European terms and highlight the importance of sustaining a future-oriented process of enculturating their students in the spirit of a United Europe. In 2005 in Bergen, Ukraine joined a Bologna declaration to participate in the

harmonization of a European higher education architecture via compatibility and comparability of regional education systems (Kushnarenko & Knutson, 2014).

As Knight (2004) declares, internationalization more particularly means international academic mobility for students and teachers. There are two separate aspects of student and faculty mobility: intra-European mobility and intercontinental mobility. “Within the framework of intra-European mobility there have been few effects.” (H) An increase in such mobility has not been as successful as expected under the Bologna reforms; the recognition of study activities completed abroad remains quite problematic. The idea of mobility can be complicated; as a result, students often minimize their risks by not studying abroad.

In the framework of intercontinental mobility, the introduction of the Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system was an instrument for attracting students from outside Europe. “Between 1999 and 2007 the number of students from other parts of the world doubled. So, introduction of the Bachelor’s and Master’s degree system was an instrument for increasing the number of students from outside Europe. In particular, progress has been made in mobility partnerships between the European Union and Ukraine, and indeed Ukrainian students appear to increasingly benefit from this.” (T)

The EU promotes mobility programs that provide large numbers of university students and teachers from the EU and other countries with academic experiences outside their home countries. Among them, the Tempus and Erasmus Programs are the most important for Ukraine. Tempus in Ukraine has been operating since 1993, and Erasmus Mundus since 2004. Since 2014, Ukrainian universities have been involved in Erasmus+ KA1 and KA2. Further, an important step toward integration into European and global research was Ukraine formally becoming an associate member of the Horizon 2020 Program in March 2015. Joining the Bologna process was an unquestionable motivator for Ukraine, given the steps that have already been taken.

Under the Bologna Declaration in 2005, Ukraine committed to significant changes. The most striking result of Bologna has been the adaptation of study courses to the two-cycle Bachelor’s/Master’s degree study system, the introduction of Bachelor’s and Master’s level courses as standard degree courses at universities, and the introduction of a PhD degree program at Ukrainian universities. All of these moves have significantly increased the global mobility of Ukrainian scholars whose home status as “candidates of sciences” was never well understood abroad. In 2006/2007, students of Ukrainian universities were integrated into a two-cycle graduate study system that corresponds to Bologna principles. Later in 2014, within the framework of the new Law on Higher Education, two variants of the Master’s Program were created: the Master of Academic and Master of Professional specializations. Within the framework of the new Law on Higher Education, the young specialist degree has been removed and a new bachelor’s degree has been introduced as accelerated ways to get an undergraduate degree. The Bologna reform in Ukraine during 2006/2007 also led to the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). Assessment points (credits) are now awarded according to ECTS. The introduction of the European Credit Transfer System significantly improved the flexibility and transparency of the learning process. Simultaneously, the Diploma

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Supplement of the European Standard was implemented. In 2014, the framework of the new Law on Higher Education decreased a university credit hour from 36 hours to 30 hours.

These changes significantly improved the flexibility and transparency of the learning process and, accordingly, achieved greater international academic mobility for students. The changes enabled Ukrainian students to study abroad without suffering academically (Knutson and Kushnarenko, 2015). International students were also encouraged to study at Ukrainian universities. An important indicator of international academic mobility is the number of foreign students in Ukraine and Ukrainian students abroad. This includes short-term study, full time study, research work, probation periods, and enrollment in language courses. Some statistics on the number of Ukrainian international students studying abroad and the number of international students in Ukraine are presented in Figures 1 and 2, and reveal that the new Law on Higher Education of 2014 resulted in favorable conditions for increasing student mobility.




Figure 1: The number of Ukrainian International Students studying abroad (Ukrainian International Students, 2016)




Figure 2: The number of international students in Ukraine (1.01.16) (Shapovalova, 2016)

A problematic point, however, that bears mentioning here is the mutual recognition of qualifications from different countries and equivalence in educational levels. According to one study participant, “such mutual recognitions and equivalencies from diverse countries are highly significant for today’s students.” (B)

In order to increase external academic faculty mobility, Ukrainian universities began: (i) signing bilateral agreements on staff exchanges; (ii) creating joint training programs for specialists with leading European universities; and (iii) carrying out joint scientific programs with leading European universities.

Another important component of international academic mobility is partnerships that create opportunities for joint research; these allow Ukrainian universities to respond to the new context of competition on a global scale, boosting employability of graduates and attracting both research partners and external funding. Therefore, higher education reforms relate to deep fundamentals of Ukrainian education and science, as well as to increasing the integration of national science and education with European and other global higher education spaces.

On the other hand, the internationalization of higher education in Ukraine continues to be vulnerable to the political context of Ukraine and tensions of the region’s geopolitics. The Revolution of Dignity during 2013–2014 and the ongoing military conflict in Eastern Ukraine provide new avenues for the renewal process due to the evolving public approaches to social issues and challenges along the path of national advancement.

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Despite these dramatic developments, however, on July 1st, 2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed the new Law on Higher Education (Закон України “Про вищу освіту,” 2014), which set the stage for Ukrainian higher education to better respond to international opportunities. The new Law on Higher Education 2014: (i) aligns with the requirements of Bologna for the country to integrate into the European Higher Education Area; (ii) enables universities to act with greater autonomy; (iii) promotes decentralized decision-making and responsibility for reputation; (iv) establishes anti-plagiarism norms and liabilities for academic dishonesty; and (v) established the National Quality Assurance Agency.

The new higher education Law of Ukraine, in providing an opportunity for systemic modernization of higher education in Ukraine, is viewed as “one of the first systemic reforms that in fact draws Ukraine closer to integration with Europe” (Shandruk & Shatrova, 2015). One point upon which everyone agrees is that the law sends a very important political message to the public and officials in higher education.

Ukrainian policy makers and education authorities outlined three phases of the higher education law’s implementation: September 2014 (major provisions), September 2015 (national agency for ensuring quality higher education), and January 1, 2016 (additional financing for the law’s provisions). There is evidence of understanding that changes in the policy discourse are vital for the reforms to work (Shandruk & Shatrova, 2015).

Also, under the new law, Ukrainian universities are expected to intensify research capacity and production. As global rankings remain an important component of the public face of a university, the quality of research and number of publications by faculty members in reputable, peer-reviewed journals is increasingly important to the viability of an institution.

Also, it is important to emphasize that, upon fully realizing the importance of higher education, Ukraine introduced a new student assessment system over the past decade. Since 2008, all high school graduates wishing to enter university have had to take the External Independent Test. This was a fundamental shift from the Soviet legacy of corrupt university admission exams; they have now been replaced with an objective testing procedure. The main aims of the External Independent Test were to combat corruption, increase equal opportunity, provide equal access to tertiary education, and create a national assessment system to monitor educational quality (Klein, 2014).

Under the new Law on Higher Education 2014, the higher education structure of Ukraine has been transformed. Today, Ukrainian higher education institutions provide the following levels of higher education: Junior Bachelor, Bachelor's, Master's, Doctor of Philosophy (first level research degree), and Doctor of Sciences (second level research degree). The Ukrainian higher education structure according to the new Law on Higher Education 2014 is shown in Table 1.

Higher education levels	Higher education degrees, educational documents	Entrance requirements	Study period and load (ESTC credits)	Access to further education	National qualification framework	EHEA Cycles
Academic level (2nd academic degree)	Doctor (Doctor diploma)	PhD diploma			9 level	
Science and research level (1st academic degree)	PhD (PhD diploma)	Master diploma	4 years 30-60 credits	Access to the 2nd academic degree	8 level	III cycle
Master level	Master (Master diploma)	Bachelor diploma	Professional educational program, 90-120 credits	Access to the 1st academic degree	7 level	II cycle
			Academic educational program – 120 credits (research part – over 30%)			I-II cycle
	Master of Medicine	Secondary school leaving certificate (Atestat)	300-360 credits			
Bachelor level	Bachelor (Bachelor diploma)	Secondary school leaving certificate (Atestat)	180-240 credits	Access to Master programs	6 level	I cycle
		Junior Bachelor diploma	HEI may transfer credits and shorten the program			
Short cycle level	Junior Bachelor (Junior Bachelor diploma)	Secondary school leaving certificate (Atestat)	90-120 credits	Access to Bachelor programs	5 level	Short cycle

Table 1: Ukrainian higher education structure according to the new Law on Higher Education 2014 (ENIC UKRAINE, 2014)

The second direction of the European higher education reform strategy is in educational management and governance. According to Wolter (2004), the reform in education management and governance—along with the Bologna reform providing new structure—is important for further development of the higher education system in Europe. It may be considered a “silent” revolution in the higher education system. Today, management and governance are the major factors influencing the development of higher education.

The framework for the transformation of management and governance structures may be defined by the following three aspects (Wolter, 2004):

1. Criteria for recognition of academic achievements:

Traditionally, criteria comprised academic reputation and outstanding publications. Today, new criteria include the amount of research grants and other monies obtained, the number of scientific articles published, the number of successful students produced, and the number of the doctoral students supervised.

2. New internal governance models:

A new type of governance within institutions has been introduced between top university management, faculty-level management, and individual professors. This new concept of a managerial university includes an agreement between the University and professor, which defines levels of targets, a new "type" of State–University relationship, and the emergence of

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a contract between the State and the institution which includes provisions for the development of a plan, budget, and structure of institutions.

3. New assessment and accreditation institutions (Agencies):

Changes in assessment and accreditation of new courses, with new Bachelor's and Master's programs providing external quality control and management.

The new steering model for educational management and governance embraces six key strategies: deregulation of state control in favour of greater autonomy; re-distribution of influence from academic oligarchy to university management; transformation of a uniform system into a more differentiated, competition-, and market-oriented system; strengthening the specific missions of institutions and improving program quality and flexibility in the provision and organization of studies according to the needs of a body of diverse students; improving the outcomes of higher education; and raising international competitiveness and the reputation of higher education.

The following is an examination of what has already been accomplished in Ukraine within the framework of reforms in educational management and governance. According to the new Law on Higher Education in Ukraine, within the framework of development of academic and financial autonomy of higher education institutions, Ukraine has worked out new mechanisms for rectors' elections. The duration of service for rectors, deans, and department heads is now a maximum of two terms (5+5 years; 7+7 years for National Universities). Also, universities have been granted the right to manage their own revenues from education, research, and academic activities. Further, according to the new Law on Higher Education in Ukraine, within the framework of developing the National Quality Assurance system for higher education and in compliance with the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance, Ukraine has established a separate governmental unit called the National Quality Assurance Agency. Within this framework of further development of the mechanism for equal access to higher education, Ukraine worked out a new mechanism of electronic admission for universities and automatic placement according to state directives.

Also under the new Law on Higher Education, Heads of HEIs will manage all aspects of the HEI: this includes their financial and business operations, structure and staffing, performance, the healthy lifestyle of students, and ensuring open and effective public monitoring of the HEI. HEI Heads will be accountable for their institution's education, research, and innovation activities, as well as financial and business performance.

The National Quality Assurance Agency is an authority established by the Ukrainian government to ensure quality higher education across the country. It is a permanent collegial body authorized to implement state educational policies. The Agency will be responsible for the following: development of regulations on accreditation of educational programs; license confirmation; and establishing criteria for adherence to standards and guidelines of the European Higher Education

Area. The Ukrainian National Quality Assurance Agency aims to become eligible for membership in the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education.

Concerning automatic placement of state orders, the major new development concerns the distribution of state orders for Bachelor-level education. The previous system was characterized by distribution of state orders between higher education institutions by the Ministry of Education. In the new system the state distributes funds to students rather than institutions in what is termed a “funds follow the student” scheme.

Many challenges exist in Ukraine in achieving the objectives of higher education reform. However, it is important to emphasize that Ukraine has no alternative but to be integrated into Bologna process and the European higher education space. Reforms are taking a long time to have any effect. There is a great deal to do in order to make the positive goals of the Bologna reforms a reality. Ukrainian universities are only minimally represented on the leading international ranking lists. This situation serves as evidence of the low competitiveness of Ukrainian higher education institutions (Shandruk & Shatrova, 2015).

Other challenges include the following: low performance and publication rates of Ukrainian scientists; lack of societal recognition of the Bachelor’s degree as a qualification level; complexity of the Ukrainian system of scientific degrees compared to the system in Europe; difficulties in implementing the results of research into higher education processes; problems with establishing contacts between Ukrainian and European universities and, in this context, the issue of implementation of Joint Programmes and Joint Degrees; modernization of the system of quality control; and the gap between education and the labor market.

Conclusions

Reforming education has been an ongoing process since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Currently, Ukrainian higher education is in a state of radical change and is in search of its place within the European and world educational space. Significant efforts toward that goal are being made at all levels—national, institutional, and individual. Great expectations have been placed on the new Law on Higher Education of 2014 to promote integration of the Ukrainian higher education system into European and world higher education spaces. The Ukrainian system of higher education must, on one hand, consider global integration processes and, on the other hand, react to significant socio-economic transformation within Ukrainian society. Great attention is being given to the deepening of international scientific and educational cooperation at all levels. The central task for all is to make changes in Ukrainian higher education system rapid, effective, and irreversible.

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Chapter 3 — Student Government in Ukraine Post Reform: A Brief Review of Students' Perspectives and Pathways Forward

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Abstract

In November 2015, the government of Ukraine announced 73 democratic reforms, among them a commitment to fund student governments with 0.5% of the budget of their higher education institutions. The reform responded to the EuroMaidan Protest of 2014 during which many students demonstrated their interest in integration in European Union (EU) institutions. The reform was also designed to enable students to gain autonomy and create new initiatives that would expedite the development of democratic processes in Ukraine. This paper offers insight into the state of student government based on findings derived from an online survey and interviews with some of Ukraine's most active student presidents and leaders. Problematic areas are highlighted and coupled with recommendations based on student governments in Canada, which their counterparts in Ukraine seek to emulate. It is postulated that many pertinent issues that plague the development of student governments in Ukraine may be overcome through increased understanding of engagement and boundary-spanning theory.

Keywords: university student government, democratic reform in Ukraine, higher education institutions, student activism, student-university relations

Introduction

In November 2015, the government of Ukraine announced 73 democratic reforms, among them a commitment to fund student governments with 0.5% of the budget of each higher education institution's budget. The reform responded to the EuroMaidan-Protest of 2014 during which many students demonstrated their interest in integration into European Union (EU) institutions, especially those leading to educational opportunities through collaboration. The reform is also designed to enable students to gain autonomy and create new initiatives that would expedite the development of democratic processes in Ukraine.

To date, no research has considered students' perspectives on their implementation of this reform. Although the process of reform in student associations is young, feedback from those participating in enacting this reform may offer insights for improvements. Given that the student population in Ukraine has demonstrated a desire to adopt Western democratic practice, this paper

draws upon a literature review of the history of student associations in Canada—a growing region for partnerships for Ukrainian student associations—as a basis for three data collection opportunities. These include: 1. interviews with student presidents conducted by the authors during a short stay in Canada in winter 2017; 2. an online survey comprised of four questions delivered to 1,283 students and 400 faculty members across Ukraine in Spring 2017; and 3. twenty interviews with student leaders in Ukraine in Summer 2017.

The paper offers recommendations for continued efforts at building student associations in Ukrainian higher education institutions (HEIs). These are: increased student activism and protest, more collaboration with government and other external organizations, establishment of student budgets and relationships with administration, spread of student voice and societal transformation, and recognition of accomplishments. These actions or themes, the author argues, would help direct attention to activities and expected outcomes that can aid the development of student government in Ukraine. Importantly, these themes are drawn from interviews with Ukrainian student presidents (SPs) and student leaders (SLs), and as such paint a grassroots picture of the challenges faced by student governments in Ukraine. The author does not promote this study as a comprehensive overview but as a worthwhile unilateral perspective of a multi-faceted undertaking. The author hopes it will spur additional research into developing student governments within the context of this reform.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

Students are motivated to form associations at universities for a variety of reasons. Some are concerned with student governance while others seek to advance specific interests and activities. All interests, however, are fundamental to the democratic operation of the institutions. This account offers original insights to the field of higher education as it relates to structures of university governance. Further, student associations necessarily interact, collaborate, and otherwise engage with people, organizations, and administrations outside of their own members. Decisions are often made both informally and formally, involving various actors at multiple levels, with students relying on relationships that cross boundaries within and without institutions. This study, therefore, is additionally important to the field of engagement studies.

Indeed, the complexity of these out-of-class experiences has been shown to be vital to educational experience in the West (Astin, 1992; Boyer, 1987; Pace, 1990). Moffat found that “for about 40 percent of students, the do-it-yourself side of college was the most significant educational experience” (1989, p. 50). More specifically, Astin (1977) noted that involvement in student government generally strengthened interest in politics, liberalism, hedonism, and the arts. Further still, student government relates positively to humanitarian values, social service roles, and student competence (Kuh & Lund, 1994). Student governments are foundational in equipping college-aged Ukrainians to better participate in their budding democracy. To better navigate these complex dynamics, a theory is needed that accounts for the multiple, formal, informal, and diverse interactions integral to any student association. A clearer understanding of the nebulous nature of such dynamics can help student associations act more purposefully towards establishing influence and representation on campus as well as enriching the campus experience for students in Ukraine.

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Students are one of many interested stakeholders at any university and thus are concerned with its governance. Further, universities are becoming “major players in the global market and in information-based capitalism” (Delanty, 2002, p. 190)—that is, they recruit international students and faculty, promote their research on a global scale, and depend on international reputation for prestige, students, and funding. In developing democracies, the pressure to participate globally is compounded as acclaim is most readily accrued in the global marketplace.

In these ways, universities compete in a global market with a range of stakeholders. Obondoh (2003) has argued that, at their most cohesive, universities involve all stakeholders in management decisions, adding that among stakeholders, students are primary and most fundamental as fee-paying investments in the future. Their involvement in university governance is necessary. It is easy, then, to recognize the value of building and maintaining student associations in post-Soviet societies. Democratic machineries at this level help to upset the atmosphere of corruption and centralization that lingers in many post-Soviet countries (Oleksiyenko, 2014).

We employ the concept of boundary-spanning theory (BST) to make suggestions to budding student associations in Ukraine based on these factors: 1. the understanding that student governments provide educational, social, and political benefits to students, 2. that universities increasingly are players in a global market whose governance should reflect a range of perspectives from different fields of interest, and 3. that such governance is practically applied as informally as it is formally. Based on original work by Aldrich and Herker (1977), Tushman (1977), Friedman and Podolny (1992), and conceptualized and operationalized by Weerts and Sandmann (2010), BST has much to offer student bodies otherwise caught in centralized, hierarchical contexts.

Boundary Spanning Theory

BST has been applied in diverse circumstances to enhance communication between parties with competing interests. These arenas include labour negotiations (Pross, 1986), interdisciplinary collaboration (Drach-Zahavy, 2011; Calvard, 2014) and, most recently, community-university engagement (CUE). The CUE framework reveals how the university interacts with a variety of stakeholders, including those both internal (e.g., students, professors, support staff) and external (e.g., donors, professional credentialing organizations, and local communities who interact with university services) to its official operations. Boundaries in this sense have been defined more conceptually as “sociocultural differences leading to discontinuities in action and interaction” (Akkerman & Bakker, 2011, p. 21). That is, student associations do not interact only with like-minded students—they are in constant contact with varying cultural student-groups on campus, branches of university administration, local and national governments, industry, charities, and volunteer groups.

The use of BST offers a lens for re-conceptualizing these interactions as important to the growth of student associations in fledgling democratic societies. An understanding of BST among Ukrainian university students could fortify their associations as they are situated between the desires of administration, politicians, growing industry, as well as the various interests of the student body which range from social to economic and political, especially in light of the new directions proposed by the Law of Ukraine “On Higher Education” in 2014. Boundary-spanning has been identified as beneficial to student affairs employees (Hollmann, 1982), but has yet to be applied to the functioning

of student associations themselves. Indeed, at the University of Arizona, Hollmann found that “a greater awareness of, understanding of, and attention to boundary spanning can assist persons serving in student affairs units to more effectively perform their function” (1982, p. 127).

Such themes, supported through an understanding of BST and having direct social democratic payoffs, are important in the context of Ukraine. Osipian (2009) as well as Knutsov and Kushnarenko (2015) have conjectured a post-Soviet vice grip on the collective Ukrainian consciousness. Corruption in the form of bribery and nepotism, they argue, curbs not only intellectual innovations but also social, political, and economic reform. Latova and Latov (2008) have suggested that modernizing HEIs, such as those in Ukraine, would “relay the cultural and mental institutions of the developed countries and in this way raise the level of Westernization of young people” (p. 56), thereby combatting such corruption. Further, in a study by Oleksiyenko and Usyk (2016), Soviet university management was named among the top three barriers (following low income and corruption) in higher education reforms. However, this politically-motivated student population, no doubt energized by the reforms, faces changes “initiated from the top government with little higher education practitioner and public input with the focus on policy procedures rather than real outcomes of proposed reforms” (Shandruk & Shatrova, 2015, p. 135). It is therefore paramount that ways of cross-boundary communication be developed so that such systemic policy reformation may take hold.

Student Government in Canada

A literature review of the history of student government in Canada helped shape the interview protocol with student leaders from Ukraine, all approved by and in accordance with the Research Ethics Board at the University of Alberta. It yielded the following five themes: a steady history of activism and protest since the early 1960s; benefits from collaborations with other student organizations; the relationship between student groups and university administration; the importance of student voice for social commentary; and an enduring pride in accomplishments.

Examples from Canadian contexts are provided below. Canadian student associations rely on relationships that span multiple boundaries to form partnerships with groups in industry, government, and even across student bodies; their relationships with administration are subject to elected boundary-crossers put forward by the student body and, in this way, student leaders are central vertices of communication between students and their administration. In outlining areas where boundary-spanning theory has buttressed the efforts of Canadian student associations to organize, influence, and effectively represent their members, we offer a development framework for fledgling student groups in Ukraine.

Student Activism and Protest

Students have engaged in protest and activism since the establishment of the very first Western-style universities at Bologna, Paris, and Oxford in the 12th century. The comparatively young Canadian institutions, still the lineal descendants of medieval Paris and Bologna, share in the enduring tradition; indeed, as recently as 2012, students in Quebec forced an election that toppled the provincial government during the “Maple Spring.” Yet student organization and activism in Canada existed long before its eruption in the 1960s. Students across the continent operated independent student unions—students’ unions formed in Toronto in 1901, Alberta in 1909, Vancouver in 1915, Manitoba in

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1919, and elsewhere through the early 20th century. These were independent, elected groups with autonomy over budgets and student affairs. Yet in lieu of substantial direct governing involvement, student groups formed to push for social change, peace, anti-poverty, and civil rights. The 1963 March for Canada held at Queen's Park in Toronto displayed students' concern for the future of Canadian Confederation in relation to the Quebec question, while University of Toronto students performed a week-long sit-in at the U.S. consulate to support civil rights in the South. Further, McGill students protested intensely between 1965 and 1969—1,500 McGill students marched on the U.S. consulate following the "Bloody Sunday" incident in Selma, Alabama, while others organized sit-ins, marches, and petitions denouncing Vietnam.

Such incidents of student action saturate the history of student government in Canada and have foreshadowed reform in curriculum, tuition, housing arrangements, and even the inclusion of students in the formal governing bodies of the institutions. The particular strides the Canadian student movements have made in furthering the involvement of students nationwide is indeed quite clear. For example, in 1955, no universities in Canada had students on their boards, but by 1975, 78% of institutions had at least one student board member.

Effective boundary-spanning has helped Canadian student governments carry out such effective movements. For example, Sheppard (1989) has shown that only a minority of students were involved in organizing the protests of the 1960s and 70s. Thus, organizers acted as spanners to mobilize the broader student population and even increasing numbers of faculty to their cause. Keniston, speaking of faculty involvement, remarked that it was "in general, the most effective protest" (1967, p. 122). This example reveals that, by negotiating with external and internal constituents, Canadian students have represented the interests and aims of one to the other in order to accrue support and leverage power. In short, this is BST in action.

Student Budget and Relationship with Administration

Relationships between student governments and their institutions are variable across Canada. Provincial jurisdictions leave rules inconsistent from province to province, yet this also means there is little centralized influence undercutting the efforts of student associations and, in most cases, Canadian student governments are validated and protected through provincial legislation.

Yet even historically, the value of student government has been recognized. The University of Alberta's Student Union (SU) was formed in 1909, the year after the institution's first intake of students. The relationship between the university and its main student association came to a head in 1920. In that year, the new president of the SU was issued an ultimatum by the University: "the reason given was the ineptitude of the students in the government of themselves and their irresponsibility in both financial and disciplinary matter" (Johns, 1981, p. 99). A year later, the situation seems to have cleared up, with the Provost stating his pleasure with the new 1922 constitution and suggesting that the relationship with the students was smooth and harmonious. Indeed, students were aware of their unique position and responded to the watchdog guidance and expectations of responsibility of administration. The 1920 valedictorian at the University of Alberta remarked upon the place of the SU:

Our system of student government is unique in university history . . . we have been given full powers of self-discipline outside of classrooms. The result is that not only do Albertans have full realization of responsibility that comes from holding various offices under the Students' Union, but they are trained in procedure. Their executive instincts are developed and they are not afraid to take the proper share of community life as they have been used to it here (Johns, 1981, p. 98).

Such sentiment is closely echoed in more contemporary research that shows student participation in associations prepares students to more effectively assume the practices of citizenship in a democratic society (Kuh & Lund, 1994; Sahin, 2005). Yet the issue of distrust between students and administration is central. Canadian provincial governments make laws governing the behaviours of student organizations and of the university. For instance, Alberta's Post-Secondary Learning Act (PSLA) stipulates that:

The students association of a public post-secondary institution shall provide for the administration of student affairs at the public post-secondary institution, including the development and management of student committees, the development and enforcement of rules relating to student affairs and the promotion of the general welfare of the students consistent with the purposes of the public post-secondary institution (PSLA 93(3)).

Official student associations are required in Alberta's universities. This grants status the University must recognize, but it also restricts student associations as the PSLA outlines the required structures and practices of decision-making. Thus student associations in Alberta are helped in terms of their creation and legitimacy but are restricted in function; for instance, they require university permission to purchase or lease property, and they must provide annual copies of audited finances. Further, the PSLA means that independent student associations have no capacity in representing students—the student associations created by the PSLA are the only official channels.

Makela and Audette-Chapdelaine (2013) conclude that student associations in Alberta are characterized by a high degree of state control. Conversely, the University of Manitoba Students' Union (UMSU), while not subject to a complex legal regime, does not benefit from the level of independence afforded to other Canadian associations, with much decision-making power tied up with the Board of Governors. Further still, in British Columbia, there is little formal legislation governing student associations. The University Act—which defines a student association largely under the provisions of the Societies Act with the caveat of student representation—governs most, but not all, BC institutions. Still, Section 27.1 of the University Act requires institutions to collect these fees on behalf of student organizations, while others in Quebec are required to provide student groups with physical space. These and other practices allow student organizations to expand rapidly and hire professional staff, contributing to the growing call for tuition-paying students to be included in formal governance.

Canadian students can therefore lean on enforced, legislative frameworks to establish representation. While the legal stipulations vary from province to province, and while some are more

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supportive than others, it is nevertheless the case that they form the bedrock through which students can effectively navigate.

Collaboration with Government and External Organizations

Student groups play key roles in representing not only their interests to the university but also in negotiating with provincial and federal government regarding tuition, policy, financial assistance, and research funding (Bégin-Couette & Jones, 2014, p. 414). To do so, Canadian student boundary spanners have formed multiple national groups. The first national student group formed in 1926, and the Canadian Union of Students was active in the tumultuous 1960s. The Canadian Federation of Students (CFS, founded in 1981) and the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA, founded in 1995) are two such national level student leadership organizations that represent more than 500,000 students.

Canadian students have consistently engaged in BST by initiating, cooperating, and collaborating on projects with other students, the government, and the community. Through the 1960s, students in Canada organized anti-war and community development groups such as the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND), which was succeeded by the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA). Further, by 1966, the nation-wide group Canadian Union of Students (CUS) was an explicit political group that linked student groups at universities to “coalitions fighting the nuclear threat, racism, and Canadian complicity in the war in Vietnam” (Coulter, 2007, p. 64). By the late 1960s, the CUS was primarily interested in forging these connections between students and larger social issues.

The Canadian Federation of Students was created to offer students an effective and united voice, provincially and nationally. Coulter calls the CFS a “democratic, coordinating network and organizational framework for facilitating communication, administration and development among students and students’ unions” (Coulter, 2007, p. 65). The CFS employs a three-pronged strategy of research, government lobbying, and membership mobilization.

Such instances of collaboration, while providing a means of connecting various student associations, have given Canadian students a platform for national influence on social, economic, and political matters.

Social Commentary and Accomplishments

As explained, student organizations play active roles in bringing societal issues to public attention, researching them, and lobbying for policy and structural change. One of the main outlets for student awareness and opinion is through student newspapers. *The Gateway*, the University of Alberta’s student newspaper, was established in the second year of the university’s operation and has functioned as a tool for democratic process since its incorporation. Johns says *The Gateway* “served not only as a faithful reporter of events on the campus and an arena for discussion of student affairs but also as a training ground for future writers, journalists, and leaders in Canadian affairs” (Johns, 1981, p. 98). Indeed, many of those involved in the paper went on to careers in municipal, provincial, and federal politics. The University of British Columbia has published its *Ubyssey*, the nation’s most read student paper, since its first publication in 1918, while the University of Toronto’s *Varsity* has been in production since 1880.

On the North American continent, students have made significant strides in both self and institutional governance. In Canada, students are represented in the bicameral governing structure by an elected representative, while in the United States where there are many more diverse types of institutions, student representatives similarly relay their constituency's interests on Board of Governors (BoGs). In most cases, having a voice in the institutional decision-making processes of university is the direct result of student organization and activism. However, only in the wake of the strong surge of protests in the 1960s did students on the continent achieve an institutional say. Yet even outside of governance, student bodies across North America are represented by umbrella organizations. Student Unions, often with national affiliations, operate increasingly large budgets, employ professional staff, reside in permanent offices, and represent the interests of their members as legally separate entities. The result is a democratic enactment of the ideal of the university, one wherein its largest stakeholder is represented.

Canadian student associations are proud of their accomplishments. CASA's website documents all the major victories of the group, while the CFS displays ongoing information on all current campaigns and activities. Even local student unions broadcast achievements and events online, through social media, and in print. The documentation and celebration of the accomplishments of Canadian student government are powerful markers of identity in the Canadian student consciousness.

Summary

The above cases illustrate how Canadian student associations have operated and gained a fortified footing at universities. Born out of protest and demonstration in the 1960s, sustained through legislation and large student associations, supported nationally by broad collaborations and affiliations, and celebrated, Canadian student associations have leveraged communication, organization, and student ideals to better the positions of their members and gain a voice in university governance. Gaining training in decision-making protocols and managing extensive budgets that offered services to students, SUs formed a platform for citizenship development. By learning to draw on the research skills they were learning in their studies, forming collaborations with varying levels of government, and mobilizing their members, SUs have grown to occupy a significant voice at local and national levels. The themes of 1. activism and protest, 2. collaboration, 3. relationship with administration, 4. social commentary, and 5. pride in accomplishments inform the data collected from Ukrainian student presidents and leaders.

Methodology

Overall the study's purposeful design aims at providing insight about a new phenomenon, not empirical generalizations derived from a sample and applied to a population. The present study gathered data from three sources. First, three face-to-face interviews were held with three student union/government presidents (SPs) from Ukraine (SP I, II, III) with a total of six hours of individual and focus group transcripts (30 pages) in Winter 2017. SPs were selected on the basis of pre-existing relationships between HEIs in Ukraine and Canada. This relationship of implied trust between the students and the researcher is a significant variable in research with individuals in and from post-Soviet states (Sapsford, Abbott, Haerpfer & Wallace, 2015). Interviewees had recently completed a

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visit to a Canadian university wherein they met with student body leaders and studied their organization and operation. Indeed, there was a consensus—Ukrainian student participants expressed their desire to model the example of established Canadian student associations. Individual and focus group interviews were held in both English and Ukrainian over a five-day period. They were transcribed and then sent to the volunteer participants for a member check (Merriam, 2009).

Second, the study drew upon Likert-scale responses to four questions that were asked on an Omnibus survey in Spring 2017 with 1,253 students and 408 faculty members from 24 Ukrainian higher educational institutions in eight cities.

Third, the researcher travelled to Ukraine in June 2017 to meet with additional SPs in Kyiv and Kharkiv. However, the two additional SPs also suggested meetings with student leaders (SLs) currently or formerly within academia. Through word-of-mouth and a tight network of informed and action-oriented leaders, 20 volunteers contributed their narratives in 20- to 40-minute interviews in coffee shops and student union offices over a three-week time span. These interviews were also transcribed but did not undergo member checks. Since data was in both Ukrainian and Russian languages, all data were transcribed, reviewed, and translated by two Ukrainian-Russian-English trilingual research assistants.

Given that no research currently exists about the reform on student government in higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ukraine, the study sought to hear from SPs and SLs as they navigate the opportunities offered by the new mandate. Data was subjected to a manual, three-step process of constant comparison analysis coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). First, after the coder read the text multiple times to get a sense of the flow of the entire discussions, she chunked the data into small units, drawing upon the word search feature of MicroSoft Word for assistance as required. During the second axial coding stage, these chunked units were grouped into thematic categories (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009, p.6). In the third and final selective coding stage, the researcher developed the themes that expressed the content of each of the unit groups as reported in this paper. In the citations below, student union/government presidents are indicated by SP and distinguished by I, II, III, IV and V, while the voices of student leaders are identified with SL and distinguished by “KH” for Kharkiv and “K and Kyiv,” as an example, to reveal the city in which the interview took place, as well as A, B, C, and so on to distinguish the individual. Thus SPI identifies the first student union/government president interviewed, and SLKHC refers to the third student leader interviewed in Kharkiv. The study hopes to bring this reform to scholars’ attention and offer some insights regarding progress on its implementation from the students’ perspective as well as to instigate further research into the topic.

Ukraine: The Form of Student Government in Pre- and Post-Independence

Before the state independence of Ukraine in 1991, a self-governing student body at the local or national level did not exist. However, since 1918 and throughout Soviet times, the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth) acted as an elite and political youth organization, and many of its members were involved in the Russian Revolution. After 1922, when the military phase ended, the Komsomol engaged its members in health, sports, education, and publishing activities as

well as various service and industrial projects. The Komsomol received its funding from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and depended on the party for direction. While effectively it served as a youth instrument for the Party, the Komsomol showed its youth-focussed influences in the 1950s and 60s when there was a push to draw foreign students to the USSR. In 1958, the Komsomol brought over 1,500 Western youth tourists to the USSR, and by 1960 that number topped 14,000. In 1964 alone, more than 7,500 foreign students from Western countries studied in the USSR (Hornsby, 2016). Even so, the Komsomol could be described as the Communist Party's youth division since student leaders of the Komsomol often participated in the Party after graduation, as one student leader explained:

As it was a controlled economy more or less all finances were controlled and managed by the state. These Komsomol activists were preparing to be activists in the Communist Party after they finished their studies. Leaders of Komsomol usually became members of the Communist Party to build communism—this is well known. My parents have said that up to 100% of the students participated in the Komsomol—they had to in order to study. (SLKHA, 2017)

Participation in the Komsomol and in political matters was important:

From 1939 to 1949 four million Komsomolites were accepted as members of the Communist Party, and from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Party Congress (October, 1952 to February, 1956) more than 440,000 Komsomolites became Party members. This is a reward since Party membership opens the door to the best careers in the Soviet State. (Hulicka, 1962, p. 370)

Due to the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, the Komsomol disbanded in 1991. A few years earlier, in 1989, the Student Brotherhood (SB), another student group, was established. Later the same year, students also formed the Ukrainian Students Union (USU).

The programme of SB aimed to protect the social needs of students and help form a “democratic national intelligentsia. [The SB] is against all violations of social, political, national, and religious rights of students and youth. It supports the raising of national and political consciousness and development of a democratic way of thinking.” (Kuzio, 1999, p. 139)

As among North American-organized student groups, together the SB and USU created a list of demands for the Ukrainian government entirely on political matters and not university-related business. Some examples include calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Masol; the establishment of new, multi-party elections; and the dropping of a proposed Union Treaty with the Soviet Union. As well, the students demanded the abolition of Komsomol in Higher Education (Kuzio, 1999). To give their demands greater visibility, they launched a hunger strike at the Maidan in Kiev in 1990. It lasted several days, and the students gained much support from activists and workers. The support of the pro-Communist society for the students was seen as a symbolic turning point and victory for the strike. As the number of protests increased across the country, the government finally

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capitulated, agreeing to fulfill the demands. In the following year—the year of independence—the SB and USU amalgamated into a single organisation, the Union of Ukrainian Students (UUS). Even though independence in 1991 symbolized the end of communism and initiated democracy in Ukraine, communist structures still dominate today. For example, the Komsomol-University relationship seems akin to how SP describe their relationship with administration:

In terms of mass movements and institutional protection, student trade unions were the only student unions, and they functioned in soviet style, up until about 2000. Even if they were supposed to be independent, they were always controlled by the administrative leadership of the university. (SLKHA, 2017)

Student organizations in Ukraine were not established as self-governing bodies but as groups important to, and controlled by, administration. This type of relationship with the administration remains, as a student leader in Kharkiv states:

At my university I don't remember any problems with the administration. Students can participate in all major events as well as the university council, academic council. Basically, I believe that they sit in all decision-making events that I am aware. (SLKB, 2017)

After independence it took some time to establish student governments as we see them today. Students note the influence of the Bologna-process on some of this evolution. One student stated: "Formally, student parliaments were established about 1999 at the time that the Bologna Process started, and the students thought 'we must move into the direction of Europe, we should integrate.' This was the first time that this kind of student parliament functioned." (SLKD, 2017) Another noted the long history of looking toward Europe: "I know that moving in the direction of Europe is not new for students. Students were already talking about this in the late 90s. I am not sure of what they did." (SLKHG, 2017)

However, some students believe they still need considerable reform. As one student leader stated: "Hmhhh . . . Protecting the rights of students? Or representing them? This is a new awareness and it has not yet spread widely." (SLKJ, 2017)

The independence of Ukraine ushered in the beginning of a comprehensive reform of the entire education sector and, in particular, of the higher education sector. Since 1991, laws have been created to redesign higher education institutions. However, in many areas, the "legacy" of the Soviet Union is still noticeable. Osipian (2009) lists bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, cronyism, cheating, and research misconduct among the more salient issues left over from Soviet regimes. Other problems are more structural, such as the top-down style of policy implementation that has been observed to skip the mid- and lower-level administrations where they are most needed.

The interview data and survey questions reveal that significant progress can be seen in the new reforms of higher education which the government of Ukraine, announced in November 2015 after the Maidan-Protest in which students demonstrated their interest in European educational

cooperation. One reform was the commitment to fund student governments with 0.5% of the budget of their higher education institutions.

Theme 1 - Student Activism and Protest

Since the Maidan-Protest in 2013, during which many Ukrainian university students protested and demonstrated their interest in European educational cooperation, students' voices were heard and the university reform took place. The current activism of student governments appears to concentrate on university-wide interests. Student groups are already active in many fields related to their university and their students' life on campus; for example, they listen to student concerns, manage the student budget, participate in social projects, and organize events on campus (SP I, SP II & SP III, SP IV, SP V, SLKHA, SLKF, SLKG, SLKHD, 2017).

Student leaders in Kyiv described more progressive and ambitious initiatives within their university including the creation of a campus contest: "My friend at Taras Shevchenko University organized a student academic contest on campus. The administration supported this. She put information about the winners online." (SLKA, 2017) Those in Kharkiv appealed for restructuring a compulsory course:

Last year we made a petition to the University about our courses. We have some compulsory courses and would like students from all faculties to be mixed in them. Currently the same course is offered exclusively for students in each faculty. We believe that we can get to know one another better and learn about different disciplines if we are mixed into one class . . . We don't know the results yet, but will keep trying this. It is good for students. (SLKHD, 2017)

Such projects promise to give students voice in the operation of their universities; however, as we shall see later, there is a need for improved communication so that students across the country can learn from one another. Despite the potential of social media channels of communication, interviewees did not comment on them as a means of informational exchange. Nor did they foresee a possible university newspaper or other venue for expressing concerns as well as sharing and celebrating successes.

Theme 2 – Collaboration with Government and other Organizations

Exercising Boundary Spanning Theory with other organizations is important for the success of student government actions. While collaboration with an institution's administration is an obligatory aspect of this support, so should be collaboration with municipal and other governments. Ukrainian students are permitted to collaborate with the government of the city in which their institution is located but not with the state government. On the one hand, student leaders are eager to propose new projects, but on the other hand, they are aware of the corruption that still exists within other government

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organizations and are disillusioned about collaborating with them. One SP recognized the value of boundary spanning but noted that students were not allowed to work with governments: "We don't work with the state's and city's government. But it's not the fault of the student government. It is a problem in the Ukrainian government." (SPII, 2017) Another described additional restrictions on possible partnerships:

[. . .] my university is well known, but still we are not allowed to cooperate [with groups outside of the university]. Only maybe with the city council. It could be part of our cooperation. Maybe in the future we can cooperate with the city council, if we find somebody who would give us money . . . maybe that could be possible if there is no possible corruption. (SP I, 2017)

Interestingly, in smaller cities, collaboration or spanning boundaries with outside groups seems to be more easily initiated: "[. . .] We have a good relationship with the mayor of the city. They helped us in one of our projects about children with cancer. The mayor likes us and he likes students . . . because 30% of the citizens are students." (SP III, 2017)

SLs in central and eastern Ukraine seemed to be slightly better organized and more vocal about concerns within their institution than those in Western Ukraine. For example, one SL told us about the independent Ukrainian Association of Students (UAS), a member of the European Students' Union which currently represents 178 student unions across Ukraine (about 1.6 millions students). He mentioned that as recently as 2017, UAS supported students from Kyiv National University who faced a backlash for publishing damning reports of utilities management and by questioning the Scholarship Fund (SLKG, 2017).

Theme 3 – Student Budget and Relationship with Administration

As in Western universities, finance is an issue related to students and administration, even though students have their own budgets. Financing more projects is a problem for Ukrainian student governments not due to amounts but rather due to restrictions on how to use the money. One SP described this as follows:

It is not a big amount of money, but last year we didn't use all of it [. . .]. I don't think that [creating more projects] is a problem for the amount of money, it's about how we can use it. For example, we can't buy furniture. It's an administrative issue, about what is forbidden, not a problem of money. (SP I, 2017)

Restrictions about the use of the student government's budget come mainly from the university's administration. The university's administration has the right to control and restrict student government spending and activities. Having a good relationship with the administration helps the student government to create new projects. This SP captures well what all SPs stated:

We have a good relationship with the administration and with the university's president. This helps us to achieve what we want. I think in most of the universities the problem is that there is poor communication between the students and the university's president. (SP III, 2017)

SP I (in Western Ukraine) described the challenges of securing space for their student body and then, once space had been assigned, said no tables or chairs were available. In contrast, I met with SP IV in Kharkiv in a room with a key, tables, chairs, a desk, and two storage lockers. Further, I was gifted with a t-shirt and a student notebook with an SU logo on it. Clearly some groups would benefit from greater contact with one another. They would also benefit from using examples of accomplishments in other Ukrainian universities to spark their own thinking about roles they could play and projects they could organize—as well as requests they could advance—especially for the basics of space and furnishings for an office. Although asked to do so, no SP could state the amount of funds that they were entitled to, had access to, or had spent.

Theme 4 - Student Voice and Societal Transformation

Many protests shaped changes in the university system and consequently, the students' mentality. Just as the decade of protests of the 1960s was of significance to developments in Western Europe and North America, the Maidan-Protest is restructuring mindsets and institutions in Ukraine. One SP reported: "So it was changing peoples' mind, but still we have a worse economical situation. The society is thinking too realistic and pessimistic, but we [students] are believing in a better time, in a better future." (SP I, 2017)

In addition to the increased future-orientation in their thinking, they also described a more progressive mentality and a new, globalized imagination as a part of the European Union: "The soviet mentality is changing and we are part of it ... In the last revolution [2007], we chose our way and I think this way goes in the direction of the European Union." (SP III, 2017)

Students have also united around and responded to the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, stating that they do not need administrative support (approval or finances) for projects meant to provide aid to affected regions. They embrace the responsibilities of citizenship and their role in shaping post-Soviet Ukraine: "We have organized a food drive for people on the Front and some students have even delivered the food, though it was dangerous." (SLKJ, 2017) Another student leader from Kyiv agreed:

We collected food and clothing—all of the students donated. We had so much. Then we packed everything and sent it to the Front. Someone drove it there—I can't remember who. . . . We didn't need administrative input on this. We just did it! (SLKE, 2017)

Although SPs and SLs strive to respond to societal needs and develop a changing mindset, student governments in Ukraine also face student apathy across their campuses (SP I, II & III, 2017).

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This finding was also supported by results of the 2017 spring survey. As Figure 1 suggests, only 45 per cent of students feel that student governance affects life at their university. Faculty (52.4 per cent), who may have the insight to see the potential of student government, were more supportive, but not overwhelmingly so.




Figure 1: student government and apathy

Despite the feeling that student government only marginally affects university life, students (67.6%) and faculty (75.2%) still feel it is necessary, as Figure 2 reveals.




Figure 2: Support for student government

Some student leaders sought direction outside their universities and recognized their need for leadership training. A female leader, who insisted on meeting me en route to her final exam, explained how training with USAID heightened her awareness about spheres of influence:

I take training through USAID. It is free though I first wrote a test to be accepted, not a test but an essay. They teach us how to get others involved. I have gone to my home village and worked with high school students to become active. My sister is a high school student. I want her to understand this while she is young. This can influence the whole village—everyone! It is very effective. (SLKA, 2017)

Upon departure this same student invited me to a gathering of youth in a local park. “We have 65 tables in the park today. We hope that youth, especially from high schools, will come to meet us. They are hungry for this, I think. Please come. You are welcome.” (SLKA, 2017)

An older graduate SL elaborated on the importance of the politicization process of students:

I have been an activist since before the new reform. There is little backbone to this reform. It does not teach student presidents how to be leaders. We work privately with leaders that are interested in change, real change. They need to know the policy, read the policy, understand how the policy can mobilize them. Not so many leaders are at this stage of thinking, but we help those who are . . . Somehow those ones find us. (SLKL)

This leader’s perspective suggests that the typical and “safe” activities that SP try to orchestrate on campus do not politicize them. Perhaps a continued legacy of the activities and understandings of Soviet student groups, Figure 3 reveals that the majority of students (58.5 per cent) and many faculty (46.1 per cent) see student government as primarily organizing sports and cultural events, while Figure 4 reveals student and faculty perceptions about the strong role administration plays in directing student governance.




Figure 3: Main activities of student government




Figure 4: Student government dependence on university administration

Theme 5 - Pride in Accomplishments

The need for acknowledgement of accomplishments is paramount in fuelling continuous change. SPs and SLs described positive accomplishments in the interviews, all very different and dependent on their local context. One SP felt that students were becoming more involved in the decision-making process: “With a good relationship with the administration our requests in the context of this university reform are positively received.” (SP II, 2017)

SPs also expressed positive progress in the development of trust, a forerunner to a strong relationship with university administration and city officials: “We have a good relationship with the university’s dean and the city’s mayor” (SP III, 2017). Another SP sated: “We increased the level of trust [last year] and it is visible this year.” (SP I, 2017)

Increases in autonomy, active participation with student groups across the country, and student projects were listed among notable accomplishments: “We have very good trust from administration, so they listen to us, if we have problems. We do good projects for our students. We started doing conferences and have this budget system . . . We also do whatever the administration asks of us.” (SP II, 2017)

Others described contests and requests for timetable changes, as previously mentioned. Yet, none saw these signs of progress as steps forward for all students in Ukraine nor worthy of more public sharing within their student body or between institutions.

Recommendations

The 73 democratic reforms of the government of Ukraine are still in their infancy. Their impacts will continue to emerge over time, be wide ranging, and affect numerous groups. Our literature review and thematic analysis, focussing on the implementation of the reform of student government through interviews with SPs and SLs, generated five themes and ensuing recommendations. Placed in the context of BST and considering Canadian examples of student government development, we offer the following recommendations:

1. Collaboration with other institutions seems to be challenging to establish, not only with other student governments but also with other possible funding groups. Student leaders at HEIs could benefit from attending conferences of student leaders, visiting other universities to meet with student leaders, engaging in frank discussions of each other’s issues, and establishing pathways to advancement. These enactments of BST could be beneficial to both SPs and SLs. For instance, after a visit to Canada, those who participated reported that “they could see more clearly how to solve some of their problems” (SP I) and “had more ideas” (SP II).

Weerts and Sandmann (2010) suggest that task orientation is a critical component to effective boundary spanning. Where student governments may struggle, especially those in developing democracies, is in task definition. Task orientation plays a significant role in dictating an individual’s, and even an organization’s, success. Managing the multiple identities and internal motivation of the collaboration, as well as structuring it to work effectively, are primary challenges. In Ukraine, where students report some distrust with administration and their goal of not engaging with corruption, clear roles would help guide the actions of student governments.

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2. The legal backing of student governments in Canada and their regulation has legitimized their existence and clarified the ways in which they interact with universities. It has been suggested that such legislation can be as limiting as it is validating, but the plight of Ukrainian students suggests that some legal footing may be beneficial.

Developing a strong relationship with their university's administration seems to be critical for students and the successful progression of this reform. We have seen that relationships between student groups and administrations in Canada are governed through bodies of legislation, and similar machinations are needed in Ukraine. Further, greater accountability on the part of administration toward student initiatives and the development of criteria to obtain the promised funds could make the processes of exchange more transparent and accountable, and teach students about transparency and accountability in practice. We have seen how, at many Western institutions, student organizations manage increasingly large budgets, hire professional staff, and even operate as legally independent entities. Increased participation of the student body in Ukraine could enhance and expedite a similar growth process. Perhaps because of a legacy of Soviet and non-capitalistic thinking, students in Ukraine seem poorly informed about matters concerning budgets, expenses, revenues, and deficits. This knowledge, perhaps delivered in part through contact with Western SPs, could empower them to take greater initiative in student projects and better prepare them for leadership in their communities upon graduation.

Further, administrators at Ukrainian universities need to understand their role in building the future of Ukraine's democratic leadership through their relationships with student governments. Providing for the basic needs of a SU such as a room, furniture, and budget would free students to concentrate on democratizing higher education institutions in Ukraine. Of course, given that the Soviet university has long been seen as training a professional cadre for the national economy and due to its hierarchical functioning and structure, the resistance to change among leaders of HEIs may require pressure to enact such basic measures (Kvit, 2015). In any case, student groups must be able to move their focus beyond only health, sports, and cultural activities to thoughts of becoming thought and change leaders. They further need to critically reflect upon ways that their dependence on university administration preserves and reproduces the Soviet, komsomol-like relationship.

Trust is a major issue when a boundary-spanner is responsible for convening with outside parties and representing that group's interests to his constituents. The issue is even more pronounced given the reigning state of distrust in post-Soviet societies. As Friedman and Podolny explain, "because the BRP [boundary-role person] is exposed to the other side and has to represent the other side's views to constituents, he or she tends to be distrusted" (Friedman & Podolny, 1992, p. 30). Solutions to this dynamic may include greater role and task clarity, complete role autonomy, or more spanners to handle different aspects of negotiations. In Canada, the issue of distrust is somewhat resolved by regulating legislation. While it is at once legitimizing and limiting, laws governing student governments provide a firm framework within which to work.

3. Student leaders need to overcome the problem of apathy among their student colleagues. Since the student government has an obligation to be present for the whole student body, it must establish a presence and demonstrate a purpose for students in all faculties and all years of study. Meaningful action projects and solicitation of student participants could help expand the reputation of the student government and also publicize its successes more widely. A student newspaper, newsletter, or website blog could act as an outlet through which to connect with the wider student population and disseminate information. UCLA's *The Daily Bruin* (1919), UBC's *Ubyssy* (1918), and the University of Alberta's *Gateway* (1910) have all provided students with work, experience, and awareness of sociopolitical issues for more than a century. Similar publications at Ukrainian universities could spike interest in student and global affairs and connect, better organize, and inform students.

Since it took 20 years for students to be expected to have membership on BoGs in Canada, we must be patient in awaiting broad, sweeping effects of reform among student governments in Ukraine. However, students in Canada took up the development of a newspaper as their voice early in their evolution, part of the British tradition upon which their institutions were founded. This source of student voice seems to require further development in Ukraine. Even in an era of social media, a student newspaper could offer a more formal mechanism to record and disseminate ideas being taken up locally under this reform; create venues for more public communication, debate, and negotiation; and inform and expand local, national, and international networks of internal and external constituents. Indeed, a newspaper acts at a level of sophistication that facilitates communication and exchange of information and ideas.

4. Even in an age of social media, we often turn to physical space as a determiner of who and what counts. The student leaders in this study all described the need for physical space as a marker of their identity and presence on campus. They also described the challenges of furnishing their spaces. Purchasing furniture is not currently allowed in the new reform mandate, yet finding sponsors for the purchase of furniture is risky since this could come with real or perceived tendencies toward corruption. The restrictions on how students can use funds merits revisiting. Moreover, a permanent space for student governments is highly recommended, as is their presence on social media and the universities' formal media channels.
5. Some students mentioned the value of leadership training programs, yet many had not heard of the idea. Perhaps the national level UAS could consider offering leadership training programs, possibly replicating the structure of the program of USAID if not necessarily its content. In comparison with Canadian SUs, those in Ukraine are in their infancy. As Ukraine's student governments evolve, they could benefit not only from striving to build trust with administration in order to accomplish their tasks, but also from studying the activities, responsibilities, and structures of SUs in other countries. Evolving student governments could be seen as another area needing knowledge mobilization (Gürüz, 2011).
6. Finally, student elections in Ukraine are held annually and only for a one-year period. Thus, without long-term capacity-building plans for student leadership, long-term projects and tasks

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are more difficult to fulfill for student government than short-term projects. Students also noted that the election period of the city's mayor or the university's dean must be factored into their decisions. Some of these constraints might be eliminated or improved if the SUs had more autonomy over the use of the funds allotted by the national government. It seems to be difficult for former student leaders to create long-term projects for a variety of reasons. Student governments should think about changing this current election system. Extending the duration of elected officials' terms of service would enable student leaders to think about different kinds of projects and could have a positive effect on long-term projects. Furthermore, an alumni network of past student leaders could be created to help connect past student initiatives with present or future projects and provide mentorship and continuity, especially during these early years of reform.

Closing and Opportunities for Further Research

Recent research has shown that Ukrainian students look favourably upon the implementation of Western education standards and integration in the European Union (Bagmet & Liakhovets, 2017). The sentiment demonstrated in 2014 through Euro-Maidan protests and the resulting November 2015 reforms endures across Ukrainian student populations. Yet there remain many institutional barriers to progress. These include the lingering Soviet command-style of economic and institutional policy and norms of bribery, collusion, cheating, and cronyism, all of which stand in the way of effective student government, which is philosophically based on democratic ideals. Practical steps, such as these recommendations, will indeed push the student agenda forward. However, real, top-level institutional practices must also acknowledge the need for reform. Through consideration of student government in a Western context, and through the utilization and enactment of boundary spanning theory, Ukrainian students and HEIs can hope to better understand the stakes of democratic university governance and implement effective strategies to realize it.

This paper has outlined a theory and practice employed by Canadian student associations as a template for Ukrainian students. It has also shed light on the experience of the Ukrainian student government leaders in the early years of implementing Ukraine's reform on higher education. In doing so, it has provided new insights into the state of student government in a budding democracy and offered pathways forward. It has not, however, explored the relationship of national organizations such as UAS to student governments or investigated the presence of other umbrella organizations or platforms for students' national influence on social, economic, and political matters. Nor has it considered the perspective of faculty or university administrators—indeed a large component of the processes of student government in the context of Ukraine. A study that takes into account the strategies of non-students in augmenting, engaging, or otherwise interacting with student governments might clarify how best to structure and proceed with future endeavours. Further, the current study has not examined Ukraine's EU aspirations nor considered the implications of the Bologna Process. It is the author's hope that this brief account might help spur such research.

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Chapter 4 — Reforming Ukrainian Health Care and Education After the Revolution of 2014: An Analysis of Parliamentary Discourse and Policy Change

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Abstract

In 2007, the Ukrainian Parliament established several parliamentary committees to discuss policy issues and examine proposals for legislation. After the Revolution of Dignity and subsequent parliamentary elections in 2014, new committees of the Verkhovna Rada were formed. In this study, we compare the policymaking activities of the Committee for Health Care and the Committee for Science and Education to examine the dynamics of democratic transition in post-revolutionary Ukraine and identify the factors that accelerate or slow this process.

Keywords: discourse analysis, policy change, Ukraine, reforms, democratization of health care, education

Introduction

In the last three decades, Ukraine has experienced three major political crises: 1) the dissolution of the USSR and regime change in 1991; 2) the Orange Revolution in 2005; and 3) the Euromaidan Revolution (or Revolution of Dignity) in 2014. The last political crisis—the Euromaidan—was seen as one of the most socially important events since independence and also as a window of opportunity in which to accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the Western world. The success of the revolution cultivated high expectations for the newly elected pro-European government and has naturally attracted the attention of social researchers.

Recent studies have focused mostly on the causes and dynamics of the revolution itself (Diuk, 2014; Marples & Mills, 2014; Szostek, 2014; Kuzio, 2016c). Also, the social consequences of the revolution have attracted the attention of scholars (Kuzio, 2015; Kulyk, 2016; Kuzio, 2016b). Some researchers have tried to assess the resulting progress of the democratic reforms demanded by protesters (Kuzio, 2016a; Cleary, 2016; Lough & Solonenko, 2016; Dabrowski, 2017; Havrylyshyn, 2017). Meanwhile, the process of post-revolutionary policymaking itself was out of the scope of the researchers.

In 1997, the Verkhovna Rada (i.e., the Ukrainian Parliament) established several parliamentary committees to discuss policy issues and examine proposals for legislation. The committees play an

important role in the Ukrainian legislative process. They may take part in legislative proposal making. However, the committees' main functions are to scrutinize draft laws before their first readings in the Verkhovna Rada and decide whether or not to put them on the parliamentary agenda. For each draft law, a main committee is designated to make that decision. Therefore, reforms in Ukraine, to a great extent, depend on their corresponding parliamentary committees. Following the post-revolutionary course toward accountability and transparency, these committees created websites to publicly disclose their current work; this provides opportunities for social scientists to study policymaking processes in Ukraine.

Schmidt (2011) argues that the dynamics of policy change are, to a great extent, determined by the transformational role of discourse. The discursive interaction of parliamentarians is seen as a reflection of institutional confrontation that serves the purpose of position-claiming, persuading, negotiating, agenda-setting, and opinion-building (Ilie, 2015). Most research on parliamentary discourse was focused on the parliamentary debates at the plenary sessions (e.g., Ilie, 2003; Treimane, 2014; Beaton, 2016), but not on the discursive interactions during policymakers' working meetings. In this research, I have considered the importance of parliamentary committees for Ukrainian policymaking and have attempted to contribute to existing knowledge by answering the following questions:

- 1) What are the dynamics of democratic transition in post-revolutionary Ukraine?
- 2) What is the relationship between parliamentary discourse at the committee level and policy change?

Framework & Method

This research is a comparative case study that contrasts the work of two committees of the Verkhovna Rada, the Committee for Science and Education and the Committee for Health Care. I chose these two committees because they both deal with services valued by Ukrainian society and guaranteed by the Ukrainian constitution, and they both aim to reform institutional systems inherited from the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, they have manifested different rates of progress with reforms.

The work of the committees was compared from two perspectives, both of which are reflected in the structural design of this study. In the first part of this study, I used a policy density and policy intensity analytical frameworks (Bauer & Knill, 2014) to explore the dynamics of policy change. The framework analyzes reforms both quantitatively (i.e., with the help of different metrics such as word counts, number of legislative acts issued, etc.) and qualitatively to better understand the amount and impact of resulting changes. The main source of data for this part of my research was the official online legislation database of the Verkhovna Rada ("Vsi Dokumenty . . .", n.d.).

To analyze discursive interaction, I also combined both quantitative and qualitative research methods under the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis (Taylor, 2004; Schmidt, 2011; Tenorio, 2011), which seeks to understand the relationship between discourse and its context. This

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part of my research was mostly data driven. First, I applied a text-mining methodology to extract quantitative data that reflects the discourse peculiarities from the corpora of the committees' sittings records. For this purpose, I used TM and NGRAM packages for R (Feinerer, 2017; Schmidt & Heckendorf, 2017) for data preparation and analysis, and PyMorph package for Python (Korobov, 2015) in order to transform the words to their initial forms. The latter is a beta version; therefore, I had to manually check the results of this part of the analysis. The descriptive characteristics of the corpora are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive characteristics of the corpora

	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
<u>Committee for Health Care</u>					
Records	2	23	22	16	63
Statements	210	6,177	6,856	4,942	18,185
Words	23,058	284,812	244,609	79,660	632,139
<u>Committee for Science and Education</u>					
Records	2	27	24	10	63
Statements	411	4,543	4,973	2,120	12,047
Words	31,134	403,229	356,072	135,262	925,697

After comparing the word counts of the corpora, I looked at the qualitative differences in the discussions of reforms to help explain the differences in reform progress. The sources of data for this part of the research were the records of committees' sittings available online on their respective websites ("Stenohramy", n.d.; "Stenohramy zasidan . . . ", n.d.). As of December 2017, not all of the records were available online. Therefore, the results may be influenced by the incompleteness of data.

Results

Policy Change

Since the Revolution of Dignity, three major laws in science and education have been approved: 1) the Law on Higher Education (July 2014); 2) the Law on Science and Technology (November 2015); and

3) the Law on Education (September 2017). The total word count for all three documents is 77,752 words.

The new laws comprise a number of reform provisions, including the following:

- granting autonomy and greater decentralization to research and educational institutions;
- setting up independent national funding and quality control agencies;
- increasing salaries and other benefits for researchers and educators;
- securing the priority of inclusive education.

Special attention is paid to ensuring that educational practices approach international standards. A 12-year schooling period with different organizational forms (e.g., homeschooling and on-line education) is introduced. Preschool education is made obligatory, but parents may choose whether to educate their children at home or in an educational institution.

As a result of these reforms, secondary and higher educational institutions are now undergoing a process of complete transformation. Nevertheless, only three healthcare related legislative proposals and two new laws have been approved since the Revolution. Changes were made to existing laws regarding: 1) government procurement (March 2015); 2) licensing of pharmacies (April 2015); and, 3) state registration of medications (May 2016). The Law, “On State Financial Guarantees of Granting Medical Services and Medicines,” was approved in October 2017, and the Law, “On Increasing Accessibility and Quality of Medical Services in Rural Area,” was approved in November 2017. The total word count for all five documents is 17,835 words.

According to the provisions of the new legislation:

- International organizations (e.g., UNDP) are allowed to take part in government purchases.
- It is clarified that pharmacies are not obliged to be licensed as medical institutions.
- The term of state registration of medications—which are already registered in the US, Canada, Japan, and several countries of the European Union—is reduced to 15 days;
- The new public control and funding institutions are set up.
- A new medical service funding mechanism is introduced; private medical enterprises are now allowed to receive governmental funding according to fixed fees despite the fact that the key innovative financial mechanism of co-payment proposed by the Ministry of Health was excluded from the final text of the bill;
- The general course of the development of rural medical institutions is outlined (without specifying many of the details) with special attention paid to the development of internet-based infrastructure.

Thus, the changes introduced can be described as first steps in Ukrainian medical services approaching Western standards, rather than as substantial reforms. It can be seen, then, that there have been substantial reforms in education and relatively minor changes in health care. Most of the

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latter have been introduced by the new laws. Hence the policy changes in Education are relatively greater in both number and intensity.

The Dynamics of Parliamentary Discourse

In the previous section, I briefly examined the results of policymaking activities of the two committees. In the following section, I will discuss the discursive interactions at parliamentary sittings that preceded the above-mentioned policy changes.

Exploring the most frequent bi-grams (pairs of words) reveals the most discussed topics of each year since the Revolution (Tables 2 and 3). Some Ukrainian bi-grams are translated with only one word and vice versa. For example, I used the word “agenda” for Ukrainian “порядок денний” and the words “hospital district” for Ukrainian “госпітальний” to specify the meaning of the word “hospital.”

Table 2: The Committee for Health Care: 20 most frequent bi-grams (trans. fr. Ukrainian; QTY)

2014	2015	2016	2017	
health care	146 health care	1873 ministry care	799 health care	220
medical insurance	38 ministry care	770 general discussion	297 medical care	105
ministry care	31 committee care	232 medication	254 general discussion	80
system care	21 committee problem	182 committee problem	230 cabinet minister	77
medication	19 problem care	171 cabinet minister	225 noise hall	70
committee member	18 cabinet minister	144 problem care	222 committee problem	53
committee care	17 establishment care	131 agenda	118 legal agency	46
general discussion	16 make change	129 noise hall	114 problem care	46
package reform	14 head people's	129 work group	109 parliament sitting	45
working group	13 project law	125 establishment care	105 local government	42
legislation provision	11 make decision	103 move change	96 health service	41
reanimation package	11 general discussion	102 count chamber	93 establishment care	38
committee hearing	9 medical care	177 problem discussion	92 agenda	34
action plan	8 minister care	96 project law	86 international organization	32
public health	8 noise hall	93 system care	84 authority local	31
committee problem	7 people's deputy	92 people's deputy	76 primary medical	30
organization care	7 medication	83 member committee	75 hospital district	28
absolute none	7 system care	83 move reading	71 move change	27
strategy advisory	6 member committee	80 red cross	71 work group	27
legislation problem	6 discussion problem	75 international organization	68 problem discussion	25

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Table 3: The Committee for Science and Education: 20 most frequent bi-grams (translated from Ukrainian; QTY)

2014	2015	2016	2017
higher education	67	education institution	539
higher education (institution)	49	higher education	536
education science	48	ministry education	483
education institution	41	education science	396
ministry education	34	academy science	307
external independent	30	higher education (institution)	274
independent assessment	29	cabinet minister	210
law higher	25	law higher	167
ministry finance	24	national academy	161
national academy	21	project decision	151
committee problem	16	committee problem	122
point view	14	law education	117
academy science	14	hear head	115
access higher	11	project law	114
large quantity	11	vocational education	108
subject competence	11	work group	107
new law	11	move change	105
criterion admission	11	point view	105
acting	10	noise hall	104
problem science	10	government contract	103
		secondary education	48
		minister education	48

The data shows that the most frequent combinations of words for both the Committee for Health Care and the Committee for Science and Education are—unsurprisingly—related to the policy making process. These words and phrases include “parliamentary sitting,” “agenda,” “project law,” and “cabinet of ministers,” among others.

More interesting are other bi-grams unrelated to lawmaking activities. In 2014, among the most discussed health-care related problems were medical insurance and public health, concepts that are relatively new to Ukraine. Other common phrases for 2014 are related to the planning of the reforms. “The Reanimation Package of Reforms”, a large coalition of NGOs that advocates for the reforms in Ukraine, was also often mentioned. In 2017, the most frequent bi-grams reflected the content of the most recently accepted laws, while “international organizations” also received frequent mention.

At the sittings of the Committee for Science and Education, the most frequently used bi-grams during all four years were “secondary” and “higher education,” “assessment of academic performance,” “governmental funding,” and “access to higher education.”

Examination of weighted unigrams reveals relative year-to-year changes in word frequencies (Tables 4 and 5). At the Committee for Health Care, the keywords “reform,” “strategy,” “Europe,” and “community” were much more frequent in 2014 and less frequent in 2017. The opposite dynamic is seen for words “assets,” “change,” “hospital district,” “international,” and “purchases.”

Table 4: The Committee for Health Care: unigram dynamics (translated from Ukrainian; QTY^a)

	2014	2015	2016	2017		2014	2015	2016	2017
assets\funds	82	113	182	181	local	35	58	47	102
ATO ^b	35	46	29	8	local government	48	26	16	60
budget	156	280	274	195	maidan	0	1	2	0
center	104	69	88	49	medications	39	33	74	58
change	139	179	173	274	military	104	52	18	3
children	17	132	146	50	patient	56	33	57	93
community	160	58	78	74	people's deputy	243	473	362	210
corruption	69	29	32	49	purchases	104	145	203	305
decentralization	43	5	25	9	reform	468	104	93	142
doctor	95	73	56	196	revolution	0	1	2	1
Europe	117	49	59	23	right to	117	85	110	110
finance	178	148	162	131	service	104	38	88	211
hospital	48	77	35	110	strategy	369	30	11	8
hospital district	30	1	2	119	vaccine	30	181	62	25
international	30	70	111	181	wound	0	18	11	0

a Policymaking process related terms (e.g., “draft,” “law,” “committee,” “decision”) were excluded from the analysis. Additionally, I examined Euromaidan related keywords (e.g., “ATO,” “maidan,” “revolution,” “reform”) even if they weren’t among the most frequent terms. The word counts were weighted by a total word count for the corresponding year and multiplied by 100,000 for better readability.

b Anti-terroristic operation.

Table 5: The Committee for Science and Education: Unigram dynamics (translated from Ukrainian; QTY^a)

	2014	2015	2016	2017		2014	2015	2016	2017
academy	141	245	201	198	local	6	57	101	83
assessment	238	45	42	14	maidan	0	3	2	1
assets\funds	257	119	147	138	military	45	23	16	7
ATO ^b	16	13	6	11	new	135	109	90	83
budget	212	185	303	189	professional	42	182	229	102
certificate	161	28	17	8	cutback	87	29	26	6
change	183	176	170	158	reform	22	68	73	65
children	96	149	204	177	region	58	67	165	98
community	3	22	19	70	revolution	0	4	5	2
decentralization	3	15	22	10	right to	225	182	113	187
development	71	70	95	123	school	87	145	157	265
Europe	45	86	62	87	service	0	21	19	41
finance	238	188	327	107	student	148	103	140	77
inclusion	3	2	5	17	university	270	201	203	131
language	80	96	64	167	ZNO ^c	100	25	40	89

^a Policymaking process related terms (e.g., “draft,” “law,” “committee,” “decision”) were excluded from the analysis. Additionally, I examined Euromaidan related keywords (e.g. “ATO,” “maidan,” “revolution,” “reform”) even if they weren’t among the most frequent terms. The word counts were weighted by a total word count for the corresponding year and multiplied by 100,000 for better readability.

^b Anti-terroristic operation.

^c Zovnishnie nezalezhne otsiniuvannia—external independent assessment of academic performance.

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At the sittings of the Committee for Science and Education, the keywords “assets,” “funds,” “cutback,” “certificate,” and “university” were much more frequent in 2014 and less frequent in 2017. The opposite dynamic is seen for the words “community,” “language,” “school,” and “service.” Inclusion is also discussed more often in 2017, although this term is not among the most frequent keywords.

If we compare the committees to one another, we see that at the Committee for Health Care, the word “reforms” was mentioned 20 times more often than at the Committee for Science and Education in 2014 and twice as often in 2017. Also, at the Committee for Health Care, reforms were directly announced, and action plans and concepts for reform were widely discussed at the first committee meetings in 2014. In contrast, at the Committee for Science and Education, reforms were only mentioned during discussions of more specific changes to be made.

Analysis: Determinants of Change

The analysis of policy change and the preceding discursive interactions prompts this question: if the reforms were more directly and frequently discussed at the Committee for Health Care, why are the changes in education greater? A closer look at the qualitative differences in discussions of reform and the corresponding social context may reveal the answer.

Here is an example of a context in which the word “reform” was used at the Committee for Science and Education in 2014 (Note: here and following, the quotations are translated by the author from Ukrainian; the sources are the websites of the previously cited committees):

We agree that in Ukraine, the reform of the system of education in general and the system of higher education in particular is vital and urgent. Also, we positively rate the work of the Ministry of Education and Science which follows the course toward elimination of the corruption that exists in Ukrainian higher education. We agree that the designation of terms of validity for the certificates of academic performance is in accordance with international practice . . .

We understand that the Ministry is reforming the present system of external independent assessment and that, as a result, acceptance of certificates issued before 2015 will be technically difficult. At the same time, we emphasize that while implementing any reforms, it is obligatory to follow the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and also to follow the constitutional principle of the priority of human rights and freedoms . . .

We have made the necessary address regarding the world practice of testing systems and specifying at least a two-year validity period for the assessment certificate. This will allow a person . . . to use his or her right [to enter the university] without recurrently undergoing the external independent assessment and bearing material costs (Oleksandr Spivakovsky, 09 December 2014).

In the first segment of this excerpt, a Member of Parliament reassures the listeners that he supports and understands the importance of the Ministry’s work on reforms. At the same time, he

refers to the human right of education, which is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine and which may be violated if a two-year validity term for the certificates of academic performance is not introduced.

In the second segment of this excerpt, the Member of Parliament continues his argument and uses the word “reform” in a negative sense to describe the changes made under the leadership of former Minister of Education Dmytro Tabachnyk. The MP suggests that these changes have negatively influenced students’ competence in natural sciences and that now they need more time to adapt to the new requirements of universities’ admission processes:

Much esteemed colleagues! I am a person who passed the math exams in 1985, and I believe that such a person may have more mathematical competence than someone who passed ZNO in 2014 or will pass ZNO in 2015. This is because the level of mathematical competence, thanks to the implemented reforms, has decreased; we have destroyed math, destroyed physics, and destroyed chemistry in secondary schools, and we are reaping all these unfortunate outcomes because certain decisions were made. Thus, I’d like to say that there is nothing bad in allowing a transitional period for the system to adjust. However, that’s it, the wrong behavioural model of Mr. Tabachnyk is over. We are all switching to the new model. So, we warn you, this is how we will work in future (Oleksandr Spivakovsky, 09 December 2014).

Thus, in this statement, the MP referenced the reforms to strengthen his proposition to introduce a two-year validity term for the certificates of academic performance.

At the Committee for Health Care, there were two types of references to reforms. The first is the discussion of reforms themselves. The following are two excerpts from a presentation of reforms made by the representatives of the Ministry, former minister Oleksandr Kvitašvili and the head of the reforming working group Volodymyr Kurpita:

1) What are we going to present today? It is the work of the group, which has gathered in September this year. Twelve people, who work, twelve, plus many more people, who work. This is Mr. Musii, who opened the first meeting of this group. The group was created. Its only task was to develop a strategy to reform the system of health care in Ukraine. It was a very interesting group, twelve people. There were some foreigners, of course, and there were the representatives of Ukrainian community and the medical field, and so on . . .

So, this is the result from synthesizing some very different approaches to the reform of health care. I like it very much, frankly, and this strategy gives us an opportunity to write a good action plan (Oleksandr Kvitašvili, 26 December 2014).

2) As a result of the group’s work, we proposed (the next slide) to develop a strategy which will cover six main directions of reform as we contend that only the combination of all six directions may give Ukraine success. These directions, or blocks are the same as those defined by the World Health Organization as crucial for the field. They include providing medical services, funding of the field, management, human resources, digitization of the field, integration of technologies, goods and medications . . .

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Regarding the provision of medical services, the group distinguishes five main spheres in which these services are being provided, represented by blocks in the strategy. They include the development and restructuring of primary medical care. The main directions the group propose for discussions are new models of relationships between primary health care doctors and the communities which hire them. This may involve either principles of private-state partnership, principles of privatization of the primary branch, or mechanisms of positioning doctors as representatives of the profession who may be directly hired by the community (Volodymyr Kurpita, 26 December 2014).

The speakers described the cooperative nature of the working process, which helped to formulate the reforming strategy as well as to enact it. Here the word “reform” is used in its most straightforward meaning—to name the process of making changes to an existing system.

The second type of reference to reforms is shown in the following two excerpts, rather emotional statements made by the head of the committee, Olha Bohomolets. In the first excerpt, she addresses the mass media and other listeners present at the sitting and stresses the inappropriateness and the Soviet nature of the current health care system:

Much esteemed colleagues! Dear guests! Mass media! I want to stress one more time that the reform of health care—though it is hard for me to call it a reform because actually the system of health care in Ukraine as caring about health of the citizens doesn't exist today. Today, the remains of the Soviet system still exist, and they are not functioning, and cannot meet the demands of an absolutely different style of economy (Olha Bohomolets, 26 December 2014).

After that she assures the audience that she would be proud to cooperate with the responsible representatives of civil society to go through the likely painful process of reforming the current Soviet system to gain success and prosperity:

We are talking about the public that the public should join. The work of the Committee for Health Care should be open to the public, the people, the labour unions. That's why we suggest—and we have discussed this issue with the “Reanimation Package of Reforms”—for them to join the work in all those directions, including primarily the reform. . .

I'm ready to cooperate with you, and together, step-by-step, we must understand that we need reforms. Yes, for some people they will be painful. For those who don't know how to work or who are not professional will lose their jobs. But those who are professional and ready to take responsibility will make a profit and become millionaires. And I will be proud of it, and I want to see it (Olha Bohomolets, 26 December 2014).

In one more example, Oleh Musii underlines that the audience members should have known that it was Mr. Musii who first noticed that the health care system should be rebuilt from scratch and that this term, which he coined—“building the system from scratch”—was recognized by experts in the field:

Concerning reforms and building the new system of health care, it was me who, you probably remember, was one of the initiators of this new term . . . reforming or building the new system of health care—which was accepted also by all the experts—where you took part. So it was built, the strategy, and this final document, which we will see today, as I understand, it is based on the concept of building the health care system, which had been developed before that. Now, after the strategy, we are waiting for an action plan (Oleh Musii, 26 December 2014).

So, this second way of using reforms in a political discourse serves the purpose of gaining political benefits by presenting an MP as having a personal commitment to follow the publicly favoured course towards reform.

One more topic that has revealed a noticeable pattern in 2014–2017—the government purchases made by international organizations—also deserves special attention. As previously mentioned, changes were made in 2015 to the Ukrainian legislation allowing international organizations to mediate governmental contracts on medical supplies between Ukraine and foreign manufacturers. These changes were seen as a means of reducing corrupt practices in government purchases. This issue was a frequent subject of discussion at many committee sittings. The following are some examples of these discussions in 2017. In the first excerpt, one of the MPs, presenting himself as the representative of public interest, complains about losing control over state funds and proposes to cancel the previously accepted reform provisions of the new legislation:

This law has been working for two years. We all have voted for this law. We—the representatives of our Ukrainian people. What do we have? Did it get better in our hospitals? No. Are the programs working? What programs? What are we talking about today? . . . These funds are behind the border of Ukraine; we are not controlling them. We are not controlling the supplies. Olha Vadymivna [Bohomolets], let's cancel this law and work normally (Shypko Andriy, 8 February 2017).

The second excerpt is an example of an MP's simultaneous use of various rhetorical devices to, in the end, demand dismissal of the Ministry staff. The tactics include referencing external sources of power (the secret service and the general prosecutor) who are claimed to be in support of the MP's argument, as well as accusations of incompetence, irresponsibility, serving foreign interests, and even killing people:

Where is the responsibility? Where is the money? Lying in America and turning over in Americans' pockets? . . . Well then, immediately inquire at the General Prosecutor's Office, and let them handle it. The head of SBU [the Secret Service] has already said, "These international purchases should be canceled in the country." So, how can we take into consideration, when people are killed, people's lives? . . . We should remove all the staff of the Ministry from office . . . They are not working, they are not willing to work, they are not able to work (Tetiana Bakhtieva, 5 April 2017).

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Two other excerpts directly allege that the Ministry in general and Uliana Suprun in particular are covering up corruption and lobbying international mafia:

- 1) Much esteemed people's deputies! Colleagues! To my deep regret, we are now witnessing international corruption, which the Ministry of Health Care covers up. And dare I say, this is a classic example of international corruption and bringing all the corruption schemes to the international level (Oleh Musii, 22 February 2017).
- 2) I think that the investigative committee . . . should evaluate these disgraceful facts about the scam with international purchases, which Uliana Suprun has signed . . . This is one more reason to think about the effectiveness of international purchases and lobbying through international organizations such as the transnational pharmaceutical mafia which exists in the world (Oleh Musii, 27 May 2017).

These examples reveal the conflict between some members of the Committee for Health Care and the Ministry of Health Care. At the same time, some reformative legislation proposals were still supported by the Committee in general. So, there is likely no unified group of interest resisting reforms but rather several groups advancing their own political agendas.

For comparison, below are several illustrations of conflict at the Committee for Science and Education. In 2014, the reform of educational institutions and post-revolutionary economic recession, combined with the military conflict in Donbass region, resulted in proposed cutbacks of funding for education and science. At that time, insufficient funds put the existence of national science academies at risk. The situation has led to mass protests by academics, and the following excerpts show how this was reflected in corresponding discursive interactions.

The first excerpt shows the position of the former head of the Committee, Liliia Hrynevich. She questions the necessity to cut back the funding of the National Academy of Educational Sciences and points out that this institution will not survive if this proposition is accepted:

I understand that it is possible to cut the budget by ten to fifteen percent. This is a cutback, which can always be handled by tightening belts. But if, in this case, we have a cutback from 104 million to 80 million [hryvnas], it is a liquidation of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. I think this question should undergo a wide public discussion, for it is the complete destruction of the scientific support of education. That's why, if this proposition actually exists, it should definitely undergo a wide discussion (Liliia Hrynevych, 10 December 2014).

The second excerpt shows the position of academics present at the sitting. The vice president of the National Academy of Sciences says he understands the need for economizing, but he warns of possible consequences:

Regarding specific numbers: So, the day before yesterday, we received an order from the Ministry of Finance to rewrite our funding expectations and funding request, reducing it by 600 million. There was 2.6 billion and now there is only 2 billion—or even less—left. Thus, the budget of the National Academy of Sciences is reduced by virtually 30 percent. I understand that the situation is indeed complex and economizing is necessary. Well, we will try to somehow survive in this situation. But obviously it may have negative social consequences (Anatoliy Zahorodniy, 10 December 2014).

Finally, the last example shows support for the existing system and also recognition of the need for it to be transformed:

I don't support the thought that we need cutbacks. We have a model, yes, and maybe it should be more effective. But making such a cutback is a destruction, a dramatic destruction, of the model that we have in Ukraine. That's why I also cannot support this (Oleksandr Spivakovskiy, 10 December 2014).

After the resignation of Minister Kvit, Liliia Hrynevich came to office at the Ministry, and currently, Oleksandr Spivakovskii is leading the Committee. So, it is likely that educational reform will follow one general ideological line. The comparison of discourse peculiarities in both committees shows the following:

- The discussion of reforms at the Committee for Science and Education is more soft and “technical,” while at the Committee for Health Care it is more dynamic and “political.”
- There is a higher conflict intensity and more diversity within interest groups at the Committee for Health Care, and more uniformity and conformity at the Committee for Science and Education.
- In education, there is a higher level of cooperation between the Ministry and the corresponding parliamentary committee.

Finally, combining the results of the two parts of this research leads to the following conclusions:

1. The reforms in Ukrainian health care and education are being implemented, although the existing systems are resisting. As greater changes are announced, the resistance also becomes greater.
2. The parliamentary discourse at the committee level directly reflects the policymaking process. At the same time, discursive interactions at this level are not only restricted to technical work in analyzing draft laws but also serve to accrue personal political benefits and advance the agendas of diverse interest groups. With higher conflict intensity and a profusion of interest groups comes a corresponding slowdown in reform.

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Chapter 5 — The Impact of Geopolitical and Military Parameters on Inclusive Education Reform in Ukraine and Crimea

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Abstract

Using Chong and Graham's three-level "nested" framework, Crimean inclusive education is compared at the macro, meso, and micro levels from 2003 to 2014, when Crimea was an autonomous republic within Ukraine, to 2014 to 2017, after the Russian Federation illegally annexed Crimea. Post-communist Ukraine and the Russian Federation inherited an identical education system for students with disabilities, here described as segregated, with some integration. In 1991, after Ukraine independence and the creation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukrainian non-governmental organizations received international aid and support to advance the social model of inclusive education (IE) based on human rights as defined by the United Nations. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Sciences, civic groups, and international donors supported this model. Funding aimed to establish student-centered IE education compatible with Ukraine's strategic direction to join the European Union, establish the rule of law, and protect human rights. After the Russian Federation's annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 2014, Russian state legislation and programming re-prioritized segregated education, while Ukraine without Crimea, continued to advance IE. Eight indicators assess progress in inclusive education and show that annexation of Crimea by military means led to the re-imposition of Russian education laws and regulations that stymied student-centered inclusive education and returned it, in large measure, to the old system of segregation with a medical model of rehabilitation. The path of IE on the Crimean Peninsula is best understood as determined by the civilizational values, objectives, and conduct of the state authority in power.

Keywords: Ukraine, Crimea, inclusive education, educational reform, Russia

Introduction

The collapse of the USSR into 15 independent republics in 1991 has provided social scientists and educational comparativists with a unique opportunity to examine how the

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standardized educational system of a unitary state became differentiated into many distinct states. These divergences are evident in recent years among independent states that formerly comprised the USSR, such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and others (Hale, 2015, p. 6; Kolupayeva, Taranchenko, & Danilavichute, 2014, p. 333).

Context matters in disciplined, international comparative research. The effects of globalization differ from place to place (Crossley, 2002, p.84), so comparison requires a framework of historical periodization and works best by collecting evidence at several levels.

This paper is limited historically to reforms in inclusive education in Ukraine and Crimea in the decade preceding 2017. We draw from Chong and Graham's nested classification system (2013, p. 29–30), a framework in comparative education that examines education systems at the macro, meso, and micro levels. Chong and Graham have accepted Dale's suggestion (2005, p. 132) of incorporating a scaled system of governance to allow a more precise examination of the effects of global influences on education.

In contrast to the customary ahistorical and de-contextualized approach often used in comparative education, this nested approach is expected to provide insights into what has occurred in the area of inclusive education in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Ukraine up to 2014 and in the Republic of Crimea after it was illegally annexed and integrated into the Russian Federation in March 2014.

Transitions in educational systems become more transparent during periods of crisis. This is particularly so with regime change. In Ukraine, the dissolution and transformation of the USSR and its educational system has had two distinct phases:

1. The period of state independence and transition to democracy and capitalism, which included Ukraine's cooperation with the Russian Federation, from August 1991 to February 2014 (Plokhy, 2015, p. 340–45; Dawish, 2014, p. 318–50).
2. From February 2014, when military conflict separated the geopolitical, economic, social, and educational systems of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, to the present time, in December 2017 (Wilson, 2014, p. 99–117).

This article focuses on how the concept and practice of inclusive education was advanced in Ukraine (including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) and how Crimea changed its policies regarding inclusive education after Russian annexation in 2014. This study allows us to understand how civilizational conflicts and national changes prompted by geopolitical and military events affect the development of inclusive education. As structures and relations change over time, operate in different contexts, and with changing activities, so do educational systems.

Examining the diverse geopolitical interests of post-communist Ukraine and the Russian Federation helps explain Crimea's current prioritization of the medical/segregated model in educating children with disabilities over Ukraine's recently launched social inclusive education model.

Study team and location

The international research team—two members from Ukraine and one from Canada—previously collaborated on an international technical assistance project on inclusive education in Ukraine. The team's skills are interdisciplinary, drawing on expertise in pedagogy, educational psychology, and international development. After the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, this team came together for one month in 2016 in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, as a follow-up to assess the inclusive educational reforms in Ukraine and the impact of annexation on the education of disabled children in Crimea. The team members shared their accumulated experiences and field notes and were reflective in identifying patterns in the development of education systems.

Framework

Inclusive education is a complex agency of social reproduction that creates and reflects relations between and within societies. This study places inclusive education at the centre of the investigation while examining how national and educational determinants are affected by macro supra-national events including geopolitical conflicts. It demonstrates that complex events interact with and influence outcomes in inclusive education.

Having collected information on reforms to inclusive education in Ukraine and Crimea, the team selected Chong and Graham's scaled nested framework (2013) to meaningfully systematize the information. This framework addresses "structures from without" laddered down to "structures from within" to "changes in practice" and allows the lower category to be nested or contextualized as a subset within the higher one (2013, p. 30).

The framework begins from a macro perspective in the jurisdiction that experienced regime change. This unique historical perspective compares two regimes in context to demonstrate how geopolitical macro trends affected the regimes' educational systems in special and inclusive education with regard to curricula, teaching processes, and educational support services in both the Ministry of Education and Science and civil society. This framework then moves to examine meso structures and micro practices.

In this descriptive, longitudinal, and revelatory case study, the team used qualitative and quantitative methods to examine reforms using multiple sources. The validity of observations was assured by triangulating and cross-checking data and searching for negative cases that

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challenged researchers' personal beliefs and knowledge. Ethical considerations of anonymity with interviews were respected.

Methods and operational definitions

Chong and Graham (2013) define their levels as follows:

- Macro level refers to an “outside in” supra-national perspective in a global context identifying historical trends that influence educational structures particular to each jurisdiction.
- Meso-level refers to shifts in national educational structures and policies.
- Micro-level refers to evidence from key stakeholders in specific cases.

Macro level structures from without

At the macro level, “civilizational paradigms” are geopolitical understandings that are incommensurable; different paradigms cannot be objectively compared in terms of their values or logic (Kuhn, 1970). In this paper, these paradigms are expressed as political scripts such as “post-communism,” “authoritarianism,” and “democracy.” In this case, we comment on educational values and systems that fit two sets of ontological assumptions: democracy and authoritarianism in the patronal systems in Ukraine (Wilson, 2014; Yekelchyk, 2015) and the Russian Federation (Hale, 2015; Goldman, 2004) in which political struggle is a competition among various patron-client networks. The present study uses literature reviews and comparison of legal documents to identify two interpretive paradigms that underlie inclusive education in Crimea before and after a regime change.

Meso level structures

The authors see education as a dynamic process at the national level comprised of multiple determinations. This study focuses on the politics of education that asks who makes key decisions and how they make them (Robertson & Dale, 2015, p. 166–67).

Legislation and policy documents in Ukraine and the Russian Federation are examined to identify past and present themes and how these themes are contextualized within national structures. Data was gathered from multiple sources:

- Changes in legislation.
- Statistical information from ministries about changes in the education infrastructure.
- Pedagogical practices.
- Information on non-governmental organizations.
- Participant observation outcomes.
- Qualitative interviews about the lived experience of IE educators in their environments.

Micro level practice

Examples focus on micro-level educational practitioners in civil society outside state educational institutions. Semi-structured interviews with policy makers are analyzed from each jurisdiction, and text-based policy discourses are juxtaposed to determine which themes disappear over time and which remain. The micro level practice also examines specific innovative educational practices of civil society used in Crimea when it was part of Ukraine prior to 2014 compared to the period afterwards.

Ukraine and the Russian Federation at the Macro level

In the following section, we examine salient factors that influenced inclusive education in Crimea in the contexts of Ukraine and after the Russian Federation's illegal annexation.

Ukraine

Divisions among political leaders have allowed citizens greater scope to be genuinely involved in political processes in Ukraine. Ukraine has had both single and plural systems of political leadership. Patronal power has changed hands among Ukrainian oligarchs, leading to greater interaction with the EU and more emphasis on human rights, which has, in turn, influenced the country's approach to education and disability issues (Hale, 2015, p. 331–50).

As a result, the rule of law is increasing, although Ukraine is not yet a consolidated democracy. Overall, the Government of Ukraine and leading organizations in civil society hold the view that Ukraine has finally achieved national state independence and is pursuing economic integration with Europe. More importantly, Ukraine has chosen European values—natural human rights, democracy, and the rule of law—to ensure the rights, freedoms, and active participation of every citizen, regardless of health, religion, and other factors.

Between 2005 and 2010, Ukraine moved from a plural system to a single system and then back to a plural, patronal system of governance. It then became apparent that the undemocratic single patronal system did not fit citizen demands of modern Ukrainian reality (Hale, 2015, p. 234–40). After 2010, Ukraine attracted considerable financial and technical assistance from democratic countries that provided help in many fields to advance the country's strategic path toward integration with Western countries. This increasing interaction of Ukraine with the West and increasing openness of that country to the world—Ukraine's civilizational choice—had a critical influence on inclusive education by directly influencing the philosophical basis of the education system.

On December 16, 2009, Ukraine ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and signed the Optional Protocol (OP), which obligates the State to protect the rights of persons with disabilities and to strengthen respect for these rights. Ukraine confirmed its commitment by signing the OP, which contains the mechanisms for implementing the Convention; it also gives a UN Committee authority to review grievances of individual citizens regarding violations of the Convention in signatory countries. States have the option to ratify or sign only the Convention and to decline to sign the Optional Protocol. Although the Russian

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Federation ratified the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities on May 3, 2012, it has not signed the Optional Protocol.

The opening of a closed society also affected inclusive education as international agencies made their presence known in Ukraine and as Ukrainian special education activists travelled and observed inclusive education in practice elsewhere. Thus, the International Renaissance Foundation and the International Centre for Child Development in Washington founded the Ukrainian Step by Step Foundation, which became one of the driving forces behind the development of social inclusion in Ukraine.

Russian Federation

In contrast to Ukraine, the political regime in the Russian Federation tried and failed to work within the values of the European Union (EU) through a win-win perspective that sees democracy and prosperity as potential consequences of international partnerships. Putin's regime has posited a binary framework as an East-West dichotomy, which leads the Russian Federation to follow a nationalist Great Power geopolitical strategy. This strategy focuses on controlling spheres of influence for the purposes of stability and dominance over neighbouring states with a xenophobic attitude toward the West (Kotkin, 2016; Kuzio, 2017).

The attitude of President Putin's inner circle of former KGB personnel toward Ukraine and the EU's Eastern Partnership is largely posited as a zero-sum struggle between countries with nuclear military capabilities. Moscow's state chauvinism empowers it to treat smaller states of Eastern Europe as buffer states over which it has leverage and from which it can expel Western influence and control their economies for its own purposes. The Russian Federation believes that Europe, the United States, and NATO promote their own civic values and civil societies to enlarge the EU at Russia's expense. The Federation prefers to view itself as having a unique Eurasian civilization rather than one that reflects contemporary Western values (Snyder, 2018).

In March 2014, when Ukraine was experiencing political disruption and poverty, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean Peninsula in a covert operation that was prepared years in advance. Illegal annexation was achieved through a hybrid war (Mankoff, 2014, p. 60–68). After Crimea was invaded, an unconstitutional and disputed referendum was held in Crimea under control of the Russian Armed Forces, paramilitaries, and self-organized groups. As the result of a vote at the United Nations condemning the annexation, the results of the referendum were not internationally recognized as legitimate.

On March 16, 2014, the Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine and requested admission to the Russian Federation (Allison, 2014, p. 1260). The Accession Treaty carried this out on March 18, 2014. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol became the 84th and 85th subjects of the constitution of the Russian Federation. This was in violation of both international law and the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, whereby the Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States had agreed to secure Ukraine's independence and existing borders.

Within a month, the geopolitical and military relationship of the Russian Federation with Ukraine and the Western world had fundamentally changed (Mankoff, 2014). Cooperation between military forces of Ukraine and the Russian Federation ceased. Crimea's autonomous political status was dissolved, and the newly created Republic of Crimea was integrated into the administration of the southern region of the Russian Federation, centered in Rostov-on-Don (Homon, 2016). As a consequence of these military events, the education system in the Crimean Peninsula is now administered under the laws and finances of the Russian Federation, which is currently experiencing both NATO military defensive responses and economic sanctions from the United States and EU.

Today, the general view of the Russian oligarchs and population is that the Crimean peninsula, despite having been legally transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 along with its military base and oil and off-shore gas deposits, has been justifiably returned to the control of the Russian Federation. Little public opposition within the Russian Federation has been expressed about the annexation, nationalization, and confiscation of properties in Crimea, nor about the Russian state's violation of human rights.

In 2017, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights released its first report dedicated to the human rights situation in Crimea (OHCHR, 2017). The report documents escalating repression and grave human rights violations committed by state agents of the Russian Federation in Crimea, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, and detainees dying in custody. The leaders of the Crimean Mejlis, an organization representing Crimean Tartars, have been subjected to detention.

Although the Russian Federation aspires to modernize and re-establish great military power status, it has left many former ministries intact, including much of the Soviet model of education, which includes the education of children with disabilities. As in the past, policies for children with disabilities continue to be built upon the ideology of state primacy over the rights of individual citizens. The Russian state does not consider the human rights of people with disabilities; as a result, such children and adults remain segregated, stigmatized, and outside mainstream society as in Soviet times. Decisions on diagnosis and rehabilitative treatment continue to be made by a government panel, the Psychological, Medical, Pedagogical Commission (PMPC). As of 2017, Open Democracy noted on its website that students in Russia are still grouped by disability in residential schools and that services are delivered through residential school collectives that use undifferentiated curricula rather than ones tailored to individual needs (Dvornikova, 2017).

Russia's military annexation of Crimea has resulted in a clash between the Russian Federation's authoritarian state civilizational paradigm and that of the citizen-centered democratic paradigm held by the majority of citizens of mainland Ukraine, the Government of Ukraine, and Ukraine's international partners (the U.S., Canada, and European Union).

Many western democracies actively support Ukraine against the Russian Federation's incursions, which they see as those of an authoritarian state that prioritizes the interests of itself and its corrupt kleptocratic oligarchs over the interests of individuals in the population

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(Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005, p. 131–50). This support has manifested in many foreign aid projects in Ukraine that have promoted the growth of citizen action and democracy. These include educational projects that emphasize personalized curricula that tailor instruction to individual students' needs.

Crimea

The territory of the Crimean Peninsula on the Black Sea is 27,000 square kilometres, and its population is 1.8 million. According to the 2014 Crimean Federal District census, the ethnic composition included 65% Russians, 16% Ukrainians, and 13% Crimean Tartars.

In the first years after the Soviet Union collapsed, the Ukrainian parliament granted the peninsula autonomous republic status (with its own Ministry of Education); in return, local Crimean politicians supported Ukraine's independence (Yekelchyk, 2015, p. 124).

Consequently, until 2014, Crimean inclusive education development was tied to that of Ukraine. Once Crimea was illegally annexed, the civilizational characteristics of the Russian Federation became dominant, along with their concomitant influences on inclusive education. The annexation of Crimea polarized political relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and became a major site of international dispute that drew responses from the European Union, the United States, and NATO. The EU has become more popular than previously with the public in Ukraine as a means of establishing the rule of law and advancing Ukraine's aspirations as a liberal democratic and independent state.

Meso level structures

At the point of collapse of the USSR in 1991, and for some time thereafter, Ukraine and Russia shared the same laws and policies on the education of children with disabilities. The medical/segregated education model had developed in the Soviet educational system. This system retained the Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation (PMPC) services that provided medical diagnoses for children with disabilities that removed them from their family homes into specialized residential schools to both live and attend classes. In both countries, students were segregated by disability (e.g., deafness, blindness) and taught in groups according to their age and severity of condition. Both systems used didactic teaching methods and were highly centralized and controlled by their Ministries of Education and Science. Special education departments set up at universities, teacher training centres, and vocational training schools prepared students for work in factories built specifically to hire disabled students (Kolupayeva, Taranchenko, & Danilavichute, 2014, p. 329–30).

In this section, we examine how Ukraine (including Crimea until 2014) reduced segregated education in favour of inclusive education as part of its civilizational strategy. We comment on eight indicators of how Ukraine reformed its systems for educating children with disabilities:

1. Western advisors on inclusive education were welcomed.
2. New laws and regulations on inclusive education emerged.

3. Parental choice in educational programs was legislated.
4. The diagnostic system was revised.
5. New IE teacher training and new educational resources were developed.
6. An inclusive education teacher assistant position was created.
7. Residential schools were closed in favour of local schools.
8. A new National Centre for Inclusive Education was created.

These indicators are compared to the situation in annexed Crimea from 2014 to 2017 when, as part of the Russian Federation, education of children with disabilities lapsed back to the medical/segregated model.

Western advisors in inclusive education

In 2001, ensuing from openness to global cooperation, the Ukrainian Step by Step Foundation (USSF) cooperated with the Ministry of Education and the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine to initiate a national study on the integration of children with disabilities into the mainstream school system. From 2003 to 2005, the European Commission funded Step by Step to create pilot model centres of integration in mainstream schools (Raver, 2007, p. 32–38). According to the USSF website (2014), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded the Canadian Centre for Disability Studies (CCDS) and the Ukrainian Resource and Development Centre of MacEwan University in Edmonton, Alberta, to carry out Ukraine's first major project on inclusive education from 2008 to 2013.

In the inclusive model transferred from Canada, students who have received a diagnosis that determines their disability and condition live at home and attend a neighbourhood school in a class in which most students do not have disabilities. In such cases, the physical structures of the school have been adapted, and staff at the school have received appropriate training to enable them to teach students with disabilities by employing an individualized educational/instruction plan (IEP) tailored for each student. The IEP is developed by diverse professionals together with the students' parents.

The five-year project had a budget of over six million dollars, involved hundreds of participants (Loreman & Lutsenko, 2014, p. 8–17), and involved two pilot schools in different regions of Ukraine:

- Lviv school No. 95 for the Lviv oblast (i.e., province).
- Simferopol school No 1. for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Other Ukrainian regions were involved through observers who disseminated results to government and non-government organizations. Kyiv represented Ukraine's national interests. The National Assembly of the Disabled in Ukraine and two Ukrainian ministries—Education and Science as well as Social Protection and Labour—were actively involved.

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The project focused on reforming legislation and policies, creating new curricula and resource materials, and encouraging civil society organizations to promote inclusive education. The National Assembly of the Disabled of Ukraine stated on its website (2013) that this project “unleashed the processes of democratization and ‘humanization’ in spheres that had traditionally been much closed, hidden from the public.” As a consequence of this project, a modern Ukrainian model of inclusive education has been initiated in parallel with the medical/segregated education system of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, thus increasing parents’ choices and students’ educational rights.

Although experimental IE projects have been attempted in the Russian Federation, no comparable process to those in Ukraine have taken place due to the Russian government’s legislated view that foreign projects are unwelcome.

New IE laws and regulations

Ukraine’s political priority is to protect its newly won sovereignty and independence by strengthening its democratic character to qualify for entry into the European Union. In order to attract investors and international trade, the Government of Ukraine is faced with the absolute necessity of reforming its old Soviet laws, ministries, and practices, and to liberalize its economy to function under the rule of law. In Ukraine, economic reform has stimulated the educational system model itself after Western institutions such that research and learning become congruent with the objectives of the new global and national market economies.

The philosophy of human rights for individuals is at the centre of Ukraine’s adopted Western system of education (Dubkovetska, Budnyk, & Sydoriv, 2016). Inclusive education has been supported by the Ministry of Education and Science, and an IE stream of schools has been launched to compete as an alternative to the older model of segregation and medical rehabilitation.

Between 2014 and 2017, Ukraine passed two major laws reforming the educational system: the *Law on Higher Education* (Zakon Ukrayny, 2014) and the *Law on Education* (Zakon Ukrayny, 2017). These new pieces of legislation ensure free education in public schools and allow parents the right to choose their children’s schools. This led to fewer children with disabilities entering residential schools and more often residing at home and attending neighbourhood schools.

The new laws also granted Ukrainian universities the right to independently develop and implement academic programs within their licensed specialties. This strategy aims to decentralize the processes of shaping program content. Consequently, the government has increased the accountability of university managers, lecturers, and students in pursuit of higher quality education. Particular attention has been paid to giving students with disabilities greater access to higher education.

As a result of the new *Law on Education*, inclusive education in schools became a state priority in 2017–18 and thereby part of Ukraine’s strategy on human rights, expanding services

to new categories of diagnoses beyond those in the Soviet concept of disability. In 2017, the *Odessa Review* website indicated that the new law allows for alternative forms of school education (e.g., distance and home schooling), greater school autonomy and freedom for teachers, and equal opportunity for students (Goncharenko, 2017). Other changes have also occurred because of the prioritization of inclusive education:

- New wording and concepts have been included in the legislation, such as “inclusive education,” “individual learning plan,” “persons with special needs,” and “universal design.”
- Teaching in inclusive classrooms is carried out according to standard curricula, programs, and textbooks recommended for general schools set by the Ministry of Education and Science.
- Each student with special needs can attend a local school and is given an individual plan that specifies the number of rehabilitation hours to be provided, taking the recommendations of PMPC into account.
- Students with complex/multiple disabilities who are not self-sufficient and require personal care and support may live in a residential rehabilitation centre in accordance with a doctor-recommended plan that includes education.
- For the first time, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine now finances the above changes.
- Funds follow the child from school to school, enabling the student’s current school to purchase additional services (e.g., psychological and physical rehabilitation).

These changes stand in contrast to the situation in the Russian Federation. Due to the illegal annexation and absorption of Crimea into the Russian Federation, earlier achievements in Crimean inclusive education have been rolled back somewhat to standards that remain prevalent in the Russian Federation. Inclusive education is an experimental field of study in the Russian Federation; however, the bulk of state expenditures remain targeted at special education. The Russian policy, stated in the *Federal Law on Education in the Russian Federation* (Federalnyi Zakon, 2012), favours the older segregation system as its principal form of education for children with legally recognized disabilities. In Russian law, inclusive education is only outlined and offered as an additional option. The law accepted after the illegal annexation, *On Education in the Crimean Republic* (Zakon Respublika Krym, 2015), is largely identical to the Russian law.

In Table 1, key words in the laws on education in the Russian Federation and Crimea have been analyzed to demonstrate differences from the law in Ukraine (Zakon Ukrayiny, 2017). This comparison shows that inclusive education has greater legal recognition in Ukraine than in the Russian Federation.

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Word	Russian Federation	Crimea	Ukraine
	2012	2015	2017
Inclusion	2	0	9
Invalid	22	2	1
Children with health limitations	24	13	0
Special educational needs	3	0	31
Word totals in full law text	53814	6862	29610

Table 1: Comparison of key words in the main laws on education

Parental choice in educational programs

The school system of Ukraine (including residential schools) is being reorganized and optimized to give parents greater choice. An experiment creating regional rural hub schools to increase the number of students in general (including students with disabilities) and improve quality of both instruction and resources has provided greater access to students with special needs. For example, in 2016, 24 schools in rural areas across Ukraine were enlarged due to the closure of smaller rural schools. Funded by the Ministry of Finance and domestic and international donors, these new hub schools are supported by bussing, educational technology, and computer systems to create a barrier-free learning environment. Hub schools have inclusive education programs. The objective is to raise standards and learning outcomes for all students, including students with special needs (Kolupayeva, Taranchenko, & Danilavichute, 2014, p. 333).

Revised diagnostic system

Ukraine has replaced the Psychological Medical Pedagogical Consultation (PMPC) with a new mandated body named Inclusive Education Resource Centres (IERC). These centres now act as advisors, offering consultations with parents and providing options for their children, rather than as decision makers who may automatically send their children to residential schools. Now parents may choose to send their children either to the still-existing residential schools or to a neighbourhood school in which students get personalized curricula plans tailored to their needs. The latter system is based on concepts, research, resources, and programs from Western institutions and governments, including the Canadian Inclusive Education project. Because of the prohibition of international educational projects, similar developments in IE have not occurred in the Russian Federation.

New IE teacher training and educational resources

Higher quality pre-service and in-service teacher education programs with new learning resources have been established in Ukrainian IE networks and programs but not in the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian government has funded these new programs and courses:

- In the 2014–15 academic year, the Ministry of Education of Ukraine approved a 54-hour course on the fundamentals of inclusive education for higher education institutions.
- The Teachers' College at Ivan Franko National University in Lviv successfully launched a four-year bachelor's degree for teacher assistants.
- Boris Hrinchenko Kyiv University now offers a Master's degree program.
- Lecturers at the Ukrainian Institutes of Teacher Upgrading and at pedagogical universities developed and piloted new, integrated courses on inclusive education.

Some local research on inclusive education exists in Crimea, but teacher upgrading courses and bachelors and master's programs specializing in inclusive education are not available.

The position of the inclusive education teacher assistant

Ukraine has established a new teacher assistant profession with salaries paid out of government funds. The positions of teacher assistant and pre-school childcare worker have been added to the list of pedagogical and academic school staff. As a result, the number of teacher assistants in inclusive classrooms has increased in all regions of Ukraine. During the 2014–15 academic year, the Ministry of Education of Ukraine reported that 635 assistant teachers were employed in inclusive classes—208 more than in the previous year. In contrast, Crimea is not expanding teacher assistant or pre-school childcare worker assistant positions.

Closing residential schools

The number of residential schools (*internats*) in Ukraine is decreasing as the Inclusive Education Resource Centres assign fewer students to residential schools and instead facilitate students attending regular, local neighbourhood schools. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science has inherited the following post-Soviet segregated schools for students with disabilities (Bondar, 2014):

- 396 residential schools with a total capacity of 60,000 students.
- 140 rehabilitation centres.
- 142 special pre-school.
- Mainstream schools with 1200 special education classes serving 45,000 students.

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As of 2014, the Ukrainian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy had the following (Bondar, 2014):

- 298 rehabilitation centres for students, 90 of which specialized in medical, social, and vocational rehabilitation and 46 of which provided social and psychological rehabilitation.

Present trends in education predict that the number of residential schools will continue to decrease due to the introduction of inclusive, integrated education. By the 2014–15 academic year, statistics on the website of the Ukrainian Ministry of Education show the following:

- Only 254 special residential schools were operating, with an enrolment of 29,334 students.
- Approximately 5000 children with special needs were integrated into general education in special classes.
- Another 2,200 special needs children attended inclusive classes.

At the same time, Crimea statistics (data obtained by personal communications with Crimean informed sources, who requested anonymity) show the following:

- The number of segregated residential schools increased from 12 to 14.
- The number of students under the inclusive education program in Crimea has grown fourfold—to 400 students—but is still far less than the tenfold growth in Ukraine.

New National Centre for Inclusive Education

A new National Centre for Inclusive Education (NCIE) is being established in Kyiv, led by The National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine and the Ministry of Education and Sciences are leading the undertaking. The centre coordinates local centres and provides consultations on IE methodology, research, forecasting, and promotional services. NCIE supports the local Inclusive Education Resource Centres and conducts research on IE internationally and locally. This new system has raised the profile of IE so that there is more cooperation among medical, educational, parental, and political representatives in Ukraine.

The previously mentioned 2008–2013 Canadian IE project established two regional resource centres, one in Lviv and another in Simferopol, to support the inclusive education program. In 2014–15, funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) helped establish two centres in Kyiv and one each in three Ukrainian provinces

(Vinnitsa, Rivne, and Cherkassy). These centres function as a single network that provides advice and services on both education policies and correctional and rehabilitation services.

Crimea continues to have only one Inclusive Education Centre, the one created by the Canadian project. The centre continues to receive state funding, but it has now been administratively integrated into the Russian PMPC. The latter body continues to make medical diagnoses and to assign children to residential schools.

Micro initiatives in educational practice

Micro initiatives are social, educational, and civil society relations that characterize teaching and learning in a national system comprised of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Parent groups and the Ministries of Education in Ukraine and the Russian Federation have developed various strategies of action regarding inclusive education. For example, from 2014 to 2017, the first lady of Ukraine, Dr. Maryna Poroshenko, publicly championed inclusive education. Further, The Poroshenko Foundation funded large-scale education development in the Zaporizhzhia province, creating 50 inclusive education schools supported by a grant from the Government of China.

In step with political developments started in 2014, thousands of new non-governmental organizations emerged in Ukraine's civil society, including volunteer parent advocacy groups. The Canadian inclusive education project helped establish some of these groups. Social changes in rationale and practice within Ukraine's political environment have fostered significant growth in the number of active volunteer non-governmental organizations. Aided by this environment, thousands of citizens—including the wife of Ukraine's president—have become activists and lobbyists influencing Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Sciences on behalf of children with disabilities.

The growth of civil society was stimulated by the need to defend the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine after the invasion by the Russian Federation (Phillip, 2009). In contrast to Ukraine, Russian legislation and policies have become increasingly more aggressive toward autonomous civil society organizations and foreign funding of non-governmental organizations (Kuzio, 2017). Non-governmental organizations from abroad are now required by law to register as foreign entities. Consequently, parental advocacy on behalf of children in Crimea has become more difficult.

Conclusion

Global events increasingly affect educational choices. Crimea is a special case in comparative education because it has experienced regime change and a change in state paradigms due to geopolitical and military conflict. As a result, the same population in the same territory has been subject to two different systems and models for educating children with disabilities: medical /segregation and inclusive education. Chong and Graham's three-level nested approach

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of studying different paradigms enables a better understanding of how decisions about pedagogical models of education are made. In this case, we used the framework to examine how military annexation has affected IE in Crimea since 2014.

Evidence demonstrates that regime change influenced local educational decisions. After sharing a single common ideological, geopolitical, and educational environment in the former USSR, differences between the Russian Federation and Ukraine emerged after 1991 due to geopolitical and economic circumstances. Competing historical and political foundations in the two countries formed different core contextual paradigms. These led to different state philosophies, policies and implementation regarding inclusive education as well as to different public attitudes regarding what is fair and just in educating students with disabilities.

The prioritized paradigm was the one used by the state that exerted military control. The Russian Federation imposed its laws and procedures upon Crimea after annexing it in 2014. As a result, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea disappeared as a political entity, as did the Autonomous Crimean Ministry of Education. Since then, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Education has stymied the scope and speed of change that had previously supported inclusive student-centered learning and has returned priority and financing largely to the segregation and medical rehabilitation model. As a result, the social model of inclusive education that originated in Ukraine has stalled in Crimea.

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Chapter 6 — Dominance of Ukrainian in the Bilingual Setting: Neurocognitive Factors

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the problem of Ukrainians' individual bilingualism when, of the two languages—Ukrainian and Russian—the dominant one is Russian, which, being dissonant with the political dominance of Ukrainian, causes psychological tension in society. To alleviate such tension, which tends to be grounded in public ignorance on the nature of bilingualism, this paper proposes a systemic analysis of neurocognitive and social prerequisites that determine dominance of a particular language for an individual, and it proposes ways to increase Ukrainian as the subdominant language for various age groups.

Keywords: *bilingualism, dominance, neurocognitive factors, the Russian language, the Ukrainian language.*

Introduction

Citizens of Ukraine are bilingual; they speak Ukrainian and Russian, a reality that is rooted in the country's history. First, Ukraine was a territory of the Russian Empire. Then it was a territory of the USSR where Russian, spoken as lingua franca in all Soviet republics, bolstered the country's political integrity. At present, for a portion of the Ukrainian population, the first language is Ukrainian and the second is Russian. For another portion, Russian is the first language and Ukrainian the second. In both cases, speakers demonstrate variable proficiencies in their second language. Since the time of Ukraine's independence, the "linguistic problem" caused by the co-existence of the two languages has been both painful and widely debated within society. It has therefore been a convenient issue for politicians to exploit to their own ends.

An appropriate legislative solution for the linguistic problem is still remote. Its realization is hindered by high emotional tensions within a Ukrainian society that faces acute ideological and military confrontations between Ukraine and Russia. Societal emotions are also occasionally stirred by scholars who remind the public of the historical persecution of Ukrainian and its treatment as an "imperfect" language. Meanwhile, social integrity—even as Ukraine confronts Russian aggression—might benefit from a "drier" and more "detached" scholarly analysis of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism as a phenomenon with many facets—not only

political, but also social, psychological, and neurocognitive. The latter, representing the ways in which language exists in the brain/mind, is foundational.

The brain/mind “program” intended for processing language is the object of cognitive science. Scholars in this field regard the brain as a biological substrate of cognition. These are the mental activities involved in obtaining, processing, accumulating, and retrieving conscious and unconscious information, including the information about language as a semiotic system employed by humans. Within cognitive science, the studies of language in general and of bilingualism in particular integrate the findings of psycholinguistics, which is concerned with representations of language in the brain. In Ukrainian science, the psycholinguistic aspect of Ukrainian bilingualism is discussed in a limited number of works that primarily emerge from the field of pedagogy. In these lines of inquiry, neurolinguistic studies of bilingualism, which require a powerful technical foundation, are practically absent. This can primarily be explained by the high, and therefore unaffordable, costs of the brain imaging equipment needed to map brain structure and monitor the functions and biochemical characteristics activated as the subjects fulfill particular linguistic tasks. In Ukraine, there are few experienced specialists who can professionally carry out positron emission tomography, magnetic resonance imagery, functional magnetic resonance imagery, diffuse optical imagery, and other specialized procedures that allow exploration of language activities in the brain. The absence of a Ukrainian neurolinguistics school is doubly regrettable because the country abounds in unique empirical data for research. Among Ukrainian bilinguals, wide diversity of types exist, and their investigation could provide much new evidence relevant to understanding the workings of a bilingual brain. Given the lack of Ukrainian scholarship in this field, the problem of Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism may be considered within a theoretical framework grounded on the ample contributions of foreign schools focused on bilingualism, which have responded to the increasing frequency of bilingualism across the contemporary world.

This paper aims to: (a) employ the findings of neurolinguistics and psycholinguistics to explain the neurocognitive underpinnings of bilingualism in Ukraine (i.e., the case when the dominant language of an individual is Russian, and when the subdominant one is Ukrainian); (b) distinguish the types of sub-dominance demonstrated by the Ukrainian language; (c) offer suggestions as to how Ukrainian, as the subdominant language of an individual, may be shifted in the direction of dominance in order to merge with the dominance of Ukrainian in the socio-political domain. The paper, addressed to a non-specialist reader, avoids scholarly technicalities and attempts to comprehensively account for some emotionally sensitive issues that continue to arise in the public debates on language.

Language dominance, analyzed in this paper, exists as a societal and individual phenomenon (Romaine, 1989, p. 23), with both aspects being interrelated. Language dominance, as a *societal-political phenomenon*, is associated with the national language of a country. Language dominance as an *individual phenomenon* means that a person gives preference to the use of one of the two or more languages that he or she knows. Individual bilingualism, being a multi-faceted phenomenon (*Ibid.*, p. 12–22), is variable; it may change

with a person's age, and it may be influenced by societal contexts. It is individual bilingualism that is the focus of further discussion here.

The paper has three parts. In the first part, Ukrainian bilingualism is discussed in terms of the psychological problem caused by the mismatch between socio-political and individual planes of language dominance, something that requires an appropriate solution grounded in neurocognitive data. The second part provides a brief overview of relevant data. In the third part, this data is applied to identify the major types of Ukrainian individual bilingual speakers and to offer proposals to achieve optimal reformatting of a neurocognitive linguistic "program" in which dominance of Russian would be gradually substituted for dominance of Ukrainian on both individual and socio-political planes.

Interaction of socio-political and individual planes of Ukrainian bilingualism as a psychological problem

Language, as a sign system, performs different functions. Among the main functions are communicative (language enables human interaction), cognitive (language serves to exteriorize the conceptual system of the mind), accumulative (language provides accumulation of information), and aesthetic (language is the material for creating literary works). This conventional list does not include, however, such important meta-functions of language as integrative (language integrates the nation and consolidates ethnic and cultural unity), and self-representational (for an individual, a particular language is the medium to favorably represent oneself to society).

In Ukraine, the integrative function is performed by the Ukrainian language which, under the Constitution, is the only national language of the country. According to the definition proposed by UNESCO specialists in 1953, the national language is that which, in a particular state, performs an integrative function within political, social, and cultural domains, being therefore the symbol of that state (Vilisov, 2012). The symbol of the state of Ukraine, as well as one of the constituents which define a nation (shared territory, politics economy, culture, and language) is the Ukrainian language. The role of Ukraine's national symbol can hardly be performed by the Russian language, most speakers of which are not Russians but rather bilingual ethnic Ukrainians. The integrative function of the Ukrainian language gains particular importance in the present circumstances in which "defense of the Russian-speaking population" (which at the same time is Ukrainian-speaking) has become a pretext for military aggression on the part of Russia and annexation of the Ukrainian territories. If earlier the political necessity of the dominance of the Ukrainian language in the country was being questioned, now it is no longer doubted, since the Ukrainian language contributes to Ukraine's sovereignty. For the county's security, the dominance of Ukrainian over other languages such as Russian and the languages of national minorities in *all* territories has become a political imperative.

However, the political necessity of dominance of the Ukrainian language encounters the reality that the dominant language of individuals, especially in particular regions of the country, is Russian. This “linguistic dissonance” evokes a cognitive dissonance: in confrontation with Russia, the Ukrainian and Russian languages become indicative of “self (positive)” and “others (negative),” which can be illustrated with Greimas’ semiotic square (Greimas & Courtés, 1983) (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Ukraine, assessment based on political views

Figure 1 reveals the actual state of affairs: Russian is spoken not only by the political opponents—Russians and Ukrainians with anti-Ukrainian views—but also by Ukrainians and Russians with pro-Ukrainian views. This fact, however, is ignored by the authors of quotations such as, “Russian is the language of the aggressor, of the Russian Hitler” (Vuets, 2014).

In the comprehensive sociological study, “*The state of Ukrainian in 2014–2015*,” completed by the “Space of Freedom” Volunteer Movement and presented in an analytical review (Ruh dobrovolsiv “Prostir Svobodi,” 2015), the language spoken by Ukrainians is also indiscriminately associated with political preferences (Tables 1 and 2).

No	Stance	Speakers of Ukrainian %	Bilinguals % (Ukrainian-Russian Surzhyk)	Speakers of Russian %
1.	Would support	90	71	45
2.	Do not know (difficult to answer)	5	14	24
3.	Wouldn't support	5	15	30

Table 1: Would you support declaration of Ukraine's sovereignty today?

No	Stance	Speakers of Ukrainian %	Bilinguals % (Ukrainian-Russian Surzhyk)	Speakers of Russian %
1.	Agree	90	65	48
2.	Do not know (difficult to answer)	9	15	23
3.	Disagree	5	20	39

Table 2: Do you agree that the Great Famine of 1923–33 was a genocide of the Ukrainian people?

First, in this part of the analytical review, bilingualism (having command of two different languages) is equated with Surzhyk (a “blended,” “creolized” form of Ukrainian-Russian mixed language), a move that is contraindicative from the standpoint of the theory of bilingualism. Second, the data obtained from respondents are not differentiated according to Ukraine’s regions as is meticulously done in the other sections of the review. Such delineation would expose compatibility of the responses not with the spoken language, but with the territories, some of which for years had been influenced by particular political parties. Third, the results of

such methodologically dubious analyses do not provide straightforward evidence that one's political standpoint is shaped by language *per se*. Meanwhile, such "evidence" considered within the general context of radical linguistic intolerance contributes to creating a perverted image of Ukrainians' political views (Figure 2), which is in dissonance with the reality (compare with Figure 1).




Figure 2: Ukraine, assessment based on languages

This cognitive dissonance is nurtured to some extent by the societal myths about our "thinking" in Ukrainian or Russian. The first myth holds that we "think" in a special "language of thought" or *lingua mentalis*, autonomous from an ordinary language, which only accompanies and thus facilitates thinking. The second myth claims that our language determines our mindset; however, in contemporary cognitive linguistics, this radical version of linguistic relativity theory is treated with caution. The third myth suggests that the distorted minds of "bad" people implies that their language is also "bad." These myths foster cognitive dissonance, which breeds insecurity. Besides cultivating ignorance, the dissonance elicits negative feedback from those unjustly accused; they feel despair, anger, indignation, and frustration. An example of psychological despair can be seen in the feelings of Ukrainians whose first language is Russian. Borys Khersonskiy captures this in his paper entitled, "My Language is My Enemy, or Games with the Feeling of Inferiority":

[What is] important is not the language that we speak, but what we say in this language. I'll remind you of a conventional wisdom: the anti-Ukrainian stance can be rendered in Ukrainian as well. And the pro-Ukrainian stance can be rendered in Russian. The writers and editors, such as Andrei Kurkov, Aleksandr Kabanov, Aleksandr Krasovitskij, and your humble servant, have been doing it all these years. However, every now and then we have to face the problem of language. To the delight of our enemies. [. . .] We have changed neither the city nor even the writing desk.

And it is not easy for people to feel aliens or guests in their native city and country. However, it is easy to evoke in a number of citizens the feelings of anxiety and inferiority. And it is even easier to manipulate this feeling of inferiority, which is artificially inflated.¹ (Khersonskiy, 2015)

Among other negative feelings, bilingual users of Facebook, especially, express anger and indignation. For instance:

You are mistaken when you think that being a native speaker of Ukrainian is something you have to take pride in. [...] And that's why. You've made no effort to know Ukrainian. You acquired it in your early unconscious years, without choosing it and working on its attainment. And now you carelessly lose in it commas and dashes, being also unable to use participles, introductory words and clauses in a proper way. Meanwhile, you dare judge others, deciding to what extent they are Ukrainians. [...]

I started to learn Ukrainian when I was 16. It was my own choice. Yes, it took effort. I strive to master it, I make mistakes of which I am ashamed, I am constantly reading something and check myself [...].

I am a Ukrainian Jew whose dreams are not in Ukrainian or Yiddish, but in Russian, because this language was made my first one in the USSR. At 16, I myself chose to come back to Ukraine. I chose to learn Ukrainian, and speak and read in it. And what is most difficult, I've chosen to speak to my children only in Ukrainian. Do representatives of the titular nation imagine what it is like—to always speak to your children in a language different from that in which you see your dreams? [...] I can tell you that one can do it only if one loves the Ukrainian language as much as one loves a woman. And now, [somebody] writes to me with the rebuke that I, so to say, use the wrong language. I am ready to forgive it only to a person who has written to me from a war trench (or who is just back from there), since the war happens to deprive people of thinking properly [...].

Yes, one must know the language of one's nation. That's why after coming back from Russia I've learned Ukrainian, even though it did not look that necessary for living in Lugansk in the 1990s. I've learned it because I considered it necessary for my right to be called a Ukrainian. For the same reason, when I turned 30, I learned Hebrew, which is hardly typical of those who do not plan to leave for Israel. I've learned it because I considered it necessary for my right to be called a Jew. However, to speak, to write, to create poetry, to sing songs and to listen to them, as well as to read books—all that can be done in the language that one prefers. Yes, there is a duty prescribed by the political office, and there is a professional politeness among others. But Ukrainians are free people in their private lives. They were, and they will be. And they should understand that recognition of others' will and rights is the distinction of a Ukrainian language that is not less important than habitation and language. No, "not less" is not the word. Our mentality is that which is our nation.

¹ Here the translations from Russian and Ukrainian are those of the author.

Learn Ukrainian, love it, and speak it! And don't dare to outright teach others, because it inflicts damage on both the Ukrainian language and Ukraine. You'd better see to it that you not accidentally drop a comma in your recent text.² (I. Pavlyuk, personal communication, February 21, 2016)

The cognitive dissonance evoked by equating the ideas of patriotism and language also causes discontent in the speakers of Ukrainian. For example:

I have always wondered how these provocations emerge that stir up discord between people. [. . .] Well, [those who do it] will hardly agree later that they intended to arouse public misunderstanding and hatred. Thus, for instance, they write that all speakers of Russian are enemies, and we have to fight them, because they are not Ukrainians but "mankurts" (the people who have lost their historical memory, spiritual values and landmarks, who have broken ties with their nation—author). No-no, [those who make provocations] will say that they've written the TRUTH, which is just painful. Or that they've provided the OBJECTIVE data, and they'll start saying something about the Canadian army. It can be some old lady from the field of linguistics, or a reputable Ukrainian writer.

But emotionally it's always very painful. And, by the way, not only for Russian-speaking Ukrainians. For your humble servant as well. In such cases, what may be qualified as tribal solidarity—blood, language, land—fails to respond. Well, I automatically try to imagine myself in the shoes of those abused. They are abused. Really. Russian-speaking Ukrainians are definitely not enemies. It's stupid to say such things. I have not been to ATO,³ but I was at Maidan. I know what I say. I have Russian-speaking friends. I love and respect them. Heck! What a heresy it is to abuse people who are ours to the core, who are soldiers, volunteers, intellectuals, writer-colleagues . . .

I don't know whether there is somebody behind it, or it is done from the bottom of one's heart—anyway, it's blunt beastliness. People mustn't be treated like that. It does not inspire respect of Ukrainian culture. It does not increase the number of adherents and speakers of the Ukrainian language. It spreads discord. [. . .]. Well, and in such moments one feels an awful shame and the desire to disengage from Ukrainians. But it's impossible, of course. [. . .] Long live Ukraine! (A. Bondar, personal communication, October 21, 2015)

In the above texts, a lively polemic highlights topics that are substantial for understanding different aspects of bilingualism in Ukraine. These are: the linguistic situation of bilingualism at the time when Ukraine was declared sovereign; the age at which the languages were acquired and the ways in which they were learned; the use of languages in different social contexts; non-abusive, motivated encouragement to learn the Ukrainian language, which does not cause psychological resistance; the culture and cultural heritage of Russian-speaking

² Here the translations from Russian and Ukrainian are those of the author.

³ ATO refers to the war in Donbas.

Ukrainians; and more. These and other topics, which are now particularly important for the Ukrainian society, are compatible with the topics discussed in the theory of bilingualism, based on analysis of diverse empirical data. Ordinary Ukrainians, politicians, and many professional linguists seem to be unaware of the *diverse* (and not only sociolinguistic and political) conclusions and contributions emerging from the theory of bilingualism. And because of this, the public discourse concerned with languages becomes needlessly heated. This discourse tends to employ simplified and sometimes erroneous claims of the following kind:

*There are no bilingual people. These are old wives' tales. One language ALWAYS dominates. Bilingualism is a lie for those who believe Kiselyov's fables. The future of Ukraine is in monolingualism. Being a Russian-speaking Ukrainian, aged 30 and over, implies laziness, stupidity, and unwillingness to change something.*⁴ (Milenko, 2016)

The complete text from which this quote is excerpted is entitled, "Three Main Things About Language Which Are Not Understood by Many." The text is written by a Ukrainian-speaking football observer who has completely switched from Russian to Ukrainian. His text, however, demonstrates that the Ukrainian problem of bilingualism, as well as the phenomenon of bilingualism generally, cannot be reduced to "three major things." Everything is much more complicated and diverse.

Diverse directions in the study of bilingualism are enumerated in the book of Michel Paradis (2004), who writes (emphasis mine):

Many aspects of bilingualism have been studied within different disciplines. These include the following:

1. *Psychological aspects, such as the effects of bilingualism on perception, cognition, memory, and intelligence.*
2. *Sociolinguistic aspects, such as the study of languages in contact and the influence of social context on choice of language, switching, and mixing.*
3. *Sociopsychological aspects, such as bilinguals' attitudes toward their languages, problems of allegiance (the desire to assert group membership), the evaluative perceptions of speakers of each of their languages or speaking with an accent associated with each language.*
4. *Anthropological aspects, such as biculturalism associated with speaking two languages and issues related to acculturation.*
5. *Political aspects, such as the study of language planning, legislation affecting official languages and their domains of authorized or forbidden use.*

⁴ Kiselyov is one of the key anchors on the Russian TV.

6. *Pedolinguistic aspects*, such as the study of language development in children raised bilingually.
7. *Psycholinguistic aspects*, such as the mental representation of two languages.
8. *Linguistic aspects*, such as the nature and state of the grammars of a bilingual individual and grammatical constraints on language mixing.
9. *Neurolinguistic aspects*, namely the cerebral mechanisms and structures involved in the representation and processing of two or more languages in one brain (p. 2).

The above aspects of bilingualism are interrelated, which makes studies involving them “hybrid” in nature. Within the scope of this paper, even a brief review of the wide research field of bilingualism is not possible and hardly required, since there exists a considerable number of fundamental works to consider (See for example, Romaine (1989), Paradis (2004), Bhatia & Ritchie (2012) among others). Within the diverse studies of bilingualism, it is necessary, however, to establish basic definitions essential for professional consideration of the problem of language dominance. The following discussion provides a brief account of the key issues relevant for understanding the nature of bilingualism as a complex phenomenon with a neurocognitive foundation.

Neurocognitive foundation of linguistic dominance: the key issues

Discussion of the neurocognitive foundations of bilingualism should start with defining the term *native language* as opposed terms like *first, second, third, (and subsequent) languages*. Unlike its English analog, the Ukrainian term *ridna mova* (lit. “family language,” “language of kinship”) is emotionally charged, which makes it inappropriate for a scholarly discussion. This is also extended by the vague meaning of both English and Ukrainian terms. The native language could denote the language of one’s family, the language of one’s ethnic group, or the national language of one’s country. In some cases, all these languages may be different. Similarly vague is the synonymous English term *mother tongue* which etymologically relates neither to one’s mother or family nor to one’s motherland. The term was coined by Catholic missionary monks to name a particular language, different from Latin, and used to speak to the natives on behalf of the Mother Church (Mother tongue, n.d.). In the theory of bilingualism, the more conventional terms are the *first language* (L1), the *second language* (L2), the *third language* (L3), and so on, which correspond to the order in which the languages were acquired by a bilingual (polylingual) during his or her lifetime. In this case, the factor of language entrenchment in the mind, that is to say, the “depth” of its acquisition dependent on neural networks, is not considered. The most entrenched language is the one that requires the least cognitive and cerebral efforts from the speaker. The first, second, and subsequent languages may have different degrees of entrenchment that relate to, but do not always coincide with, the sequence in which the languages were attained. Entrenchment of a language is decisive for

its *dominance* in, or preferred use by, a bilingual individual. Conventionally, the most entrenched language is most used in speech. However, in particular contexts, for instance, professional or business environments, the dominant language may be the one that is less entrenched.

The above properties of bilingualism can be associated with its types (Bilingualism i ego vidyi, 2011). The first, second, third, and other languages relate to both *natural bilingualism* (in which a person is exposed to a bilingual environment from birth and acquires the two languages simultaneously; both of them thus becoming “first” languages) and *artificial bilingualism* (in which the second language is learned after the first). Entrenchment of the bilingual’s languages can be linked to *receptive bilingualism* (a person understands one of the languages but does not speak it), *reproductive bilingualism* (a person can reproduce the patterns of a language), and *productive bilingualism* (a person is fluent in both languages). Further, entrenchment of a language is relevant for *subordinate bilingualism* (the bilingual speaks one language better than another) and *coordinate/balanced bilingualism* (the bilingual speaks both languages equally well). Language dominance depends on *active bilingualism* (both languages are used regularly) and *passive bilingualism* (one of the languages is used more frequently than another). Therefore, each particular case of bilingualism may embody a complex mix of characteristics, for example, *natural, reproductive, balanced, and active bilingualism*. Given this complexity, it is especially important to understand/recognize the neurocognitive grounds of each type of bilingualism.

Neurolinguistics and psycholinguistics recognize the fact that language in general, and language dominance in particular, result from the interaction of biological and societal factors—that is, language is both nature and nurture (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Factors that influence language dominance for a bilingual individual

The interaction of an individual's cognition with his or her social context represents language dominance as emerging at the intersection of three sets of factors: natural, societal, and functional. *Natural factors* include the age of acquiring languages, and their simultaneous or sequential attainment. *Societal factors* include the social-linguistic contexts in which the languages had been acquired and used as well as the conformity of such contexts with language norms. *Functional factors* include intensity (i.e., frequency and duration) of language use as well as the speaker's proficiency in particular languages. Figure 3 demonstrates interactions among these factors, each of which is important in influencing language dominance in a bilingual.

Natural factors: Age of language acquisition

According to neurolinguistic findings, human language faculty, as a natural endowment, is optimally activated only within a certain age range. In the case of one's first language, this age

is called *the critical period* because a child not exposed to language during this phase will not be able to fully learn the language and develop full human intelligence. Examples of children who missed the critical period for language acquisition include so-called “Mowgli” or feral children, raised by animals, or certain examples of abused or neglected children. In the case of a person’s second language, the period for acquisition is deemed *sensitive*. During this period, both languages are acquired unconsciously with the help of implicit, or procedural, memory (Lenneberg, 1967; Cook, 1997; Robson, 2002; Kasper, 2003; Paradis, 2004; MacWhinney, 2005; Singleton, 2005; Hernandez & Li, 2007; Aamodt & Wang, 2008, 2012; Birdson, 2014, among others).

The sensitive period for *phonetics* is defined as ages 5 through 7, when the child’s ear can distinguish the sounds of any language and, therefore, may recognize them later. After this age, the child’s ear becomes more tuned to the sounds of the acquired language or languages. Articulation works similarly; language production mirrors language comprehension (Hernandez & Li, 2007, p. 645). At the stage of cooing (3–6 months), children can reproduce the sounds of any language; at the stage of babbling, they utter syllable-like phonations that are not yet associated with a particular language (Burns, Yoshida, Hill & Werker 2007; Aamodt & Wang, 2012). Phonological systems separate at about 14 months, when bilingual children start to clearly differentiate between the two languages. During this same period, bilingual children can identify the phonetic media of their native and non-native languages, but they comprehend only the native tongue (Sebastian-Galles, Echeverria & Bosch, 2005, p. 248; Shnurovska, 2013, p. 151). Conventionally, bilingual children’s schedule for developing the phonological systems of both languages coincides with the respective schedule of monolingual children who develop the phonological system of one language. This early experience leaves a lifelong impression in the individual’s phonetic memory (Burns et al., 2007). That’s why a “forgotten” early language may be later learned more quickly than a new and unfamiliar language.

The sensitive period for *grammar*, for acquiring the morpho-syntactic structures of a language (the principles of building phrases and sentences which differ from language to language), extends until 11–12 years of age. Multiple experimental studies lend support to the fact that in this time period, the child, who has implicit linguistic competence, unconsciously identifies structural properties of a language as a result of exposure to its respective linguistic environment (Paradis, 2004, p. 7–8; Aamodt & Wang, 2012). Regrettably, in Ukraine, this period of sensitivity to grammar in the child’s brain is not considered when teaching non-native languages to pre-school and primary school language learners. Instead of being exposed to grammatically salient speech, children usually learn lists of isolated words. The acquisition of vocabulary, on the other hand, has no sensitive period. Word learning, similar for any age, employs explicit, declarative memory (Parasis, 2004, p. 59; Aamodt & Wang, 2012). The only difference between age ranges is that early learners memorize the auditory image of a word, which reinforces the importance of sensory information for this age (Hernandez & Li, 2007, p. 644).

A critical period for acquiring any aspect of language relates to brain plasticity and lateralization (Kasper, 2003). Lateralization is the functional specialization of the brain’s

hemispheres accompanied by the formation of billions of synapses—junctions between two nerve clusters. As Al Buhbinder (n.d., p. 5) notes, “our destiny depends neither on the geniuses nor on the memories of happy childhood, but on the first three years of our life, when the brain forms neural networks.” Neurovisualisations, or brain images obtained with the help of contemporary techniques, demonstrate an overlap of electric circuitry associated with each of the languages acquired in the sensitive period. In other words, both languages appear to be “processed” in the same natural way. During the time of the brain’s lateralization, a child may acquire the second language as effortlessly as the first one (Granena & Long, 2013, p. 130–145).

The child’s brain, being functionally flexible and “under-specified,” has considerable plasticity; that is why children can easily switch from one language to another. However, in teaching, the two languages should be delineated so that the learner does not mix them up. This can be achieved by adhering to one of the three major commonplaces of language teaching: 1. “One speaker, one language,” different languages are spoken by different family members, or different languages are spoken inside and outside the family group; 2. “One situation, one language,” different languages for different kinds of activities within the family; 3. “Particular time, particular language,” different languages on different days (For more on these approaches, see Pearson, 2008).

The period of language acquisition after the age of 11–12 is called *post-sensitive*. In this period, language acquisition happens differently; language is learned consciously with the help of explicit, or declarative, memory (Paradis, 2004, p. 9). A study of the relationship between age of onset of bilingualism and degree of hemispheric involvement demonstrates that infant and childhood bilinguals have shorter wave peak latencies in the left hemisphere (the location of Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas specified for language), while adolescent bilinguals have shorter latencies in the right hemisphere (Romaine, 1989, p. 83). Since the neural correlates for processing syntax depend considerably on the age of language attainment, late learners can seldom achieve the level of grammatical competence inherent in early learners (Hernandez & Li, 2007, p. 644). Syntax, especially morphosyntax, is more sensitive to the age of acquisition than semantics in both monolingual and bilingual individuals. The learning of syntax and morphosyntax relies heavily on phonological processing abilities that develop early. In contrast, semantic processing relies on the conceptual overlap across languages and should transfer readily; hence, semantic processing is less susceptible to the age of acquisition (Hernandez & Li, 2007, p. 645).

Although children have more chances to attain native-speaker-like proficiency in the non-native language—and to do it unconsciously—adults have other advantages in language learning. Adult learner neural cells responsible for higher-order linguistic processes, such as understanding semantic relations and grammatical sensitivity, develop with age. Adults are better language learners than children in the areas of vocabulary and language structure. Older learners have more highly developed cognitive systems, and they are able to make higher order associations and integrate new language input with their previous learning experiences. They also rely on long-term memory rather than the short-term memory function used by children and younger learners for rote learning (Schleppegrell, 1987). Therefore, teaching languages to

adults should employ appropriate approaches and rely on encouragement and motivation. (For details, see Zhabotynska & Plakhotnyuk, 2016.)

Natural factors: Sequence of the acquired languages

According to neurolinguistics, the phonetic and syntactic projections of two languages in the brains of early bilinguals, each of whom acquired their languages simultaneously during the sensitive period, have common localization (Burns et al., 2007, p. 469; Shnurovska, 2013, p. 151). If L2 is distanced from L1 in time, L1 influences wiring the brain for L2. Recent fMRI studies support the suggestion that maintenance of neural templates from early language experiences influence subsequent language processing. In particular, the sounds of L1, even if the child heard them only during the first two years of his or her life before being removed to a new linguistic environment, continue to influence the neural processing of L2 sounds years later, even in highly proficient, early-exposed users (Pierce, Chen, Delcenserie & Klein, 2015). The longer time distance between L1 and L2 leads to an increase in the effort required for learning L2. Recently, a growing number of studies suggest that age effects in ultimate attainment are due to L1 entrenchment. In this view, an increase in L1 proficiency leads to the progressive entrenchment of L1 representations, with the consequence that L2 acquisition becomes more difficult. Inherent in this interpretation is the assumption that the “less L1,” the less it will interfere with L2 (Bylund, Hyltenstam & Arbahamsson, 2013). Further, successful acquisition of L2 also depends on the adult’s age; the older brain has more difficulties with acquiring a new language. The brain mechanisms facilitating concentration on a new language are less effective in both infancy and old age. One such mechanism is the integrated operation of the frontal lobe, a structure that is known to gradually develop in childhood and to be among the first to lose efficiency in the senior brain (Shnurovska, 2013, p. 151–152).

Societal factors: Societal contexts of language acquisition and use

Societal contexts in which languages are acquired and used may be informal, such as communication with family members, friends, and acquaintances, or formal, such as at school and work. Normally, the context of acquiring L1 is informal; it is the family language. The context of acquiring L2 may be both informal and formal. Contemporary Ukrainian bilingualism is characterized by “diglossic” use of Russian (L1) in informal contexts and Ukrainian (L2) in formal ones. The more diverse the contexts of L2 use, both in production and comprehension, the deeper its neurocognitive entrenchment in the brain or mind; this builds a base for extending the use of L2 to new communicative domains.

Societal factors: Language norms in the linguistic environment

The linguistic environment to which the language learner is exposed can be represented by standard and non-standard language or languages. In Ukraine, the mixture of the two non-standard languages—Ukrainian and Russian—is known as Surzhyk, described in numerous linguistic works (see for instance Taranenko 2008 as one version of a language emerging from contact between two others). Under present circumstances, when such contact has taken on a political flavor, this contact tends to be indiscriminately ascribed as the source of Surzhyk—that is, the Ukrainian language “distorted” by Russian. This point of view is expressed in Yuriy Shevchuk’s work, “*Linguistic Schizophrenia*” (2015), in which the latter is defined as the “consecutive mixing of two languages, Russian and Ukrainian, in one place and at one and the same time. In Ukraine, this phenomenon is most actively disseminated through TV and radio, the Internet, and movies” (*Ibid.*, p. 3). This definition, however, implies a different type of language contact—code switching. In the 1980’s, code switching was regarded as a pathology. Now, after many studies, it is recognized as a normal and typical part of the bilingual experience (Wade, 2013). As for the term *linguistic schizophrenia*, in the theory of bilingualism it is more or less neutral. It is the phrase given to “real difficulties faced by people who study a foreign language” (Lushpai, 2009, p. 58). The problem of Surzhyk, which must, by all means, be resolved, is not created by code switching when two standard languages are used in the same communicative setting. Surzhyk appears because its speakers’ education is insufficient; they don’t know either standard Ukrainian or standard Russian. Their children then inherit their parents’ Surzhyk—through natural exposure—from the Surzhyk linguistic environment. The only way to defeat Surzhyk is by learning standard Ukrainian. This should preferably occur in childhood and within an educated environment, whether monolingual or bilingual.

Functional factors: Intensity of language use

Regularity with which the languages are used and duration of their application promote entrenchment and algorithmic retrieval of the patterns of cerebral activity. In a neurolinguistics study, a functional MRI was used to study Spanish-Catalan bilinguals who acquired either Spanish or Catalan as the first language in the first years of life. Subjects were exposed to the second language at three years of age and had used both languages in daily life since then. Subjects had a comparable level of proficiency in the comprehension of both languages. The results indicated that, during a production task, less extensive brain activation was associated with both age of acquisition and language use or exposure (Perani et al., 2003). On the other hand, L1 that have not been completely acquired by young learners and are not used later, can be lost, or suffer attrition. This phenomenon may be exemplified by emigrants’ children who are moved to a new linguistic environment before puberty. Hence, there is a sensitive period not only for acquisition of L2, but also for attrition in L1 (Montrul, 2008).

Functional factors: Degree of proficiency

Language proficiency, which can be defined as the degree of control one has over a language (Hernandez, 2007, p. 641) is an integrative factor; it depends on the age and sequence of language acquisition, on formal or informal language learning, and on the intensity of using languages in different societal contexts. The importance of age acquisition decreases when early and late learners of L2 attain the same proficiency. Competent bilinguals, irrespective of age of acquisition, demonstrate similar cerebral reactions to L2. However, there is sufficient evidence that L2 is processed in brain areas that are involved in effortful retrieval, which includes effortful semantic retrieval in lexical decision, articulatory and motor processing during reading, and in visual form processing in picture naming (Hernandez, 2007, p. 641–642). Switching to subdominant L2 requires cognitive effort, which is tiring for the brain. Even after many years of regular use of L2, switching to L1 is a relief (Wade, 2016).

As a result, the neurocognitive background for a Ukrainian bilingual whose dominant language is Russian and subdominant language is Ukrainian can be described as follows. Each language has its own neural network, which may differ in degree of development and functional activity. The neural network of the dominant language is the one that works “by default”—the one that formed during the sensitive period in childhood and became entrenched due to intensive use of the language for many years in diverse contexts. The effortlessly activated neural network becomes the conventional, natural instrument for speech comprehension and production. It is no wonder, then, that in a situation in which the neural network of the subdominant Ukrainian language is not quite developed, the language user will choose Russian for favourably presenting him or herself to society.⁵ Variety in the subdominant Ukrainian language group reveals three basic types of bilinguals.

Type 1. The neural network for L2 may approximate the neural network of L1 in its development and entrenchment, if the Ukrainian language was acquired in childhood along with Russian, and was further intensively used. Type 1 is a productive bilingual.

Type 2. The neural network for L2 was formed in the sensitive period in childhood (between 8–12 years of age) in the family and beyond, but it has not been thoroughly entrenched because of its sporadic use in limited contexts, such as only during Ukrainian lessons in a Russian-speaking school. Type 2 is a reproductive bilingual.

Type 3. The neural network for L2 was formed in the post-sensitive period, after primary school (after 12 years of age), exclusively through formal language learning, and has not been sufficiently entrenched because of a lack of necessity to use L2 and/or the absence of an L2 linguistic environment. Type 3 is a receptive bilingual.

⁵ The author believes that this should be born in mind by those opponents of Russian who groundlessly accuse Russian-speaking Ukrainians of political treachery.

The above illustrates that bilingual competence in L2 is a variable phenomenon. Ukrainian language proficiency may evolve from receptive (which is understood but not spoken) to reproductive (which is understood and reproduced), and reproduced language may evolve to productive—even becoming as fluent as in the L1. Such shifts in the bilingual's proficiency in Ukrainian can be illustrated through a series of measures that attend to the multi-faceted nature of language dominance and target particular age groups.

Ukrainian as L2: conditions for dominance shifts

Opponents of Russian-speaking Ukrainians should remember that language is, first and foremost, not “politics” but “biology,” and that one may use Russian as a tool for creating one’s desired social identity and image. However, the speakers of Russian, in turn, should understand that *the Ukrainian language unites the nation, and it is the symbol of Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty*. That is why every citizen of Ukraine should know Ukrainian—either as his or her first or second language. Language planning involves developing individual bilinguals and aims to raise their knowledge of, fluency in, and comfort using Ukrainian. This is a long-term program and could benefit from being grounded not in coercion but in understanding of how our brains and minds work with languages. In the context of Ukraine, the two major target groups of language planning should be speakers within both the sensitive and post-sensitive age groups.

Speakers of the sensitive age

These are children up to the age of 12 who are raised in Russian-speaking families. Pre-school and primary school instruction in Ukrainian will make them productive bilinguals for whom the Ukrainian language, acquired implicitly and effortlessly, may eventually even become dominant, with Russian becoming subdominant. Increasing contexts that employ standard Ukrainian, such as children’s books, movies, and videogames, may reduce the linguistic confusion and potential negative social fallout from many people’s everyday use of Surzhyk. Successful attainment of the Ukrainian language by young learners may be enabled, on the one hand, by parents’ recognition of the necessity and cognitive benefits of raising a bilingual child, and on the other hand, by concerted efforts to develop and implement language programming by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science. The Ministry should implement a scientifically sound program of training teachers of Ukrainian and developing contemporary educational materials that will engage children. It appears that failure to consider the neurocognitive factors of language acquisition has been integrated into the debates about the content of Article 7 of Ukraine’s law “On Education,” adopted September 5, 2017 (Zakon Ukrayini “Pro Osvitu”). In conformity with this article, national minorities of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to obtain pre-school and primary school education in both Ukrainian and the language of the national minority. Through this provision, the model provides choice of minority language in the education of young children, as well as mandating a compulsory switch to Ukrainian in post-primary education (Tischenko, 2017). Meanwhile, nursery and primary schools are the best settings for teaching Ukrainian—as well as other languages that a child is

not exposed to in the family. More balance among languages in nursery and primary schools and greater adherence to the principles previously mentioned (i.e., “one person, one language”; “one situation, one language”; “particular time, particular language”) may be the most natural and painless method of learning Ukrainian. To start teaching Ukrainian after primary school, however, is too late.

Speakers of post-sensitive age

These may be (loosely) divided into several age groups: 2–22, 23–40, 41–50, and 50+ years. These groups differ in their potential to improve Ukrainian as their L2. Since the sensitive period has passed (a biological factor), Ukrainian must be improved through societal mechanisms such as extension of the Ukrainian linguistic environment.

For speakers aged 12–22 years, this arises primarily in the Ukrainian linguistic environment in secondary and high schools, as well as through various entertainment events held in Ukrainian. For 23–40 year olds, the Ukrainian linguistic environment is the business environment, which is most often bilingual but where individuals feel that they must be “invited” to use Ukrainian. A system of various incentives could transform this. For the 12–22 and 23–40 age cohorts, an increase in the contexts in which Ukrainian might reasonably be used could make a shift toward individual dominance of Ukrainian a realistic possibility, at least in professional domains. These bilinguals, who were born in a sovereign Ukraine or shortly before independence, had more exposure to Ukrainian-speaking contexts, which is beneficial for neural processing of Ukrainian as a subdominant language.

The 41–50 and 50+ cohorts are the most problematic. First, their Russian (the conventional language in the USSR)—learned early and practiced variously—has built a powerful neural substrate. Second, development of a similar substrate for Ukrainian is unlikely because of the gradual decrease of cerebral functions. A new language is difficult to acquire and, if acquired, it requires cognitive effort to use. However, the steady increase in Ukrainian linguistic contexts (i.e., in everyday life, in the service sector, on TV) may also be favorable for improving their Ukrainian, if only at a receptive level. At the level of receptive bilingualism, it would be best for individuals to be spoken to in Ukrainian and not reproached for speaking back in Russian. Exceptions, however, include officials, educators, public representatives of the service sector, and some other professions for which Ukrainian is legally prescribed and thus has to be acceptably proficient.

For adult bilinguals, switching to the subdominant Ukrainian language requires *motivation*, both ideological and pragmatic. In addition, favorable conditions for societal dominance of Ukrainian are needed. To this end, the Ukrainian Government’s decision to increase the scope of Ukrainian linguistic content on radio and TV has been absolutely appropriate. However, this decision should have been explained to the public with reference to the neurocognitive data. Ideological effort should be directed to build Ukraine’s image as an economically and politically successful country with a rich history and culture. Pragmatic motives ought to be enough to convince young people to obtain quality education in Ukrainian, to realize their professional potential, and to obtain a decent and honest income. When such

motives become reality, it will no longer be necessary to persuade Ukrainians living in any part of the country to learn Ukrainian.

Conclusions

The dominance of Russian exhibited by Ukrainian bilinguals can neither be changed quickly nor by decree. Language is a neurocognitive function of the brain, which both develops and diminishes gradually over time. Improving one's second language, which today is most often Ukrainian, calls for ideological and pragmatic motivation. Motivation will most fruitfully arise from raising the status of Ukrainian, not from disparaging Russian as the dominant language of pro-Ukrainian Ukrainians. Such disparagement causes psychological resistance.

The future of Ukraine is not in monolingualism, as expounded by the football observer opining on linguistic issues; rather, it is in the multilingualism through which Ukrainians may know the languages of their national minorities (or even foreign languages), outside of their dominant Ukrainian language. This understanding of a multilingual present and future is conventional among the democratic societies that Ukraine wishes to join.

Cognitive science confirms the benefits of bilingualism for the brain and mind. Early bilinguals demonstrate better adaptation to new environments, they are quicker in decision making, and they demonstrate superior capacities for abstract thinking. An early bilingual acquires new languages more easily than a monolingual (Protasova, 2015). The permanent cognitive challenge faced by a bilingual brain improves its executive function—that is, its ability to filter out unnecessary information and make decisions (Wade, 2016). L1 influences acquisition of L2, and L2, when learned, somewhat reshapes L1. Thus, a bilingual does not have two monolingual minds operating separately in the brain. Rather, a bilingual has one cognitively robust bilingual brain (Wade, 2016), which has more gray matter than the brain of a monolingual (Olulade et al., 2016). Finally, there is much evidence that bilingualism protects cognitive function in older age and delays the onset of symptoms of dementia (Bialystok, Abutalebi, Bak, Buke & Kroll, 2016).

In general, from a scholarly, professional standpoint, the “language problem” in Ukraine can be solved not by ousting Russian from Ukrainian territories (which, in any case, is impossible), but by reducing its dominance in individual bilingualism. Provided Ukraine pursues a sound language policy based on scholarly contributions instead of political slogans, and provided leaders comprehensively explain those policies to the public, the dominant language of Ukrainian bilinguals, within 10–15 years, will be Ukrainian. Alongside that, the languages of minorities and foreign languages will serve as instruments for integrating Ukraine with the world. At present, the acquisition of foreign languages by Ukrainians is hardly efficient, and the manner in which they do so requires revision, grounded in neurocognitive studies. However, this is another topic warranting another discussion; it is beyond the scope of this one.

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Chapter 7 — The Concept of Language Praising: A Case of Contemporary Ukrainian

Holger Küsse

Abstract

In debates about language and ethnicity or language and nation, one can find at least three types of arguments. First is the extrinsic type, in which the functionality (quality argument) and the distribution (quantity argument) of a language are emphasized. Second is the intrinsic type, in which language is seen as a value in itself because of its aesthetic, cognitive, or other features (for example, the language is regarded as being beautiful, melodious, clear and so on). Finally, the third is a type of argument related to identity—from individual to national and ethnic identity. Language is constructed as an essential part of identity, and the care of the language becomes a moral duty. On the background of the war in Donbass, language is sometimes seen as a weapon against external aggression. In these moral argumentations, historical assertions are often intertwined.

Keywords: Language praising, intrinsic arguments, extrinsic arguments, language and identity, language war

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the wake of Ukraine's independence and the recent Maidan Revolution, a poetic genre with historical roots in the 19th century—the genre of language praising—has become popular in Ukraine. Books about the Ukrainian language have been published, websites concerning the Ukrainian language have appeared, and poems about the language have gained popularity.

I comment on examples of this contemporary language praising in poems, on websites, in public spaces (i.e., billboards, graffiti) and specifically in two popular books. At first glance, references in public spaces exhibit more of an informative (rather than praising) character, but the aforementioned books especially can be seen as a kind of praising in prose. The relationship between historical and linguistic information on the one hand and patriotic praising on the other can differ, and the chosen books represent these differences. Volodymyr Seleznov's *Language Wars* (*Мовні війни*) is a popular science book about the history and linguistics of the

Ukrainian language, with a clear orientation towards defense of its autonomy (Селезньов, 2016). *Language and Nation* (*Мова і нація*) by Yaroslav Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Vail Ivanyshyn—first published in the 1990s, the 6th edition came out in 2012—manifests an outright patriotic attitude toward the Ukrainian language (Радевич-Винницький & Іванишин, 2012).

This paper begins with some remarks about the defense of languages, especially marginalized ones. Following that, the main arguments with respect to language praising are presented. These are the intrinsic and extrinsic arguments, which are related to characteristic features of a language or to the functional objectives of a language preference. To conclude, the question of language and identity is raised, and it is shown how language is conceptualized as a moral duty, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Donbass.

Defending and praising Ukrainian is not an isolated phenomenon and has cross-cultural parallels. Therefore, examples come not only from contemporary Ukrainian language praising but also from historical cases of Czech, Polish, and Ukrainian language praise to illustrate its commons features. Although the Ukrainian case is not unique, we are interested in the ways that language praising, as a special genre typical of nation building contexts, continues today.

In defense of the language

The human history of war and suppression, of the rise and fall of empires, and of genocides and the survival of marginalized nations are histories of language suppression and language death. But they are also histories of language revitalization. In the global history of nations and their languages, one can see processes of language loss, on one hand, and the expansion of languages, on the other. There is marginalization and disrespect of some languages and privileging and aggradizement of others. There is also the love of languages, independent of their status, and there is at least symbolic importance attached to self-identity and cultural originality. Cultural, political, and ethnic conflicts are often intertwined with language; this was, for instance, the case in the Yugoslavian Civil War in the 1990s.

The Ukrainian crisis is no exception. The Maidan revolution, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbass are not primarily language conflicts. Yet in multilingual Ukraine, with its “linguistic complexity” (Bowring, 2014, 58), different political positions are held by speakers of Ukrainian and Russian (as well as by completely bilingual speakers). As such, different attitudes toward are taken these languages (Kulyk, 2014; Hentschel & Brüggemann, 2015; Nedashivska, 2015). The conflict over the status of Russian and Ukrainian are integral parts of the conflicts in Ukraine.

This was seen soon after the Maidan revolution, when a new law about minority languages and their status was discussed. There was an attempt to repeal the 2012 Yanukovich-era law, *On the Principles of the State Language Policy*, which gave the right, “in places of compact residence of citizens of other nationalities,” to declare a language as an official

regional one (Bowring, 2014, p. 63). This immediately provoked protests among parts of the Russian speaking population. Although this law—which was never signed—was abolished in 2012, it was nonetheless taken to be a threat against the Russian language and an act of violence against the freedom to use one's mother tongue. Photographs from pro-Russian language protests show the aggressive will to use Russian (and only Russian). Protestors wore handwritten posters on their clothes with the slogan, “I want to speak Russian” (*Я хочу говорить по русски*), and sealed their mouths with strips of tape in the colours of Ukraine.



Figure 1: “I want to speak Russian” [<http://grominfo.eu/news/ru/society/other/96126-russkij-yazyk-v-ukraine-okazalsya-v-xudshej-situacii-chem-drugie-yazyki-menshinstv-sekretar-venecianskoj-komissii>] (Date of visit: 15.03. 2018)



Figure 2: “I want to speak Russian” [<http://vesti.lv/news/ukraina-vyrvet-russkii-yazyk-u-detei>] (Date of visit: 15.03. 2018)

During the resistance against the possible annulment of the language law of 2012, the myth of a suppressed Russian language in Ukraine arose, which was in obvious contrast to the historical evidence of the longtime suppression of Ukrainian and superiority of Russian on Ukrainian territory. At the same time, the old argument against an autonomous Ukrainian language was renewed. The following claim from an internet forum, appropriately named *antimaydan*, is an example of the aggressive internet discourse about language (Ефремов &

Шарлай, 2016). The author declares the “Artificiality of the ‘Ukrainian language,’” which “can be seen from a distance of at least one kilometer” (Искусственность “украинского языка” видна за километр). Some arguments, based on a comparison of Ukrainian and Russian, are presented ironically. The author calls Ukrainian *ukromova*—an insulting construction of the abbreviation of Ukrainian (*ukr*) and the Ukrainian word for language (*mova*). The author asserts this “artificiality” based upon factors like the presence of more than one root for one lexical meaning without noting that such a characteristic common among world languages, and—ironically—in Russian especially. An example is the word *town*, which in Ukrainian is *місто*. However, in some composite forms the Russian word *город* or the Church Slavonic *град* are used. Such a purist critique of Ukrainian notably fails to recognize the difference between the Russian and the “imported” Church Slavonic root.

Как-то спрашиваю одного шибко свидомого: "как будет на укромове "город"? Он мне: "місто, и никак иначе." Ну тогда я говорю ему: "Давай на карту Украины посмотрим." Открываем, а там: УжГОРОД, ГрайГОРОД, МирГОРОД, ЧервоноГРАД, ГОРОДОК аж подо Львовом. В ответ бессвязное мычание и попытки свалить всё на ОГОРОД и т.п. Даже не смешно. [https://vk.com/antimaydan?w=wall-41232698_1023733] (Date of visit: 12. 12. 2017)

Defenders of the Ukrainian language and its history are then compared with transvestites (*типа трансвеститов*), posed within the framework of debates about gender and so-called “nontraditional sexual orientations” in Russia—from the author’s perspective, a rather harsh insult.

На мой взгляд, совершенно очевидно (очебачно), что обычный русский язык просто изменяют каким-то противоестественным образом исключительно для отличия от оного. [...] смешно выглядят защитники его древности и просто почитатели, типа трансвеститов – вроде и мужик, но баба. (Ibid.)

In the conclusion, the author speculates about the intentions to create a Ukrainian language that does not actually exist, supposing that it might serve only for talking and thinking “bullshit.”

А мне подумалось о том, что если думать на таком исковерканном, абсолютно неестественном языке, то какие ж мысли могут в голову прийти?! Недаром кто-то сказал, что укромова придумана только для того, чтобы говорить и думать всякую хрень. Дуже дякую! Очень ДАНКЭ. А что, звучит! (Ibid.)

By the end of the piece, the combination of German and Russian to say, “Thank you so much” (Очень ДАНКЭ) ironizes not only the widespread use of Ukrainian-Russian mixed language (Surzhyk), but also alludes to the supposed fascist tendencies of which the

Euromaidan and the Maidan revolutions are accused by the Russian side. This claim was most prominently made by the Russian president in his speech after the Crimea referendum on the 18th of March 2014. At that event, the activists of the Maidan Revolution and the new Ukrainian government were vilified as nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and Anti-Semites (<http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/20603>; Date of visit: 21.09. 2015).

The above argument from the so-called *antimaydan* website represents a rather radical example. However, in the context of such hostile radicalism, it is no wonder that passionate reactions in favor of the Ukrainian language have arisen. Through these, the thesis of the non-existence of an autonomous Ukrainian language is often explicitly expressed, but only in order to be rejected. Take, for example, Volodymyr Seleznov's book, *Language Wars* (Мовні війни):

Наявні на сьогодні дані лінгвістичної науки дозволяють цілком упевнено стверджувати, що українська мова зовсім не зіпсована суміш якихось мов, а самостійна, самобутня і самодостатня мова. І вона з успіхом довела це своїм багатовіковим розвитком.
(Селезньов, 2016, p. 231)

Defending Ukrainian has a long history. Ivan Franko (Іван Франко, 1856–1916), in his poem *To Antoshka P. (Az pokoy)* (Антошкові П. (Азъ покой)), had reflected on whether Ukrainian ought to be called a dialect or an autonomous language (*Діалект чи самостійна мова?*). Further, Franko underlined the importance of the word, Ukrainian, for the millions of its speakers (*Міlionам треба сього слова*):

Діалект чи самостійна мова?

Найпустіше в світі се питання.

Міlionам треба сього слова,

І гріхом усяке тут хитання.

[<http://poetyka.uazone.net/franko/pages.phtml?place=franko&page=semper10>] (date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Today, the popular poem, *To the Mother Tongue* (Рідній мові), is often cited on websites related to Ukrainian language and culture. It was written by Vasil Didenko (Василь Діденко, 1937–1990), who lived and wrote in the Soviet period. Sometimes the poem is published under the name of Vasil Sosyurchenko—Василь Сосюрченко, 1926–1998—who also wrote some poems on language. In the poem, *To the Mother Tongue*, Didenko refers to critics of Ukrainian, who claimed it to be a dying (*наша мова геть відстала*) and old fashioned idiom (*наша мова вже не в моді*):

Мені казав один ханжा,

Що наша мова геть відстала,

[. . .]

Що наша мова вже не в моді.

[http://roditeli.ua/deti/development_poetry/den_ykrainskoi_movu]

(Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

The poem has the subtitle, *I'm Not the Last of the Mohicans* (Я не останній з могікан), which suggests that speakers of Ukrainian are not a dying breed but rather proud members of a great culture. The poem ends with the words, “I am the son of the great Taras (Я – син Великого Тараса),” and, “I am not the last of the Mohicans (останній з могікан). I am the son of a great nation! (син великого народу)”:

Я – син Великого Тараса.

Як Прометей не вмер від ран,

Не вмре і мова – гарна зроду.

Я не останній з могікан,

Я – син великого народу! (Ibid.)

Historically, language defense and language praising are embedded in processes of nation building (Stukenbrock, 2005; Woldt, 2010). The following examples illustrate the defense of Polish and Czech within the European languages from the 16th century to the mid-19th century. Jan Mączyński (1520–ca. 1584) argued that the Polish language is not less abundant (*nie mniej obfit*) in words and sentences than other languages:

[. . .] język polski, czyli słowiański, jest nie mniej obfit w słowa i zdania, nie mniej poważny i powabny niż którykolwiek inny. (cit. by Klemensiewicz, 1965, p. 73)

Josef František Miloslav Rautenkranz (Routovský, 1776–1817) asserted that *our* (i.e., the Czech) language, is able to express all arts *clearly, truly, tunefully, gracefully* and *shortly*:

[. . .] jazyk náš schopen jest ve všech uměních zřetedlně, jadrně, zvučně, líbezně a krátce podle potřeby se vyjádřiti. (cit. by Pražák, 1945, p. 232)

For Karel Ignác Thám (1763–1816), the Czech language in the field of poetics can be compared with Greek and Latin:

Co se zpěvomluvnosti (poesis) tkne, v té jazyk český jak řeckému, tak i latinskému vrovnati se může. (cit. by Pražák, 1945, p. 152)

Perhaps the best-known representative of the Czech National Revival in the 19th century, Josef Jungman (1773–1847) confirms that there is no doubt that the Czech language is able to function in all sciences and arts:

Že jazyk náš český co nástroj k wědám a umám spůsoben jest, toho ani nepřízniwci jeho neupírají. (Jungmann, 1846, p. 28)

It is no wonder, then, that in the praising of long suppressed languages like Ukrainian, one can find similar examples from various times. The modern author Maksym Ril'sky (Максим Рильський, 1895–1964) praised Ukrainian as a “beautiful language, which should be brave in the middle of the beautiful brother languages.”

Мужай, прекрасна наша мово, / Серед прекрасних братніх мов, / Живи, народу вільне слово, / Над прахом царських корогов, / Цвіти над нами веселково, / Як мир, як щастя, як любов! [http://www.ukrlit.net/lib/rilsky/hidna.html] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

In these verses, the political dimension of the language is expressed. The language is related to the free word which should arise *over the dust of tsarists' flags*. The language is seen as expressions of the *peace, happiness, and love* of the nation. Also, the verses posit that the language could guarantee the survival and future of the people; it is positioned as a foundation of the country's independence. The romantic correlation of language and nation is as vital as in the 19th century. Consequently, the previously mentioned Volodymyr Seleznov calls the language question one of Ukraine's most troubling problems, both in the past and in the present:

Однією з найбільш гострих проблем в Україні була і є проблема мови. (Селезньов, 2016, p. 3)

Types of argumentation: intrinsic and extrinsic

Defending and praising a language raises arguments about why the defended and beloved language should be considered as equal to, or even better than, others. In most such arguments, aesthetic, functional, and historical reasons are provided. Languages are conceptualized as beautiful, rich, and old, as well as precise carriers of the experiences of the people. When a language is praised as being beautiful, melodious, clear, and so on, we can say the argumentation is *intrinsic* (Kuße, 2008 & 2016). The language is seen as holding a value in

and of itself because of its aesthetic, cognitive, or other assumed qualities (19th century poets especially enjoyed accumulating rather expressive attributes). For example, the above quoted Josef Jungmann describes the Czech language as *rich*, *elastic*, and *smooth*, but also *strong* and *melodious*:

[. . .] jazyk bohatý, ohebný, měkký, nicméně silný, dvorný, libozvučný, ke všem prosaickým i básnickým dílům na nejvýš spůsobný. (Jungman, 1846, p. 28)

In Ukrainian language praising we find metaphors like *diamant*, used by Volodymyr Samilenko (Володимир Самійленко, 1864–1925) in his poem, *The Ukrainian Language. Remembering Taras Shevchenko* (Українська мова. Пам'яти Шевченка):

Діамант дорогий на дорозі лежав, – / Тим великим шляхом люд усякий минав, / І ніхто не пізнав діаманта того. / Йшли багато людей і топтали його, / Але раз тим шляхом хтось чудовий ішов, / І в пилу на шляху діамант він найшов.
[<http://www.ukrcenter.com/Література/Володимир-Самійленко/21040/Українська-мова>]
(Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Furthermore, the poetic and philosophical qualities of Ukrainian itself are often emphasized. This may be observed in a poem by Vasyl Symonenko (Василь Симоненко, 1935–1963), in which the language is related to the *depth of the people's wisdom* (*Мудрості людської глибини*):

Вченому ти лагідно відкрила / Мудрості людської глибину. / І тобі рости й не в'януть зроду, / Квітують в поемах і віршах, / Бо в тобі – великого народу / Ніжна і замріяна душа. [<https://mala.storinka.org/вірші-про-українську-мову-збірка.html>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

These aesthetic arguments are typically related to the romantic model of language of the 19th century (Yavorska, 2010, p. 173), however they can be found today as well. On the website *Literary Town* (*Літературне місто*), a verse by the poet Dmitro Semenovych Cherednichenko (Дмитро Семенович Чередниченко), who was born in 1935, reveals a typical accumulation of metaphorical aesthetic features of Ukrainian. The language is characterized with the traditional Ukrainian symbol, the so-called *snowballtree* (*калинова*). It is praised as *tender, sweet as honey, and rich*:

Наша мова / калинова, / і ласкава, / і медова, / і багата, / і не бідна – от що мова / наша рідна. [<http://litmisto.org.ua/?p=26078>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Ch. 7 — The Concept of Language Praising (Küsse)

In Seleznov's book, one of the main arguments in defense and praise of Ukrainian is its history. The Ukrainian language has not had fewer phases in its historical development than other languages.

Українська мова пройшла не менший шлях свого розвитку, аніж російська, або польська, або будь-яка інша. (Селезньов, 2016, р. 27)

Here, the author asserts that the Ukrainian language, as well as its lexicon, have a deep history:

Українська мова, як і її словниковий запас, має глибоку історію. (Селезньов, 2016, р. 99)

Praising often reflects a purist attitude toward language. In *Language and Nation*, Yaroslav Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Vail Ivanyshyn argue that the use of the common Ukrainian-Russian mixed language known as Surzhyk leads to "Surzhyk-thinking"—that is, a poor and corrupt form of thinking.

Наївно вважати, що люди тільки розмовляють суржиком. Вони ним також і думають, і поводяться теж «суржиково». (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин, 2012, р. 93)

Methods of argumentation and the character of arguments in language praising differ little from language to language. In a way, then, they are universals, an idea supported by Joshua Fishman who, in his worldwide study about language, summarizes:

Often I would read a citation about Language X to an advocate of Language Z and ask him or her to "Guess what language this is about." In almost all cases they would guess it was about their own "beloved language" (although it never was) and that gave me the idea that the content of language praises might really be quite parsimoniously structured the world over" (Fishman, 1997, p. xix).

Intrinsic arguments are not only historical. One may also see such sentiments in contemporary culture, demonstrated in a study about language evaluation by Czech and German students at the Technical University Dresden (Woldt, 2011). Positive poetic appraisal comes from those students for whom Czech is their mother tongue but also from enthusiastic Germans who are learning Czech as a third or fourth language. Aesthetic features are frequently cited. The Czech language is praised as *beautiful*, and *rich*, though *very difficult* for foreigners.

Jazyk český se mi sám o sobě jeví jako velmi krásný a bohatý, ale velmi obtížný zvláště pro cizince. (cit. by Woldt, 2011, p. 190)

For another study participant, the Czech language is very *beautiful, rich* and *colorful*:

Čeština je však sama o sobě velmi krásný, bohatý a barvité jazyk. (Ibid.)

A German study participant wrote, “It sounds flowing like a pure stream in the mountains, flowing through green meadows, and not like a rough and crude waterfall”:

Sie klingt fließend wie ein klarer Gebirgsbach, der durch grüne Wiesen zieht und nicht wie ein rauer, ungehobelter Wasserfall. (Ibid., p. 194)

In the intrinsic type of language praise, language is treated as having a value in and of itself. This model is dominant in some Slavic cultures (Garvin, 1993, p. 51; Yavorska, 2010, p. 167). However, apart from intrinsic arguments there are arguments for the communicative functions of languages (Ibid.), and these arguments, in which the functionality (quality of argument) and the distribution (quantity of argument) of the language is emphasized, we can call *extrinsic* (Kuße, 2008 & 2016).

One of the most important extrinsic arguments for a language is its role in the prosperity and might of a nation. This argument especially arises in times of nation building and, in Slavic contexts, became common in the 19th century (i.e., in the Romantic epoch). In 1945, Albert Pražák titled his anthology of praising the Czech language *The Nation Defends Itself* (*Národ se brání!*). Defense of a language stands for defense of a nation. In this anthology, one can find many examples of extrinsic argumentation in which the language is functionally praised as the basis of an independent, civilized, developed, and prosperous nation. One of the most emotive arguments in this vein was put forward by the famous Czech poet Jan Neruda (1834–1891). A nation, he argues, that loses its language also loses its voice and is reduced to the role of a serf:

Národ, který svůj jazyk ztrácí, ztrácí svůj hlas v lidstvě a je odsouzen, aby hrál na jevišti světovém jen úlohy němé – lokajské! (cit. by Pražák, 1945, p. 340)

In contemporary Ukraine, Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Ivanyshyn stress the importance of language in the *normal functioning* of the *national organism* in its political, economic, and cultural functions:

Ch. 7 — The Concept of Language Praising (Küsse)

Мова забезпечує нормальне функціонування національного організму в усіх його виявах – політичному, економічному, культурному та ін. (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин, 2012, р. 109)

In Radevych-Vynnytskyj's and Ivanyshyn's view, the language is the source of being for the nation. They assert that protecting the mother tongue means protecting the nation:

Мова – запорука існування народу. Захищаючи рідну мову, ти захищаєш свій народ, його гідність, його право на існування, право на майбутнє. Не ухиляйся від цієї боротьби! (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин, 2012, р. 204)

As a result, Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Ivanyshyn do not see aggression against a language such as Ukrainian as lingua-phobia in a narrow sense but as aggression against a nation:

Ясно є те, що мову нищать не з якоїсь лінгвоксенофобії – ненависті до чужих мов, а для того, щоб носій цієї мови втратив своє «я» і розчинився в іншому народові. (Ibid., р. 13)

One can especially find extrinsic arguments in the public sphere. The heightened importance given to the language is based on the function and ideal of Ukrainian unity. Therefore, the most popular slogan is, “We are united by the language” (*Нас єднає мова*), which one can find on several internet sites as well as on billboards in the streets.



Figure 3: “We are united by the language” [<http://uchitel9.webnode.com.ua/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)



Figure 4: "We are united by the language"

http://zik.ua/news/2012/07/27/yedyna_derzhavna_mova_zaporuka_tsilisnosti_ukrainy_360749 [Date of visit: 17.03. 2018]

Extrinsic arguments can be offensive in a political sense. In 2012, the nationalist group Autonomous Resistance (*Автономний Опір*) in Lviv sprayed on house walls the slogan, *Whose language is used? They are in power* (*Чия мова того влада*)



Figure 5: "For whom there is language, to them goes power"

[<http://opir.info/2012/06/17/chyya-mova-toho-vlada/>] [Date of visit: 17.03. 2018]

On the organization's website, this slogan received the following comment: "A nation, it is argued, does not die because of an infarct, but because its language is no longer chosen."

Нація вмирає не від інфаркту- спочатку в неї відбирають мову! Мова-душа українського народу. Її століттями забороняли та всіляко намагались знищити. (Ibid.)

In addition, on various internet sites, there is often added the following assertion of the philologist Oksana Pakhlovska (Оксана Пахльовська, *1956): "Nations without a language are slaves."

Раби – це нація, котра не має Слова. Тому й не зможе захистити себе. (Ibid.)

Language and identity

An accumulation of positive values expressed about one's language tends to position the language as superior in comparison to others. In the view of its enthusiasts, the praised language can better express feelings and is superior for arguing in a philosophical sense than any other language that the speaker or writer knows. A characteristic example of this shift from defense to the suggestion of superiority appears in the foreword of Mikhail Lomonosov's (1711–1765) well-known *Russian Grammar* (1755). Ironically, but nevertheless seriously, Lomonosov praises the Russian language in the following way:

Карл Пятый, римский император, говоривал, что испанским языком с богом, французским – с друзьями, немецким – с неприятелями, итальянским – с женским полом говорить прилично. Но если бы он российскому языку был искусен, то, конечно, к тому присовокупил бы, что им со всеми оными говорить пристойно, ибо нашел бы в нем великолепие испанского, живость французского, крепость немецкого, нежность итальянского, сверх того богатство и сильную в изображениях краткость греческого и латинского языка. Сильное красноречие Цицероново, великолепная Виргилиева важность, Овидиево приятное витийство не теряют своего достоинства на российском языке. Тончайшие философские воображения и рассуждения, многообразные естественные свойства и перемены, бывающие в сем видимом строении мира и в человеческих обращениях, имеют у нас пристойные и вещь выраждающие речи. (Ломоносов, 1952, p. 391–392)

Charles V, Emperor of Rome, was wont to say that it is proper to address oneself in Spanish to God, in French to friends, in German to the enemy, and in Italian to the female sex. Had he been skilled in (the knowledge of) Russian, he would doubtless have added that in the last named it behooves one to speak to all the above. For therein he would have found the magnificence of Spanish, the vivacity of French, the strength of German, the tenderness of Italian, and, besides, the opulence of Greek and Latin and their forceful gift for concise imagery. The powerful eloquence of Cicero, the magnificent stateliness of Virgil, the pleasing poesy of Ovid, do not lose their worth in Russian. The finest philosophical concepts and reasoning, the multiform properties and changes of nature occurring in this visible edifice of the universe and in the intercourse among men as well, have, in our tongue, locutions befitting and expressing the matter.

(Translation quoted by J. A. Joffe in "Russian Literature", part of Lectures on Literature (Columbia University, 1911, p. 316) [https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Russian_language] (Date of visit: 17.03.2018)

Lomonosov's main argument in favor of the Russian language is its equality to all other European languages. Russian can express philosophical discourses (философские воображения и рассуждения) as well as feelings of love or anger. Even further, unlike other European languages, each of which has some distinct virtue—as illustrated by the authority of Charles V—Russian combines all these qualities. Therefore, the Russian language seems to be “more equal” than others and should be seen as the best language that one might find anywhere in Europe. The way that Lomonosov praises the Russian language is characteristic of a period in which citizens sought to establish a language as a polyfunctional standard language. As revealed in this paper, in language praise, the language that is used in a restricted way is not defective compared to other, more prestigious languages. It furthermore has unique attributes. Also, the language is praised as the best language that one can imagine, as a language that is obviously superior to others.

In the patriotic book, *Language and Nation*, by Yaroslav Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Vail Ivanyshyn, they argue for a unique, close relationship between the Ukrainian people and their language. Implicitly, this relationship, which the authors argue is expressed in a great number of songs—especially ones about language—gives the Ukrainian people and their language culture a spiritual superiority above all other peoples and cultures. The source of this information is not provided. However, this clearly does not matter to the authors, who carry out their language praising in the form of a full-length monograph.

Останніми роками про українську мову з'явилося понад 300 пісень. Уже цей факт свідчить про те, як ставиться наш народ до своєї мови. Видаеться, що українці мають не тільки більше пісень, ніж будь-який інший народ у світі, але й найбільше пісень про мову. (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин, 2012, р. 14)

However, in the history of language praising, there are also examples of praising the language for its qualities without pretensions to superiority. The language is posited as having a value in itself, as it is the people's own language, even if it is less important and less polyfunctional than others. This is the case in the praise of Belorussian by Janka Kupala (1882–1942). Although the language seems to be “poor,” it is beloved, because it is the mother tongue:

*Загнанае слова, ты, роднае слова! / Грымі ж над радзімай зямлёй: / Што родная мова,
хоць бедная мова, / Мілей найбагатшай чужой. (cit. by Neureiter, 1983, p. 54–55)*

Similar examples are frequent also in Ukrainian language praise. In poems by Ivan Franko (see above) and Valentyn Bychko (Валентин Бичко, 1912–1994), the fact that the language is the people's own is emphasized. Therefore, the value of the language depends not upon its intrinsic qualities but on ownership. In the poem, *I'm Calm* (Азъ покой), Franko expresses his feelings toward the language, saying that foreign richness he could not love:

Ch. 7 — The Concept of Language Praising (Küsse)

На чуже багатство ми не ласі, / Ласа лиш твоя душа жебрацька. / Бідні ми, як коні на припоні, / Збагатись нас труд на рідній ниві. / В діалекті чи хоч би в жаргоні / Будемо багаті і щасливі.

[<http://poetyka.uazone.net/franko/pages.phtml?place=franko&page=semper10>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Valentyn Bychko points out that the Ukrainian language is *his* language, that the language lives in his roots:

Мово моя українська — / Батьківська, материнська, / Я тебе знаю не вивчену — / Просту, домашню, звичну, / Не з-за морів прикликану, / Не з словників насмикану. / Ти у мене із кореня — / Полем мені наговорена, / Дзвоном коси прокованна, / В чистій воді смакована.

[<http://gramotiy.co.ua/бичко-валентин-українська-мова/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

This leads to the third type of argument, which is related to *identity* (from individual to national or ethnic). In this line of praise, language is constructed as an essential part of identity. What a nation is and how peoples think and feel is expressed through their language. The language should resemble the soul of the people. Vasil Symonenko (Василь Симоненко, 1935–1963) praises the language in the poem, *My Language* (*Моя Мова*), within which lies *the soul of the great nation*.

І тобі рости й не в'януть зроду, / Квітують в поемах і віршах, / Бо в тобі – великого народу / Ніжна і замріяна душа.

[http://roditeli.ua/deti/development_poetry/den_ykrainskoi_movu] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

In Volodymyr Sosyura's (Володимир Сосюра, 1898–1965) poem, *To the Brother* (*До брата*), language, like the nation, has gained a nearly religious status. The author confirms that he *believes* in it, and that the language is his *mother* and his *God*: “The language won’t bend and Ukraine will glow upon the earth in true light.”

Я вірю в тебе, моя мами. / Мій бог, що дивиться з висот. / В народів інших старцовати / Повік не буде мій народ! / Ні, наша мова не загине, / ії не знищать сили злі! / Ти власним світом, Україно, / Сіяти будеш на землі.

[<https://onlyart.org.ua/sosyura-volodymyr-do-brata/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

In the praise poem, *The Mother Tongue in One's Native School* (*Рідна мова в рідній школі!*) by Oleksandr Oles' (Олександр Олесь, 1878–1944), language seems to be the guarantee of unity. Nothing else, the poet argues, can be closer and more beloved than the mother tongue. Also, it is again suggested that the language unites the people:

*Рідна мова в рідній школі! / Що бринить нам чарівніш? / Що нам ближче, і милюш, / I
дорожче в час недолі? / Рідна мова! Рідна мова! / Що в єдине нас злива,—/ Перші матері
слова, / Перша пісня колискова.*

[http://roditeli.ua/deti/development_poetry/den_ykrainskoi_movu] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

In identity arguments, historical assertions are often intertwined. Vasyl Didenko (see above) finds in the history of Ukrainian language and lyrics his own value as a son of the famous poet Taras Shevchenko (Тарас Шевченко, 1814–1864), and therefore as a son of a great nation:

*Я – син Великого Тараса. / Як Прометей не вмер від ран, / Не вмре і мова – гарна зроду. / Я
не останній з могікан, / Я – син великого народу!*

[http://roditeli.ua/deti/development_poetry/den_ykrainskoi_movu] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Language praising and the appraisal of historical heroes often flow together. Volodymyr Sosyura (see above) remembers Shevchenko and Franko:

*Національним самогубцем / Невже ти, брате, хочеш стати? / Яке прекрасне рідне
слово! / Воно — не світ, а всі світи... / Шевченка мову і Франкову / Невже під ноги кинеш
ти?*

[<https://onlyart.org.ua/sosyura-volodymyr-do-brata/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Volodymyr Samilenko (Володимир Самійленко, 1864–1925) praises Shevchenko as the rescuer of the Ukrainian language, the man who brought the language to its highest level:

*Так в пилу на шляху наша мова була, / I мислива рука її з пилу взяла. / Попробила її,
обробила її, / Положила на ню усі сили свої, / I в народний вінець, як в оправу, ввела, / I, як
зорю ясну, вище хмар піднесла.*

[<http://www.ukrcenter.com/Література/Володимир-Самійленко/21040/Українська-мова>]
(Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Ch. 7 — The Concept of Language Praising (Küsse)

Today, the purported close connection between language and nation is also visualized in many ways. One popular icon on the internet is a heart in the colors of the Ukrainian flag that contains the words, “language is the nation’s heart”:



Figure 6: “Language is the nation’s heart” [<https://babusjamanya.wordpress.com/2012/11/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Heart is a very traditional metaphor, though there are other contemporary metaphors as well. In a special internet project, language is metaphorized as the DNA of the nation. The logo portrays the double helix for the letter “o”:



Figure 7: “Language is the nation’s DNA” [<https://ukr-mova.in.ua/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

On this site, Ukrainian language training programs are promoted and illustrated in a comic book style with a tongue (i.e., language) as a main figure:



Figure 8: “Love Ukrainian” [<https://ukr-mova.in.ua/library/inshe/lyubit-ukrayinsku!>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

In books, popular scientific evidence can support the thesis of an inseparable relationship between language and nation, as we see in Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Ivanyshyn. They quote—or perhaps more accurately, paraphrase—statements about this subject from authorities in the history of linguistics and philosophy such as Wilhelm von Humboldt (*The Language is the Spirit of the Nation*) and Martin Heidegger (*Language is the Spirit's House*):

«Мова народу—це його дух, і дух народу—це його мова» (В. фон Гумбольдт).

«Мова – оселя духу» (М. Гайдегер). (Радевич-Винницький & Іванишин, 2012, p. 71–72)

The authors call language the “genetic code” of the nation:

Мова – це генетичний код нації, який поєднує сучасне з минулим, програмує майбутнє і забезпечує буття нації у вічності. (*Ibid.*, p. 75)

Language as a moral duty

Language praising often has an appellative character, especially when the argument is mainly extrinsic. Valentina Kamenchuk (Валентина Каменчук, 1956) not only recommends but also indirectly demands that we take care of our language:

Бережімо нашу мову / І як маму полюбім, / Бо немає нам рідніших / В цьому світі все гарніших, / Як та мова наша рідна, / Найгучніша з-поміж мов.

[<https://mala.storinka.org/вірші-про-українську-мову-збірка.html>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

For Radevych-Vynnytskyj and Ivanyshyn, to have a language is not a merit but a duty:

Володіння рідною мовою – не заслуга, а обов’язок патріотів. (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин, 2012, p. 204)

The argument is an extrinsic one; the fight for the language is the fight for independence and identity:

Омож навіть в умовах омріяної державної незалежності українцям доводиться і далі боротися за рідну мову, а тим самим за свою ідентичність і свою державність, без якої народ не може мати повноти життя. (Радевич-Винницький & Іванишин, 2012, p. 21)

For Seleznov, the inhabitants of the eastern regions of Ukraine especially have to fight against the language myths related to Ukrainian in order to protect the nation:

Сьогодні українцям, і особливо українцям південно-східних регіонів України, слід побороти міф, нав'язаний імперською політикою асиміляції, що змушує принизливо ставиться до української мови, нібито народженої шляхом ополячення або вигадування галичанами, і почати ставиться до неї як до гідної, рівної серед рівних мов, що має власну історію і свій особливий шлях розвитку. (Селезньов, 2016, р. 231)

On internet sites, these arguments are also combined with visualizations. *Put an End to Russification* is the slogan on the site, *streebogblog.wordpress.com*. Pictured is a map of Ukraine in the colors of the Ukrainian flag on which an arm in a jacket of the Russian colors dispenses red paint on the eastern part as well as in Crimea. This picture is combined with a statement from Vasil Ivanyshyn, one of the authors of *Language and Nation*. The main point is again, that protecting the language means protecting the nation.



Figure 9: "Put an end to russification"

[<https://streebogblog.wordpress.com/2016/10/09/захисти-українську-мову-нема-мови/>]
(Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Мова – запорука існування народу. Захищаючи рідну мову, ти захищаєш свій народ, його гідність, його право на існування, право на майбутнє. Не ухиляйся від цієї боротьби . . . Це наш історичний обов'язок, віправдання нашого перебування на цьому світі. Василь Іванишин

[<https://streebogblog.wordpress.com/2016/10/09/захисти-українську-мову-нема-мови/>]
(Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

The Movement for the Protection of the Ukrainian Language (*Рух захисту української мови*) distributes a kind of advertising for Ukrainian with definite appellative messages. Ukrainians are invoked to shift to Ukrainian and to speak the state language of the nation, and a reason is provided: the Ukrainian language is called “a weapon in the war with the aggressor.”



Figure 10: "Movement for the protection of the Ukrainian language"
[<http://pyriatyn.org.ua/actual/26>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

On another poster one can see a soldier holding a little girl. Above them is written: "War is there, where the Ukrainian state language wasn't." After this claim, related to the war in Donbass, there is a testimonial. Father and daughter confirm that they *already learned Ukrainian and speak it*. This is followed by the direct question, "And you?". At the bottom of the poster the slogan, "War is there, where the Ukrainian state language wasn't," is repeated.



Figure 11: "War is there, where the Ukrainian state language wasn't" [<http://zahystmovy.org.ua/category/pro-movu/>] (Date of visit: 17.03. 2018)

Already, the Russian-Ukrainian war has had consequences for language praising. The argument shifts from defense of equality with respect to the language's beauty and richness, as well as its importance for the national identity, to the function of a weapon.

Finally, it is important to note that in language praising, one most often sees a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic arguments. An example appears at the beginning of Radevych-Vynnytskyj's and Ivanyshyn's *Language and Nation*. Above the text, the authors quote words from the Ukrainian hymn, *Ukraine Has Not Yet Died!* (*Ще не вмерла Україна!*), and the subsequent appraisal of the Ukrainian language offers the reason—because the Ukrainian language is still alive. This reveals intrinsic and extrinsic arguments and also arguments of identity, while concluding with an indirect appeal to love the language and to make the effort to learn and use it.

«Ще не вмерла Україна!» «Ще не вмерла і не вмре!»

Бо живе наша мова. Отже, живий наш дух, жива наша пісня, наша історія, наша єдність і одність.

Живе наша мова – і з нами наші князі і гетьмани, наші письменники і вчені, наші державники і збройні оборонці.

Живе наша мова – і з нами 15-мільйонна діаспора.

Живе наша мова – і наш голос звучить у вселенському хорі народів.

Бо наша мова – це наша релігія, наша держава, наша минувшина, наша надія, наше майбутнє.

Бо наша мова – це ми, українці, – добрий, чесний, працьовитий народ, що тисячоліттями живе на берегах Дніпра і Дністра, там, де була колиска індоєвропейських народів, де сформувався тип білої людини.

Бо наша мова – це наша пісня, а народ, котрий має таку пісню, не здатний чинити неспровоковане зло іншим народам.

Отож, не лише клянімося в любові до рідної мови, не лише плачмо над її долею, а працюймо для неї, вивчаймо, заглиблуймось у її походження й історію, поширюймо, пропагуймо її. (Радевич-Винницький, Іванишин Мова і нація, 2012, р. 11)

In the first line one can see the argument for identity. The vitality of the language is related to the vitality of the spirit of the nation in its songs, history, and unity; the argument for identity is intertwined with the extrinsic argument for unity. In the following verses, the extrinsic values of the propagation and power of the language are added, including remembering its history, its heroes and the number of its speakers. It is emphasized that language ensures a voice in the *choir of the nations*. The next verses deal with the argument of identity. Language is called the *religion*, the *past*, the *hope*, and the *future* of Ukraine. The authors assert that language is the nation itself, which is characterized as *good*, *honest*, and *industrious*. Furthermore, a historical and strange ethnological argument is provided. The territory between the rivers Dnipro and Dnister is called the cradle of the Indo-Europeans and white humankind. The next-to-last verse is again intrinsic. It speaks of the peacefulness of Ukrainian songs, identified with the Ukrainian language which, in the view of the authors, expresses the quiet mentality of the people. At the end, the moral duty to protect, use, and develop the language is indirectly expressed in the form of an assertion.

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Chapter 8 — Swinging between Christian Forgiveness and Military Pathos in the Ukrainian Mass Poetical Discourse Since 2013

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Abstract

This case study analyzes mass poetic discourse in Ukraine since 2013. Its interdisciplinary approach helps settle the question of how the author's attitude to the war in Ukraine and to the enemy (whether or not the author considers the war fratricidal) correlates with the intensity of poetic pathos, the prescriptive modality, and the argumentative strategies in mass poetry.

Keywords: Ukrainian mass poetical discourse, (anti-)military pathos in poetry, argumentation in poetry, Ukrainian war poetry

Introduction

As generally understood in the field of psychology, writing (especially in small genre forms) is the most effective and accessible tool to ameliorate people's traumatic experiences.¹ Whether in the form of correspondence, diary, or poetry, writing is psychological therapy because of its deep, self-reflective capacity. Poetry, however, has a clear advantage over other forms. Poems not only narratively describe personal experience but also impact and compress it in a symbolic form. Therefore, poetry is often likened to "natural medicine," meaning that "poetic essences of sound, metaphor, image, feeling, and rhythm act as remedies that can elegantly strengthen our whole system—physical, mental and spiritual" (Fox, 1997, p. 3). Although psychological approaches to poetry therapy (Caeners, 2011) do not underpin the present case study, it is nonetheless important to interpret mass poetic discourse as a therapeutic space that reflects the most painful problems in society. By examining a discourse as a whole within a particular cultural space, at an appointed period in time, and within the respective historical context of

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language, metaphor, predominant modalities, motives, and more, we can see how the society generally feels.

The Ukrainian Euromaidan 2013 and the tragic events that followed were a powerful catalyst a new wave of creativity throughout Ukrainian society. Ukrainian poetical discourse has also become one of the most sensitive mirrors of social change, and the war has enhanced its cross-discursive and pivotal motifs. Many poetry collections dedicated to the poetics of the revolution have been published; for example, "Nebesna sotnya: antolohiya majdanivs'kyx virshiv" (Voronyuk, 2014), "Materyns'ka molytva. Ukrayinky – heroyam Majdanu" (Cherep-Perohanych & Perohanych, 2014), "Yevromajdan: lirychna xronika" (Bil'chenko, Kruk & Kalytko, 2014), "Boritesya – poborete! Poetyka revolyuciyi" (Ulishhenko, 2014), "Osin" u kamuflyazhi: zbirka virshiv" (Cybul's'ka, 2014), and many others. These poetry collections combine the works of both well-known and emerging Ukrainian poets. They often cross genres and, in general, the poetic form recedes into the background and gives way to content. The experiences of each author become central, and their many voices merge into a single discourse, talking to themselves, to other authors, to readers, and of course to the surrounding reality. Such reflexive dialogues are conducted not only on paper but also in poetic portals on the internet such as the "Klub poeziyi," "Bukvoyid," "Ukrain's'kyj portal poeziyi," "Postril," and others. On poetic websites and social networks, poems are often written under pseudonyms. However, because of their anonymity, perceived triviality, or poor writing style, classical literary critics often dismiss such public poems as naive, compulsive, and of no artistic value and so exclude such poems from the greater poetic discourse.

However, the social significance of mass poetry, especially that published online through social networks, is enormous. Considering the Ukrainian mass poetic discourse after 2014 and its impact on political and social circumstances, the most well-known poem, "Nikogda my ne budem brat'jami," was written by Anastasia Dmitruk (2014) about the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014:

*Nikogda my ne budem brat'jami
ni po rodine, ni po materi.

Duha net u vas byt' svobodnymi –
nam ne stat' s vami dazhe svodnymi.

Vy sebja okrestili „starshimi” –
nam by mladshimi, da ne vashimi.

Vas tak mnogo, a, zhal', bezlikie.

Vy ogromnye, my – velikie.

A vy zhmete . . . vy vsyo maetes',
svoej zavist'ju vy podavites'.*

*Volja – slovo vam neznakomoe,
vy vse s detstva v cepi zakovany.*

*U vas doma „molchan'e – zoloto”,
a u nas zhgut koktejli Molotova,
da, u nas v serdce krov' gorjachaja,
chto zh vy nam za „rodnja” nezrjachaja?*

*A u nas vseh glaza bestrashnye,
bez oruzhija my opasnye.*

*Povzrosleli i stali smelymi
vse u snajperov pod pricelami.*

*Nas katy na koleni stavili –
my vosstali i vsyo ispravili.*

*I zrja prjachutsja krysy, moljatsja –
oni krov'ju svoej umojutsja.*

*Vam shljut novye ukazanija –
a u nas tut ogni vosstanija.*

U vas Car', u nas - Demokratija.

Nikogda my ne budem brat'jami (Dmitruk, 2014).

This poem, read by its author, Anastasia Dmitruk, appeared on YouTube in March 2014, and soon afterward became widely known and precedent setting. In just one month, more than a million YouTube viewers viewed the video. Later, the poem was set to music, and a newer version of the video clip has—at time of writing—gained more than eight million views. The poem, “Nikogda my ne budem brat'jami,” became one of the key texts of the public Russian-Ukrainian discourse of identity across social networks. This poem resonated powerfully with the public because it expressed key ideas of the emerging Ukrainian identity, the Ukrainian Self, and contrasted sharply with the Other, namely, the Russian people. Dmitruk’s poem captured the main motives of contemporary Ukrainian patriotic discourse, including freedom, greatness, spiritual strength, dauntless courage, invincibility, and rebellion. The thesis of the poem, “Nikogda my ne budem brat'jami” became a cross-discursive statement in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It was used repeatedly in various contexts and public discussions, and it even came to function as justification for confrontation, hate speech, and finally military aggression, both for pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian discourse actors.

Since Euromaidan 2013, Ukrainian mass poetical discourse has mirrored social developments and reflected the drastic changes in Ukrainian identity. The present study focuses on this complex question: How has the idea of brotherhood between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples transformed under conflict and military confrontation and, more specifically, how is brotherhood interpreted and argued within the Ukrainian mass poetical discourse? And what heroic pathos accompanies it? This case study should reveal several viewpoints expressed within the mass poetical discourse, whether the author considers the war as fratricidal (meaning that Ukrainians and Russians still seem to be brothers), or whether the author considers this war as one between two enemies (such interpretations reject the idea of brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians). Both of these opposing views and their variants correlate with the intensity of poetic pathos and the author's prescriptive modality. The present case study focuses on this correlation between the author's attitude to the war and his or her linguistic peculiarities.

Theoretical embedding and method

This case study partly continues a widespread investigations of Ukrainian identity and its successive shifts under various political circumstances—and especially following the Euromaidan 2013 (Bystryc"kyj et al., 2015; Halling & Stewart, 2015; Korostelina, 2013; Kulyk, 2014; Novosolova, 2016 and many others).

This case study is interdisciplinary and is conducted at the intersection of several dimensions. The first dimension is a comprehensive, discursive investigation of language, culture, and communication concerning any given society. There exist a multitude of discourse theories and approaches. However, the simplified interpretation of discourse as a coherent formation system of verbal and nonverbal messages on any current topic with a high social significance and within the scope of any essential generic, institutional, or pragmatic requirement (Foucault, 1998; Kuße, 2012; Spitzmüller & Warnke, 2011), underlies this case study.

In accordance with the above definition of discourse, the case study corpus consists of poetry published in Ukraine after 2013 as collections, though in various forms—for example, under the authorship of individual poets like Hryniw (2015), Yavors"ka (2016), or in poetry anthologies such as those edited by Bil"chenko, Kruk & Kalytko (2014), Cherep-Perohanych & Perohanych (2014), Cybul"s"ka (2014), Ulishhenko (2014), or Voronyuk (2014). They may also appear in online poetical portals such as "Bukvojid" (<http://bukvoid.com.ua/>), "Klub poeziyi" (<http://www.poetryclub.com.ua/index.php>), "Poeziya Majdanu ta Revolyuciyi | ATO" (<https://sites.google.com/site/amajdanato/poezia-ato>), "Postril" (<http://postril.org.ua/>), "Ukrayins"kyj portal poeziyi" (<http://www.stihi.in.ua/>), or other public resources with poetical subsections, such as the online portal "Svatovo" (<http://svatovo.ws/>), "Volyns"ki novyny" (<https://www.volynnews.com/messages/poeziya-maydanu/>), and "Zhnyborody - Buchachchyna - Ternopillya" (<http://zhnyborody.te.ua/>). All of these poems are devoted to contemporary circumstances in Ukraine: the Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in Donbass.

The authors reflect the surrounding world and express their ideas and feelings in words. Their clear pro-Ukrainian orientation is a discourse framing idea around which the poetical discourse revolves.

In the analyzed discourse, the poets relay their well-defined attitudes toward the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and thereby reflect Ukrainian identity and its transformation during the war through the collapse of a sense of brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians. The inquiry into this, however, adds a second dimension, namely the social identity approach. Since the middle of the 20th century, social identity studies have developed across several disciplines, thereby building many schools of thought and generating many controversial ideas (Erikson, 1975; Habermas, 1984; Heidegger, 1957; Gilbert, 2010; Ricoeur, 1992 and many others). This case study does not enter into academic polemics; rather, it is primarily guided by linguistic and semantic approaches (Lotman, 1996; Stepanov, 2001). These approaches support the statement that the identity paradigm with its pivotal opposition of “We and They” (also called “the Self and the Others”, or “Svojo-Chuzhoe” predominantly in the post-soviet scientific space [Civ'jan, 2009; Grishaeva & Curikova, 2008]) is the main epistemological tool for creating order of the world and finding one's place therein. Consequently, speech analysis can disclose the speaker's implicit cultural and social attitudes and, in the end, offer a clear idea about his or her identity.

Regarding the subject and socio-political context of the present study, the analysis of the Ukrainian mass poetical discourse since 2013 should show a shift in imagery concerning the enemy along the identity paradigm. This case study hypothesizes that considering the war as fratricidal implies the rapprochement of the Self and the Enemy. This excludes military pathos and activates motives of Christian forgiveness. And, conversely, if the author does not view the war as fratricidal, it removes the Enemy from the Self along the identity paradigm and activates military pathos, patriotic prescriptions, and the justification of military actions.

Analysis

Fratricidal War

If the author considers the enemy to be a fraternal people, the war is explicitly regarded as fratricidal [1, 4, 8]. If the author interprets the war as fratricidal, his or her modality depends on whether his or her pathos is military or anti-military.

Anti-military Pathos

The first case involves the interpretation of the war as fratricidal with anti-military pathos. For instance, Istyn (n.d.), Irxa (n.d.) and Xromov (n.d.) do not formulate any aggressive prescripts in their poems but rather urge readers to remember their heroes [6], glorify both the heroes and Ukraine [2, 3], and lament the tragedy that befell the Ukrainian people [5, 7].

Bozhe, yaki tyazhki nyni vtraty

v usiyeyi Ukrayiny, i v moyeyi mriyi...

[1] *Hynut" u bratovbyvchij vijnis soldaty.*

I zaznayut" porazok moyi poetychni armiyi. (Istyn, n.d.)

[2] *Zapolonyv nam dushi smutok za krashhymy synamy Ukrayiny,*

Yaki povstalyj ne skorylys" – teper lezhat" u domovyni.

I rozryvayut" serce materyns"ki kryky, i bat"ko tyxo ochi vytyraye.

[3] *Vony heroyamy zalyshat"sya naviky, ale zh dlya materi – ditej nemaye!*

Na cvyntari yix tyxo poxovayut." A dityam skazhut", shho bat"ky – heroyi!

I zvisno, shho heroyi ne vmyrayut"! Yix dushi zalyshayut"sya z tobou.

[4] *To buv nerivnyj bij, i xto povynen v c"omu? Navishho brat na brata jshov?*

Hadayu ya – poperedzhav nas Boh i spodivavsyu zupynyty.

Ale nakaz tyraniv nevblahannyx zvesty lyudej v nerivnyj bij.

[5] *Zabrat nash cvit, nashu nadiyu, ditej v bat"kiv, druzhyn i materiv.*

Za Bat"kivshhynu jshly vony! Za Ukrayinu!

Proty bandytiv, zlodiyiv j voryuh.

[6] *To xaj na nebi dushi yix spochynut", a na zemli my ne zabudemo pro nyx!*

I vidrodyt"sya nasha Ukrayina, mista postanut" iz ruyin.

Heroyam slava! Slava prolunaye i dushi uspokoyit" yix navik! (Irxa, n.d.)

I zyma ne zyma

i vijna ne vijna

[7] *Nazbyrala smertej*

yak zerno na zhnyva

Natrusyla nam sliz

mov travnevym doshhem

Dlya vijny ce kapryz

I vona xoche shhe

I vidvazhni don"ky

*i najkrashhi z syniv
Vid'yizhdzhayut" na Sxid
u obijmy vijny
U obijmax zymy
tam de hrim kanonad
[8] Kozhen inshomu voroh
kozhen kozhnomu brat
I vijna ne vijna
zakinchylys" slova
I krayina nima
ta zhyva shhe, zhyva! (Xromov n.d.)*

Religious interpretation

In its closing, the motive of fratricidal war is interpreted through religious motifs, primarily through the images of Cain and Abel, as seen in Yavors"ka's (2016), Tabak's (2016) and Alynah's (2016) poems [9–12]:

*Zaholosyly dzvony u stolyci,
Kryvavylys" troyandy u truni,
Metalo hnivno nebo blyskavyci
[9] Na kayiniv oblychchya kam'yani (Yavors"ka, 2016)*

*[10] Cej svit xyzho dyvyt"sya temnymy ochycyamy, Avelyu,
vidrikayet"sya vid usix istyn pered zhertvoprynoshennyam.
bo tebe usi tvoyi istyny pered svitankom zradily,
i znykaly raptovo dumky, mov by mechem tupym skosheni (...)
Vsluxajsyu u vidzvuk ciyeyi zhyvoyi floyary, shho lyne zhory,
poky vse, shho kolys" zdavalos" rayem letyt" u prirvu.
[11] a u Kayina, Avelyu, ruky v bahryanij krovi, vin nese dary
lisorubam tvoyeyi dushi, poky ty, led" dyxayuchy, virysh.*

*Dyxaj prahlo i hlyboko, mov vdyxayesh materyn sum,
[12] Dyxaj, Avelyu, bo Kayin lysh odyn z yud, shho kryvavo zradyat."
i nebo vid bolyu rozkolet"syia navpil, i bytyme strum tam,
de u najpershij paporoti zaxovana istyna – vlasna pam'yat" . . . (Tabak, 2016)*

Especially in Alynah's (2016) poem, we can see the reflection of the Biblical narrative [13–15]. In my opinion, this example reveals a complete absence of the motive of revenge or defensive countermeasures. Here we can see an actualization of the motive of Christian obedience, and the author even urges humble endurance of the betrayal of the fraternal people. Of course, the phrase, "A ty kolossyam voli vsi polya svoyi zasij!" [16], can be interpreted as an indirect call for rebellion. But in fact, the imagery is not conclusive here. If we regard this phrase not separately but in the context of the entire imagery of the poem, heroic prescripts remain uncoded.

Kayin i Ukrayina

*Ty dyvyshsya – stoyit" vin u vorit,
A ty joho shhe vyjshla zustrichaty.
[13] Ce toj, shho bratom zvavsa stil"ky lit,
Pryjshov tebe bezzhal"no ubyvaty.
A ty jomu vsmixneshsya yak zavzhdy,
Dyvytymeshsya v ochi tak nevynno,
[14] Bo ne chekaesh vіd найближчого біди,
A він тобі устромить ніж у спину.
I po zemli tvoyij tektyme krov,
Stane vona kryvavoyu rikoyu,
[15] Bo ne u hosti, znayesh, brat pryjshov,
A shhob ubyt" tebe braters"koyu rukoyu.
Pryjshov z mechem toj brat koxanyj tvij.
I na zemli tvoyij teper ruyina,
[16] A ty kolossyam voli vsi polya svoyi zasij!
I xaj u luzi zacvite kalyna! (Alynah, 2016)*

Motive of forgiveness

It may be seen, then, that the Christian view on the war and on the enemy neutralizes military pathos, and consistently, the explicit motive of forgiveness appears in the prescriptive modality [17]. The Utrycko's (2014) poem shows this:

*Svyatyj nash Bozhe, shho yesy na Nebi,
U tebe Otche nash, ya xochu zapytaty,
Chomu panuye nenavyst" u sviti?
Chomu vijnoyu brat ide na brata? . . .
Odyn dlya druhoho buduye peklo,
A mozhut" zhyty v myri i dobri,
Yak u Rayu – de brat shanuye brata!
I de ne hynut" lyudy na vijni! . . .
Molyu tya Bozhe sxameny narod u vs"omu sviti!
[17] Zabud"mo nenavyst", xaj zapanuye lysh lyubov!
Nexaj toj brat probachyt" svoho brata,
Xaj budut" razom vony znov!!!! (Utrycko, 2014)*

Raising of the military pathos

The next poem from Bojkivchanka (2015) illustrates the transitional case. On the one hand, the author implies the war to be fratricidal in her statement, "Z narodom brats"kym staly vorohamy" [18]. According to this emotional stance, there is no apparent aggression toward the enemies because the author does not disclaim the brotherhood between Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Even the fact that the brother was first to shoot [19] is not enough to hate the other side. That is why, instead of employing violent heroic pathos and aggressive prescripts, the author expresses her regret: "Nemaye v nas tyx teplyx vzhe obijmv, / J rukostyskannya v nas takozh nema. / Zamist" c"oho zaraz lyuds"ka bijnya, / J bezzhalsne v nas krovoprollytta" [20]. However, on the other hand, the author clearly provides a key argument that completely justifies the military countermeasures—"the brother attacked us first": "I pershym vystrilyt" nash brat u nas, / J u vidpovid" pidemo my do boyu" [19]. This argument underlies the rising military pathos which will be illustrated in the following cases.

*Vijna . . .
Lysh chuty posvyst kul" nad holovamy.
Nas polonyla cya bida,*

[18] *Z narodom brats"kym staly vorohamy.*

Nixto ne vidav shho nastupyt" chas,

Koly my viz"memo u ruky zbroyu.

[19] *I pershym vystrilyt" nash brat u nas,*

J u vidpovid" pidemo my do boyu.

[20] *Nemaye v nas tyx teplyx vzhe obijmiv,*

J rukostyskannya v nas takozh nema.

Zamist" c"oho zaraz lyuds"ka bijnya,

J bezzhalisne v nas krovoprollytya. (Bojkivchanka, 2015)

In Chabala's (2017) poem, the military pathos distinctly increases. Being at war as a Ukrainian soldier, the author realizes that the war is fratricidal [21] and asks himself: "Yak teper u prycil dyvytysya . . . / Na kurok natyskaty yak teper?" [23]. His reflection exemplifies the process of poetry therapy: "Ya vsyu dushu po krapli vychavlyu / Iz braterstvamy tymy slov'yans"kymy" [22]. He is sure that he will not be able to forgive himself if he engages in war: "Xoch sobi i ne zmozhu probachyty" [24], but he understands the need to take countermeasures and maintains: "voroh pryjde – voroh zahyne" [25].

Shho nakoyeno, shho narobleno

Chomu v sviti otak vidbuvayet"sya?

Mozhe kymos" kolys" porobleno

Shho slova ti prorochi zbuwayut"sya?

[21] *Mozhe staty vijna bratovbyvchoyu*

Xoch lyshytysya nehromadyans"koyu

[22] *Ya vsyu dushu po krapli vychavlyu*

Iz braterstvamy tymy slov'yans"kymy . . .

Nu a dolya – zlodijka vrazhaya

Zabavlyayet"sya, yak bozhevil"naya

"Os" take na vahy tobi zvazhyla

Za mozhlyvist" lyshatysya vil"nymy

Yak tobi taka vyra, voyine

Chy hotovyj splatyty ne zolotom
Shhob doviku cina za volyu tu
U dushi viddavalasya xolodom?"
[23] *Yak teper u prycil dyvytysya . . .*
Na kurok natyskaty yak teper? . . .
Shhob tobi, "holub", udavytysya
Nedomirkuvatyj lyucyfer!
Budu dumaty, budu bacyhyt
[24] *Znayu til"ky, napevne, yedyne*
Xoch sobi i ne zmozhu probachyty
[25] *Voroh pryjde – voroh zahyne . . . (Chabala, 2017)*

War with an Enemy

If the author doesn't consider the war as fratricidal, his or her poetry is infused with a violent military and heroic pathos, thereby simultaneously advancing two main arguments: "my enemy is not my brother" and "the enemy attacked us first."

Justifying military actions

If the author does not consider the enemy as a fraternal people, two arguments appear most frequently to justify military countermeasures. The first argument is the precedent-setting claim, "My enemy is not my brother" stated by Dmitruk (2014), and the second argument is, "The enemy attacked us first." In the mass poetical discourse, both arguments are implicated in several metaphorical constructions or spoken out directly, such as in Veresyuk's (2013) exclamation, "Ne ya do tebe! Ty pryjshov, / Na moyu zemlyu i tut hydysh!" [26]:

[26] *Ne ya do tebe! Ty pryjshov,*
Na moyu zemlyu i tut hydysh!
Idy podal"she vid hrixa,
Moye terpinnya ne bezmezhne.
Nexaj svyatyt"sya u vikax
V borni zdobuta nezalezhnist"! (Veresyuk, 2013)

Both arguments can be expressed simultaneously, such as in the poem, "NE brats"ke" by Olivec" (2014). The arguments strengthen one another by building the frame of defensive military pathos. Being confined to the bounds of military pathos (defensive as well as

offensive), the poets often resort to aggressive use of language regarding the enemy and to an elevated heroic style regarding the friendly troops and their own people:

[27] *NE brats"ke*

Zhytta proplyva, yak lajno v opolonci,
My rozbyvayemos" ryboyu v lid,
Zlitayut" u nebo vkrayins"ki xlopci,
Bisom var'yuye pidstupnyj susid.

Shho ne novyna – prychyna depresiyi,

[28] *Shho ne hodyna – kryvavi zhnyva,*
Informacijno-kul"turna dyversiya,
Vperlas" v bezvyxid" sama bulava.

Xochet"sya vyty slipym vovkulakoyu,
Krykom krychaty, shho Putin – murlo,
Spytyj narod joho z holoyu srakoyu

[29] *Zmushuye jty nas u spil"ne zhytlo!*
Kazhut" buvali: "V sim'yi ne bez vyrodka",
"Lysycya sobaci – ridna sestra",

[30] *Ta z moskalyamy my z riznoho vyvodka,*
Riznyx ditej vydayem na-hora.

Rizna mental"nist", kul"tura i zvychayi,
Ce i dytyni – konstanta z konstant,
Marno na stinu deret"sya u vidchayi
Yixnya dvoxhlava istota-mutant!

[31] *My ne zdamos" na potalu nikchemnosti,*
Bihtymut" vatnyky zvidsy v tajhu

Cherez torzhestvenne svyato vzayemnosti –

[32] *Nashu nezmohu lyshatys" v borhu!*
Zhest nash yaskravyj do demonstratyvnosti

[33] *Dast"sya vznaky samozvanym bratam,*

Yak prysyahatymet "sya v lehitymnosti

Yixnij hospodar u misti Pxen"yan.

[34] *Bil"sh ne probachymo hostej neproxanyx,*

Darom ne viz"memo yixnye pal"ne,

[35] *Rodychiv nashyx samoproholoshenyx*

Rado poshlemo na misce odne!

Zhytta prolitatyme ANom-140,

Dribno z borta vyhlyadatyme svit,

Najneprymyrennishyj nynishnij voroh

U pidlabuznyky perebizhyt"! (Olivec, 2014)

In this poem, the author speaks explicitly about the difference between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and their mentality, culture, and customs [30]. He denies any brotherhood between them, and through expressions such as “self-proclaimed brothers” [33], “uninvited guests” [34], and “our self-appointed relatives” [35], Olivec exposes the mythological idea of brotherhood created by Russian propaganda. The author rejects the forced Russian appeal to live in one united family [29], proclaims anti-Russian resistance [31, 34] and exhorts Ukrainians to respond decisively [34, 35]. In this poem, the author turns to both arguments justifying the military countermeasures. The first, “My enemy is not my brother,” is initially implicated in the poem’s title “NE brats”ke” [27]. This argument is accompanied and strengthened by the next, “The enemy attacked us first,” conveyed within the statement, “nezmoha lyshatys” v borhu” [32]. Thus Ukrainians are completely exonerated from the responsibility for the “bloodstained harvest” [28] happening in Ukraine.

Patriotic prescriptions

Further, in the poetry with military pathos, the construction of convincing argumentation and direct prescriptions fulfill the persuasive function. The next two poems written by Hryniw (2015) illustrate three of the most frequent prescriptions, including a call to arms against the enemy [36], and a call to love one’s own country [37] and hate the enemy [38]:

[36] *Stan"mo, brattyia, vsi na herc"*

Z ordamy vorozhymy.

Ukrayina – abo smert"! –

Razom peremozhemo (Hryniw, 2015, p. 12)

[37] *Lyuby Ukrayinu, vona u boyax*

Spynyaye moskovs"ku navalu

I hrudy yiysi u donec"kyx stepax –

Ce – mic" yevropejs"koho valu.

[38] *Nenavyd" Moskvu yak ostannyu ordu*

Bez chesti, bez viry, bez Boha.

My volyu u bytvax kuyemo tverdu,

Nam – insha v majbutnye doroha!

Vstaye Ukrayina – rodyna odna!

Zdyvovana sonna Yevropa.

Moskalyu, tvoya virolomna vijna

Zdyxaye u nashyx okopax! (Hrynniv, 2015, p. 13)

Discussion of results

As the present case study shows, Russian-Ukrainian relations followed by the war have been the most strained and explosive topics in Ukrainian mass poetical discourse since 2013. These circumstances reverberate through the poetry and elicit military and heroic pathos.

This analysis shows the mutual interdependence between authors' attitudes to the war and the intensity of their poetic pathos and prescriptive modality. If an author considers the war fratricidal, it is very difficult to identify the antagonists as enemies in his or her work. Within the identity paradigm, those antagonists stay close to the Self, and it seems to be quite difficult to be at war with him or her. In such cases, the author's reflections are imbued with anti-military pathos and Christian motives of forgiveness as a supreme manifestation of peace. Contrary to this view, if the author perceives no sense of brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians (and thinks that they probably never have been brothers), he or she considers the enemies to be aliens who remain firmly on the opposite pole of the identity paradigm. In such cases, military pathos rises steeply, and the author expresses central patriotic prescriptions (to love one's country, and to hate and fight against the enemy), and also uses hate speech against the enemy. This analysis of mass poetry discourse reveals a wide transition space between these two diametrically opposed points of view. Within this space, the authors use arguments justifying military countermeasures. The most frequent are the discourse-framing and precedent-setting argument, "The enemy is not my brother," and the rational argument, "The enemy attacked us first."




Figure 1: Shift of the enemy image along the identity paradigm

Mass poetry discourse is neither a source for statistical sociological research nor a single space in which to examine the transformation of public opinion. However, taken together with other public discourses, it effectively demonstrates and illustrates social trends and shifts. Public opinion polls carried out by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, named after Alexander Razumkov (i.e., the Razumkov Centre), verify the successive collapse of the idea of brotherhood between Ukrainian and Russian people. Thus, in 2014, 62 per cent of Ukrainian citizens were of the mind that Ukrainians and Russians are brothers. In 2016, this number had shrunk to 51 per cent (Yakymenko, 2017). It is very important not only to know the statistical results but also to hear the real voices of respondents. Public discourse studies provide this opportunity and should be continued through diverse interdisciplinary approaches.

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