

JOURNAL
OF
SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET
POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Vol. 7, No. 2 (2021)

Special Sections

**Issues in the History and Memory
of the OUN V**

**A Debate on “Ustashism,”
Generic Fascism, and the OUN II**

JSPPS 7:2 (2021)

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Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Cover picture: A Parade of the "Ukrainian Army". © copyright 2021 by Omer Bartov

Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society Vol. 7, No. 2 (2021)

Stuttgart: *ibidem*-Verlag / *ibidem* Press

Erscheinungsweise: halbjährlich / Frequency: biannual

ISSN 2364-5334

Ordering Information:

PRINT: Subscription (two copies per year): € 58.00 / year (+ S&H: € 6.00 / year within Germany, € 10.00 / year international). The subscription can be canceled at any time.

Single copy or back issue: € 34.00 / copy (+ S&H: € 3.00 within Germany, € 4.50 international).

E-BOOK: Individual copy or back issue: € 19.99 / copy. Available via [amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com) or [google.books](https://www.google.com/books).

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Ukrainian Nationalism, Ustashism, and Fascism: The Subject-Matter and Context of the Discussion

Serhiy Kvit

What Is the Debate About?

In an attempt to avoid the mechanical identification with fascism of nationalist movements in stateless nations—primarily Ukrainians, Croats, and Slovaks, who did not create their own states in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires—Oleksandr Zaitsev has proposed a new term, “ustashism” (after the “Ustaša”—the Croatian Revolutionary Organization, UHRO). Zaitsev specifically states that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was not a fascist organization by nature. Rather, he contends that the OUN belongs to a category of political movements and corresponding ideologies that may be characterized as “revolutionary integral nationalism developing under conditions of perceived foreign oppression, and using violence for the purpose of national liberation and the creation of an independent authoritarian state.”¹

The concept of “integral nationalism” dates back to the monarchical political organization *Action française*, founded by Charles Maurras in 1899. Incidentally, this was the same year that Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi authored *Independent Ukraine*, initially delivered as a public speech in Poltava and Kharkiv, and then published as a brochure in L’viv in 1900.² Maurras and Mikhnovs’kyi

¹ Oleksandr Zaitsev, “Fascism or Ustashism? Ukrainian Integral Nationalism in Comparative Perspective, 1920s–1930s,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48, nos. 2–3 (2015): 183–93, 184.

² Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, *Samostiina Ukraina* (Vyd. Kosevycha, 1900).

put forward strikingly similar slogans—“France for the French,” and “Ukraine for Ukrainians,” respectively. While these slogans appeared more or less simultaneously, they emerged independently of one another, and there is no evidence of any contact between Maurras and Mikhnovs’kyi.

Oleksandr Zaitsev notes that later the concept of “integral nationalism” was adapted and explored further by Carlton Hayes, Peter Alter, and John Armstrong in order to typologize radical nationalist movements, especially so as to distinguish between nations with or without their own states. This was a continuation of a great debate in which Anthony Smith, in particular, considered Nazism and fascism as alternatives to the tradition of European nationalism based on the idea of unique and plural free nations. Indeed, it was Smith who was the first to recognize French integral nationalism as the link between nationalism and fascism.³ For its part, Zaitsev’s concept of “ustashism” is intended to establish a distance between the political organizations and ideologies associated with stateless nations, on the one hand, and such phenomena as (Italian) Fascism, (German) Nazism, or (Spanish) Falangism, on the other. The latter all emerged in the context of established states, and are generalized under the term “generic fascism” in the research literature.

Tomislav Dulić and Goran Miljan have criticized Oleksandr Zaitsev’s approach on the grounds that “by the late 1930s *ustaštvo* was basically another iteration of fascism that contained the usual specificities to suit a local historical, political, and cultural context.”⁴ These authors also deny the existence of fundamental differences between nationalist organizations and their ideologies in nations with or without states, and, most interestingly, they refer to subject identity (effectively equating this with state independence) within the USSR, as if such identity was related to the Ukrainian nationalist

³ Oleksandr Zaitsev, “Integral’nyi natsionalizm’ iak teoretychna model’ dlia doslidzhennia ukraïns’koho natsionalistychnoho rukhu,” *Ukrains’kyi Vyzvol’nyi Rukh* 15 (2011): 5–25.

⁴ Tomislav Dulić and Goran Miljan, “The Ustašas and Fascism: ‘Abolitionism,’ Revolution, and Ideology, 1929–42,” *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 6, no. 1 (2020): 277–305, here 305.

movement. Specifically, they point to the fact that “the status of Ukraine as one of the founding republics of the Soviet Union that nominally retained a large part of its sovereignty and the right of secession,”⁵ as though this fact somehow meant that the Ukrainian nationalist movement could rightfully be designated as fascist. Contextually, such statements are ridiculous and absurd.

It is important to note that Oleksandr Zaitsev does not insist on his term: “[...] (if anyone can suggest a better one, I am ready to accept it), but I insist that ultra-nationalist (integral nationalist) movements in stateless nations are typologically different from ultra-nationalist, in particular fascist, movements in nation-states and, therefore, they should be considered a separate genus of ideological movements.”⁶ In this essay, I discuss not the specific term itself, but the underlying concept, which I view as rational and useful for comparative study of nationalist movements in interwar Europe.

The Deeper Subject of the Discussion

As we can see, the discussion is complex because of the ambiguity inherent to any typology of nationalist movements. The specific national phenomena and the circumstances in which the movements developed resulted in distinctive functional features. For example, it is extremely problematic to apply the definition “integral nationalism” in the Ukrainian context precisely because it originates from *Action française* and is hence associated with the latter’s characteristics.

If one examines the ideological legacy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and specifically, the writings of Dmytro Dontsov, it immediately becomes obvious that the Ukrainian nationalist movement never emphasized ethnic exclusiveness—in any of its “active,” “volitional,” or “organized” embodiments. Indeed, we can even find the opposite in Dontsov’s

⁵ Dulić and Miljan, “The Ustašas and Fascism,” 281.

⁶ Oleksandr Zaitsev, “On Ustashism and Fascism: A Response to Critics,” *Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society* 6, no. 1 (2020): 125.

works: his alternative slogan “Ukrainians for Ukraine”⁷ is closer to a call for responsible leadership in the struggle to create one’s own state than to any claim to ethnic exclusivity.

At first reading it might seem that the slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians” (authored by Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi), was quite in line with the principles of *Action française*. But deeper analysis of the Ukrainian context calls this claim into question. After all, the draft Ukrainian Constitution, published in September 1905 in the only issue of the Ukrainian People’s Party newspaper under the title “Independent Ukraine,” for a state which, unlike France, did not exist on the global map at that time, guaranteed all rights to national minorities.⁸ Therefore, we should interpret Mikhnovs’kyi’s slogan after 1899 as a call to fight against the occupiers—a call to (re)establish an independent Ukrainian state and realize the nation’s right to self-determination. As a lawyer, Mikhnovs’kyi paid much attention to the legal justification of the Ukrainians’ right to state independence, in particular, through revision of the 1654 Pereyaslav Agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

The French context of monarchical nationalism was quite different at the time. *Action française* developed in the context of a strong state, and so this movement was linked to colonial traditions of global empire. It called for domination of weaker social elements that did not fit its concept of national exclusiveness and narcissism.

The idea of national “integrity” that is central to the Ukrainian liberation movement places national priorities over all else. This idea is rooted in a romantic perception of the nation, initiated by Taras Shevchenko in his poem “To my fellow-countrymen, in Ukraine and not in Ukraine, living, dead and as yet unborn, my friendly epistle” written on 14 December 1845. There we can see a nation as a community existing outside of time and space.

7 Dmytro Dontsov, “Na dva fronty,” *Zahrava* 9 (1923).

8 Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, “Osnovnyi Zakon ‘Samostiinoii Ukrainy’ Spilky narodu Ukrain’s’koho,” *Samostiina Ukraina* 1 (1905). Article 117 stated: “Foreigners who settled in Ukraine 10 years before the proclamation and enactment of this principal law shall be considered as those who have lived continuously and along with natural Ukrainians (...).”

Taras Shevchenko's vision was influential in shaping the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism. In particular, the OUN adopted another of Shevchenko's formulations in viewing the Russian Empire/Soviet Union as a "prisonhouse of nations" that must be destroyed by all means. Starting from 1940, the Ukrainian nationalist movement officially used the slogan: "Freedom to the peoples! Freedom to the individual!" Such a goal would be unthinkable for fascist movements with their deeply rooted étatism.

National "integrity" was also supported by Ivan Franko, a prominent Ukrainian intellectual, in a media discussion spawned by the publication of Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi's *Independent Ukraine*. In his essay "Beyond the Limits of the Possible" (1900), Franko takes the side of Mikhnovs'kyi, reflecting on the "ideal of political independence" and the "ideal of national independence."⁹ He does not express any reservation with respect to the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians" because he also perceived it in a national liberation sense, and not through an ethnocentric or xenophobic lens.

So, Who Was Really Who?

When considering the characteristic features of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, one should question the widespread thesis that attributes an authoritarian nature to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The OUN was authoritarian in the sense that it was a military organization. Its purpose was not only armed struggle for Ukrainian state independence, but also preparation for World War II, along with other European states and nationalist movements in stateless nations.

The authoritarianism of interwar Ukrainian nationalism did not signify an intention to accomplish any particularly authoritarian/totalitarian project once independent Ukraine had been achieved. Commentary published by Ukrainian nationalists during the interwar period should not be quoted out of context;

⁹ Ivan Franko, *Poza mezhamy mozhlyvoho: Zibrannia tvoriv u 50 tomakh*, vol. 45 (Naukova Dumka, 1976-86), 279, 280, 285.

doing so does not serve to advance our understanding of the movement.

Likewise, statements about Dmytro Dontsov's "fascination with fascism" are actually quite dubious. Dontsov also "admired" Bolshevism, the Zaporizhian Cossacks, the Crusaders, and the figure of Mohammed—as he did any examples that could "technically" represent "cases of success" to inspire the Ukrainian liberation movement. Similarly, some Western politicians, intellectuals, and businessmen of the interwar period also once "admired" the anti-communist actions of Benito Mussolini and other authoritarian leaders.

Even in Soviet Ukraine, during the Russian Bolshevik occupation, when intellectual discussions used rhetoric like "Away from Moscow!," the writer Mykola Khvyly'ovyi, who coined this phrase, wrote in 1926 that "the hot temper that spawns fascism cannot but invoke sympathy."¹⁰ Such a statement would have been treated in a very different way after the Nuremberg trials, but during the interwar period, its contextual meaning was quite different.

At that time, Dmytro Dontsov expressed his sympathy for the political system of Great Britain. In 1933, in a letter to the writer Yurii Klen, he said "I consider England the best creation of modern civilization."¹¹ Likewise, in 1929, he expressed his admiration for the United States of America.¹² In no way do these facts signify his adherence to the ideals of contemporary liberal democracy. If an understanding of the true ideologies and opinions of the time is our goal, we may not ignore the interwar geopolitical context: On the eve of World War II, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was focused not on the political system of a future Ukraine, but on the struggle for its independence.

¹⁰ Serhiy Kvit, "The Ukrainian Liberation Movement in the Interwar Period (1923–1939)," in *Konferentsiia Dmytra Shtohryna: Zbirnyk materialiv*, ed. S.M. Kvit (Vydavnychiy dim "Kyievo-Mohylins'ka akademiia," 2020), 169.

¹¹ R. Rakhmannyi, "Dmytro Dontsov i Iurii Klen: 1933–1939," in *Ukraina atomnoho viku: eseii ta statti, 1945–1986* (Homin Ukrainy, 1988), 21.

¹² Dmytro Dontsov, "Dukh amerykanizmu," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk* 4 (1929).

One should remember here that the OUN gave rise to three attempts to declare an independent Ukrainian state and create Ukrainian governments. These were Carpathian Ukraine (1939), the Ukrainian State (1941), and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (1944). The latter was a prototype of a Ukrainian government designed to provide political leadership during the armed struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Each of these is important for understanding the OUN's intentions regarding the future political system of independent Ukraine. All three governments were established with elements of a coalition structure—not an authoritarian single-party state.

It should be noted that only the government headed by Avgustyn Voloshyn was actually established in Carpathian Ukraine just before World War II, and it was created as a coalition. After the war started, legal Ukrainian political parties ceased to exist. However, whenever possible, well-known public opinion leaders, experts, scholars, and individuals with different political views were involved in the Ukrainian State Council under Yaroslav Stets'ko, as Prime Minister.

Finally, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was symbolically headed by Kyrilo Osmak, a former member of the Central Council of Ukraine (1917–18), which emphasized the continuity of Ukrainian statehood since the Ukrainian People's Republic period. That is, all three precedents for creating national governments were attempts at making the latter attractive to society as a whole. Each professed a sharing of political responsibility with leaders who had different political views, but who stood on the platform of an independent Ukraine.

Coming back to the comparative features of the Ukrainian and Croatian nationalist movements, it should be noted that they had much in common. Oleh Bahan points out that “the Croatian topic arose in 1913 for the first time in the discourse of the emerging Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 20th century, at the 2nd Student Congress in L'viv in the famous speech of Dmytro Dontsov

(1883–1973) titled “The Current State of the Nation and Our Tasks’.”¹³ Bahan writes about political and institutional cooperation, exchange of ideas, and artistic contacts taking place in the context of the very similar historical task facing Ukrainians and Croats: to create their own independent state. The OUN member Bohdan Kravtsiv played a special role in the development of Ukrainian–Croatian dialogue.

The idea of typological similarity between the OUN and the Ustašas is thus fruitful. However, according to Bahan, it is important to remember how the two political traditions differ. Unlike the Ukrainians, the Croats for a long time had had state autonomy, and their own idea of monarchy, and they had been more deeply immersed in the Western European cultural and political context. At the same time, Ivan Patryliak reminds us that

firstly, until 1941 the Ustašas were mostly an émigré organization, which had little influence in Croatia after the 1932 Lika uprising and which, unlike the OUN, could not boast of an extensive underground network at home. So, the Ustašas really “received” their statehood from the Nazis and fascists whose recipes they followed for nation-building. Secondly, in 1941, OUN members (specifically, the Bandera organization) strongly rejected the Slovak or Croatian type of ersatz statehood (and informed Berlin of this in a special memorandum on 23 June 1941).¹⁴

That memorandum was prepared by Ukrainian nationalists on 15 June 1941 and handed over to the Reich Chancellery on 23 June 1941. The text contained ruthless criticism, edification, and even threats towards the Third Reich, as well as demands for complete state independence and the creation of a full-scale Ukrainian army. The document strictly rejected the Croatian and Slovak “models”:

¹³ Oleh Bahan, “Khorvatska tema v ukrains’kii natsionalistychnii presi 1930–1940-kh rokiv,” in *Ukraina i Horvatiia: Istorychni paraleli. Materialy Druhoii mizhnarodnoi ukrainsko-khorvatskoi naukovoi konferentsii* (Boikivske etnolohichne tovarystvo, Kafedra ukrains’koi movy ta literatury Sveučilište u Zagrebu, 2019), 366; and Dmytro Dontsov, *Suchasne polozhennia natsii i nashi zavdannia* (Vydavnytstvo Ukrains’koho students’koho soiuza “Moloda Ukraina,” 1913).

¹⁴ Ivan Patryliak, “Vidhuk ofitsiinoho oponenta na dysertatsiiu Oleksandra Zaitseva ‘Ukrains’kyi intehral’nyi natsionalizm (1920–1930-ti roky): heneza, evoliutsiia, porivnial’nyi analiz,’” Kyiv, 2014.

It must be stated that there is no analogy for resolving the Ukrainian issue. Since 1938, two new states have emerged in Europe: Slovakia and Croatia. Without taking into account the difference in area and population of the countries, the Ukrainian problem is far more outstanding [...] This cannot be the final resolution of the problem on which further German-Ukrainian relations depend, and cannot be the methods to be used from the very beginning. [...] The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which has for many years been leading the vibrant part of the Ukrainian people in its revolutionary struggle for Ukraine's state independence, and educating the entire Ukrainian people for this duty, is ready to lead this struggle to achieve its national ideal.¹⁵

After the proclamation of the Ukrainian State in L'viv on 30 June 1941, as part of the so-called “policy of fulfilled facts” pursued by the OUN, the German occupation authorities imprisoned many members of the leadership and started large-scale repressions against the nationalist movement. In response, the OUN, keeping to the promises stated in the abovesited memorandum, launched an insurgent movement and created the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Those events are highlighted by the historian Volodymyr Kosyk, whose research is based on sources in German archives.¹⁶

More about the Context

After World War I had come to an end, Ukrainian society was left with two possible choices: either to accept defeat and abandon any intentions to create an independent state or to continue the armed struggle. All the major players in the European arena had denied Ukrainians the right to their own state. The refurbished Russian Empire—the Soviet Union—organized the Holodomor in 1932–33 on the territory of the quasi-state called the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, threatening the physical existence of the Ukrainian

¹⁵ Ivan Patryliak, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba OUN ta UPA (1939–1960 rr.)* (Vyd. ADEF-Ukraina, 2019), 117.

¹⁶ Wolodymyr Kosyk, *L'Allemagne national-socialiste et l'Ukraine* (Publ. de l'Est Européen, 1986); and *Ukraina u Druhii svitovii viini: Zbirnyk nimets'kykh arkhivnykh materialiv (1944–1945) u 4 tomakh*, edited by Volodymyr Kosyk (L'vivskyi natsional'nyi universytet im. Ivana Franka; Instytut ukrains'koi arkheohrafiï ta dzhereloznavstva im. M. Hrushevs'koho NAN Ukrainy, 2000).

nation. The Entente collaborated with the newly created states, which also pursued a policy of denationalization of the Ukrainian population in their territories (first of all, Poland, Romania, and Hungary). Altogether, those countries viewed the “Ukrainian question” from the position of “no state—no problem.” Only Czechoslovakia headed by Tomáš Masaryk was an exception.

Therefore, the Ukrainian nationalist movement did not have much choice but to cooperate with Italy, Lithuania, Finland, and Germany (with the *Abwehr*), on a joint anti-communist platform. For these same reasons, the Entente countries also engaged in similar cooperation. That period in history saw a sort of “fashion for authoritarianism,” a massive preparation for World War II. For the OUN, it also put forward the task of national mobilization in the face of deadly danger for Ukrainians, who had neither their own army nor state.

It does not make sense to assess the European national liberation movements of the interwar period, in particular the Ukrainian movement, through the rhetoric of the 1945–46 Nuremberg process. Doing so would mean eliding important aspects of the interwar context, such as the fact that the Allies denied military support to Finland against Soviet invasion. They turned Carl Gustaf Mannerheim into an ally of Hitler’s Germany. Likewise, it would mean ignoring the fact that Stalin had begun the war as a natural ally of Hitler. Later, he situationally continued the war within the anti-Hitler coalition, and it was this that allowed him to avoid international condemnation for crimes against humanity.

Norman Naimark points out that almost all the members of the Soviet delegation to the Nuremberg trials had been involved in the mass repressions within the USSR and therefore deserved to be put on trial alongside the Nazi criminals:

After having demonstrated his worth as a vicious and unrelenting attack dog of Stalin’s during the Moscow trials, where he abused the defendants and shouted down their attempts to clear themselves of impossible charges, Vyshinskyi was deputy foreign minister in 1946 during the Nuremberg trials and head of a secret special commission on Nuremberg that reported directly to Molotov and Stalin. The main job of the commission [...] was to make sure that there was no public discussion of Nazi-Soviet relations (not

to mention cooperation!) during the period of the pact, 1939–41. The Soviet government was especially concerned that the secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact were not mentioned at all.¹⁷

Finally, according to Norman Davies, the discursive problem that plagues the Ukrainian nationalists is rooted in the fact that they fought not only against Hitler but also against Stalin.¹⁸ Many in the West continue to regard the latter not as a necessary evil in the fight against another evil, but as a “great ally” of the West in the Second World War.

Conclusion

When it comes to the OUN, discussions concerning typologies of European interwar nationalist movements in the 20th century are rooted in the “presumption of guilt.” According to some, given the OUN’s alleged pro-fascist orientation, it was only by mere accident that it did not materialize into a quasi-state, following the path taken by Croatia and Slovakia. Such a view comes from an observation made by Alexander Motyl, which should be considered in a broader context: “Paradoxically, repression proved to be the best thing that could have happened to the OUN, saving it from the collaborationist fate of the Croatian Ustasha or the Slovak People’s Party.”¹⁹

A collaborationist quasi-state of this kind did not materialize in Ukraine since it was fundamentally impossible. On the one hand, Hitler unleashed World War II, intending to expand the “living space” for the Germans into the East: *Lebensraum im Osten*. First of all, this applied to Ukraine. The Ukrainian territory had been devised for the Third Reich, not for Ukrainians.

On the other hand, the facts prove that the OUN was never going to agree to Hitler’s projects. The OUN was fighting the war on all fronts, against literally everyone who opposed Ukrainian

¹⁷ Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin’s Genocides* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 18.

¹⁸ Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford University Press, 1996), 1032.

¹⁹ Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism* (Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 95.

independence—first of all, against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (a new iteration of the Russian Empire). It is this anti-imperial focus that makes the ideological heritage of the Ukrainian liberation movement so relevant today.

This is, in particular, relevant when trying to better understand Putin's Russia, which has set the "Great Patriotic War" narrative as the main ideological basis for the world's largest "fake news factory," an integral part of the global post-truth phenomenon.²⁰ What is the "Great Patriotic War"? In fact, it is almost the same as World War II—only without its beginning (1939–41), when the Soviet Union collaborated with Nazi Germany. Today, the unpunished crimes of the "communist paradise" have sprouted into the generic fascism of Putin's Russia.

Finally, I would like to mention two publications that are conceptually important for the discussion on the typology of nationalism and fascism. The first is Alexander Motyl's 2010 article "Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera," in which he offers extremely valuable thoughts about the nature of both phenomena:

There is no reason that nationalism must have fascist components. The striving for national liberation is perfectly compatible with every philosophy, political ideology, culture, and economic theory. Unsurprisingly, nationalist ideologies and movements have spanned the political spectrum, being found among democrats, liberals, authoritarians, militarists, fascists, Communists, Catholics, Islamists, Jews, and capitalists. Interwar nationalist movements tended to be influenced by the prevailing fascist ethos, just as post-World War II national liberation struggles tended to be influenced by the prevailing Communist ethos—which is simply to say that nationalism is malleable and can adapt itself to a variety of political ideologies, even, as in the nineteenth century, to liberalism. Fascism, meanwhile, presupposes an independent nation state and proposes to reorganize it along specifically fascist lines. In that sense, fascism is not about national liberation per se; instead, it assumes that national liberation and the attainment of a nation state have already taken place. Logically, this means that nation-statehood is a necessary condition of fascism: that is, fascist ideologies, movements, and systems of

²⁰ Serhiy Kvit, "A Perspective on 'Fake News'," *Kyiv Post*, 8 May 2021.

rule can exist if and only if an independent nation state is already in existence.²¹

The second publication is the book by Myroslav Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, which presents a broad picture of the political and intellectual history of the Ukrainian nationalist movement and its values: “This generation, whatever its political colors, exhibited a remarkable enthusiasm for, and faith in, political struggle. It refused to reconcile to the existing political situation and continued to dream of an independent state, even when the odds against such a state emerging seemed overwhelming.”²² One should also not forget about the later influence of the OUN on the development of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union: “The imprisoned dissident (Mykhailo Horyn), like other Ukrainian and Jewish prisoners, of conscience who at this time found themselves in the camps, came to admire the steadfastness of these old prisoners, their discipline, solidarity, and commitment to national rights.”²³

When studying the Ukrainian liberation movement in the 20th century one must discard the habitual accusatory mythology that has been created by the opponents of Ukrainian independence. Shkandrij argues that “neither pursuit of ethnic purity, nor racism, nor acceptance of Nazi doctrine were central to the OUN’s ideology, nor were they officially endorsed.”²⁴ (Methodologically, his book is related to Aleksander Motyl’s principles.) Our main conclusion is the following: along with independence, Ukraine has attained its right to the history of the struggle for this independence. Over time, the work of professional researchers and media representation of the history of the Ukrainian liberation movement will become increasingly responsible.

²¹ Alexander Motyl, “Ukraine, Europe, and Bandera,” *Cicero Foundation Great Debate Papers* 10/05 (March 2010), 3–4.

²² Myroslav Shkandrij, *Ukrainian Nationalism: Politics, Ideology, and Literature, 1929–1956* (Yale University Press, 2015), 12.

²³ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 268.